Surber v. Rockingham Cty. B.O.E.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedDecember 1, 2004
DocketI.C. NO. 310814
StatusPublished

This text of Surber v. Rockingham Cty. B.O.E. (Surber v. Rockingham Cty. B.O.E.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Surber v. Rockingham Cty. B.O.E., (N.C. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

***********
Upon review of the competent evidence of record with reference to the errors assigned, and finding no good grounds to receive further evidence except on attorney's fees or to rehear the parties or their representatives, the Full Commission upon review of the evidence affirms with modifications the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner.

***********
The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing before the deputy commissioner as:

STIPULATIONS
1. At the time of Plaintiff's injury by accident, on April 4, 2000, the parties were subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Defendant-Employer employed three or more employees, and the employer-employee relationship existed between Defendant-Employer and Plaintiff.

2. Defendant-Employer was a duly qualified self-insured employer under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act at all times material to this claim. Key Risk Management Services is the administrator for Defendant-Employer's self-insured workers' compensation program.

3. Since the issue that predominates in this case is whether Plaintiff's claim is closed due to the statute of limitations, Defendant-Employer has agreed that in the event that the deputy commissioner finds for Plaintiff and finds that her case is open, it will pay for the medical study recommended by her treating physician for further diagnosis of her right knee injury.

4. Plaintiff's average weekly wage at the time of the injury was $894.17, which yields a weekly compensation rate of $596.11.

5. The stipulations contained in the parties' Pre-Hearing Agreement dated 16 October 2003 and Supplemental Stipulations dated 26 November 2003 are incorporated as though fully restated herein and the exhibits admitted into evidence by the stipulations in the Pre-Hearing Agreement and Supplemental Stipulations are incorporated into this record.

6. The Supplemental Stipulations dated 26 November 2003 state that Plaintiff's average weekly wage and compensation rate may be subject to further verification.

***********
Based upon all the competent evidence in the record, the Full Commission makes the following additional:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. At the time of the hearing before the deputy commissioner, Plaintiff was 51 years old and had been employed by Defendant-Employer as a health and physical education teacher at its Morehead High School for a number of years. Plaintiff had previously been a track and cross-country coach.

2. On 4 April 2000, Plaintiff twisted and fell, injuring her right knee while breaking up a fight at Morehead High School. Prior to her injury, Plaintiff was physically active and regularly jogged 25 to 30 miles per week. She had not had any previous problem with her right knee.

3. Following Plaintiff's injury, the secretary at Morehead High School gave her the front side of the Industrial Commission Form 19 to complete and a second form asking for a description of the circumstances of her injury. Plaintiff was not provided with the back of the Industrial Commission Form 19 containing the notice that a claim is required to be filed by the employee with the Industrial Commission within two years of the date of injury.

4. Plaintiff came under the care of Dr. Stephen Lucey, an orthopedic surgeon, for treatment of the recurrent swelling and pain from her injury. On 13 September 2000, Dr. Lucey performed an arthroscopy and partial medial meniscectomy on Plaintiff's right knee. Plaintiff was out of work following her surgery for three days and thereafter returned to work on crutches.

5. On 14 November 2000, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Lucey that she was doing well. Her motion was good and she had no tenderness. Plaintiff was to follow up with Dr. Lucey as needed. After the 14 November 2000 visit, Plaintiff had occasional swelling in her right knee after she increased her running. Defendant assigned Amy Secher, a medical rehabilitation case manager, to assist Plaintiff with her medical rehabilitation. Ms. Secher sent Plaintiff a letter advising of her assignment on 20 November 2000.

6. The North Carolina School Board Association was the third party administrator for Defendant-Employer's workers' compensation program before 1 January 2001. Beginning 1 January 2001, Key Risk Management Services, Inc. began administering Defendant-Employer's claims.

7. In 2002, Plaintiff noticed a clicking and increased swelling in her right knee. She contacted Defendant's third-party administrator to have Dr. Lucey examine her knee. Defendant's third-party administrator told Plaintiff that the statute of limitations had expired on her workers' compensation claim for her knee.

8. Plaintiff retained counsel and filed a Form 18 notice of accident with the Industrial Commission on 26 November 2002 requesting compensation for her 4 April 2000 injury to her right knee. The Form 18 was the first document filed by either party with the Industrial Commission in Plaintiff's claim.

9. On 27 November 2002, Plaintiff's attorney wrote to Defendant's third-party administrator noting that he had timely filed the Industrial Commission Form 18 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24 because it was filed within two years of the last payment of medical compensation in a case in which no other compensation had been paid.

10. On 4 December 2002, Plaintiff's attorney again wrote to Defendant's administrator, referencing the "April 4, 2000 right knee injury." Plaintiff's attorney stated, "Laura needs to return to a physician for evaluation of the right knee. I would appreciate your getting back to me in the next few days to authorize a return visit to the treating orthopedic surgeon, Stephen Lucey." On 18 December 2002, Defendant's administrator wrote Plaintiff's attorney, with a copy to Dr. Lucey's office, that "(a)n appointment has been made for your client to be examined, evaluated, and treated, if necessary" by Dr. Lucey's practice. The date of the appointment was 31 December 2002.

11. On 31 December 2002, 21 February 2003, 11 April 2003 and 29 May 2003, Plaintiff was seen and treated for her right knee by Dr. Lucey. Plaintiff also was seen at TheraSport in Eden, North Carolina for physical therapy prescribed by Dr. Lucey. Defendant paid medical expenses to Dr. Lucey and Eden Sport. Defendant's claims representative testified that she reviewed the medical records before paying medical expenses.

12. On Plaintiff's last visit to Dr. Lucey on 29 May 2003, Dr. Lucey recommended an MR arthrogram to further evaluate the condition in Plaintiff's right knee. He noted that if the MR arthrogram "shows anything obvious, we may consider an arthroscopy."

13. Following Plaintiff's visit to Dr. Lucey for the right knee on 29 May 2003, Defendant's claims representative notified Dr. Lucey's office on 10 June 2003 that Defendant would not authorize treatment for Plaintiff's right knee. Defendant's claims representative, S. Renee Brock, also wrote to Plaintiff's attorney on 25 June 2003, stating:

I have been trying to decipher what exactly your client is still trying to get medical treatment for. Her injury dated April 4, 2000 to the right knee has been closed and the statute of limitations had run December 28, 2002 for this claim. To my knowledge you requested she be treated for her left side injury which occurred on September 18, 2002, but to my surprise she was really getting medical treatment for her right knee.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hodges v. Equity Group
596 S.E.2d 31 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2004)
Apple v. Guilford County
361 S.E.2d 588 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1987)
Chisholm v. Diamond Condominium Construction
348 S.E.2d 596 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Surber v. Rockingham Cty. B.O.E., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/surber-v-rockingham-cty-boe-ncworkcompcom-2004.