Suprina v. Goodman

Opinion

Suprina v Goodman

2026 NY Slip Op 05053

August 19, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Scott Suprina, appellant,

v

Fredric Goodman, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 19, 2026

2025-01260, (Index No. 607797/24)

Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.

William G. Ford

Carl J. Landicino

Susan Quirk, JJ.

Farrell Fritz, P.C., Uniondale, NY (Franklin C. McRoberts, James R. Maguire, and Giuseppe Chiara of counsel), for appellant.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, New York, NY (Jamie R. Wozman, Nicholas P. Bowers, and Sarah Lang of counsel), for respondents.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for breach of an oral escrow agreement and breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lisa A. Cairo, J.), dated November 12, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint is denied.

The plaintiff commenced this action against Fredric Goodman and Marin Goodman, LLP, alleging breach of an oral escrow agreement and breach of fiduciary duty. The defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. In an order dated November 12, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the defendants' motion. The plaintiff appeals.

"Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), a party may move to dismiss a cause of action where the movant has a defense founded on documentary evidence" (Stamp Rite Tool & Die Corp. v Branded Leather, Inc., 236 AD3d 1076, 1079; see Sunset Café, Inc. v Mett's Surf & Sports Corp., 103 AD3d 707, 708). "A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted only if the documentary evidence submitted by the moving party utterly refutes the factual allegations of the complaint and conclusively establishes a defense to the claims as a matter of law" (Silber Inv. Props., Ltd. v BJG Islandia Realty, LLC, 236 AD3d 953, 954 [internal quotation mark omitted]; see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326; Katsorhis v 718 W. Beech St, LLC, 234 AD3d 744, 746).

"On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must 'accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" (Acala v Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 222 AD3d 706, 707, quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see New York State Div. of Human [*2]Rights v Town of Oyster Bay, 177 AD3d 893, 894). "Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal shall not eventuate" (166-20 Union Turnpike, LLC v Tavak, LLC, 241 AD3d 1505, 1506 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see GLD3, LLC v Albra, 241 AD3d 1288, 1290).

"The elements of an escrow agreement are an agreement as to the subject matter of the escrow, delivery of the funds to a third-party depository conditioned upon the performance of some act or the occurrence of some event, and relinquishment of the funds by the grantor" (Gargano v Morey, 165 AD3d 889, 891; see Brassell v Harbourview Abstract, Inc., 163 AD3d 908, 910). There is no requirement that an escrow agreement be in writing (see Johnson v Optometrix, Inc., 75 AD3d 1073, 1073; Sienna Capital Group, Inc. v Rosen, 44 AD3d 742, 743-744).

"[T]he elements of a cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant[']s misconduct" (J.D. v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 203 AD3d 880, 882 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Mann v Sasson, 186 AD3d 823, 824). An attorney holding funds in escrow owes a fiduciary duty to anyone with a beneficial interest in the trust (see Hosannah v Millennium Abstract Corp., 231 AD3d 715, 717; Zi Kuo Zhang v Lau, 210 AD3d 829, 831). An attorney owes this fiduciary duty even in the absence of an attorney-client relationship (see Zi Kuo Zhang v Lau, 210 AD3d at 831; Shan Yun Lin v Lau, 210 AD3d 817, 819). "[A]n escrow agent can be held liable for breach of the escrow agreement and breach of fiduciary duty as escrowee" (Sasidharan v Piverger, 145 AD3d 814, 815; see Hosannah v Millennium Abstract Corp., 231 AD3d at 717).

Here, the complaint set forth cognizable causes of action to recover damages for breach of the oral escrow agreement and breach of fiduciary duty. Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their motion did not demonstrate that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff was not a fact at all and did not utterly refute the plaintiff's factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law (see Esposito v Weiner, 160 AD3d 930, 930-931; Sasidharan v Piverger, 145 AD3d at 816).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

IANNACCI, J.P., FORD, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court