Supper v. Stauss

39 Pa. Super. 388, 1909 Pa. Super. LEXIS 498
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 10, 1909
DocketAppeal, No. 52
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 39 Pa. Super. 388 (Supper v. Stauss) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Supper v. Stauss, 39 Pa. Super. 388, 1909 Pa. Super. LEXIS 498 (Pa. Ct. App. 1909).

Opinion

Opinion by

Orlady, J.,

A case stated was agreed upon in an action of trespass in the court below, to determine the right of the plaintiff to vote at a primary election, held in the forty-seventh election district in the twenty-second ward of the city of Philadelphia. The plaintiff was a duly qualified elector, duly registered as a resident, under the provisions of the constitution and the laws of the commonwealth, and he presented himself at the regular polling place and asked for a ballot of the Republican party, when he was challenged by a qualified elector on the ground that he was a City party voter, and not entitled to receive the Republican ballot, whereupon he declared and offered to make an affidavit to the effect “that at the next preceding general election at which he voted, to wit: November 5,1907, he voted for a majority of the candidates of the Republican party for which ballot he now asks, by voting for them in the City party square.” The defendant who was the judge of the election of that district refused to permit the plaintiff to make the affidavit, and also refused to give him the ballot of the Republican party, on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to vote at the Republican party primaries, within the meaning and intent of the act of 1906, and that the affidavit which he tendered did not qualify him so to vote. The court below entered judgment for the defendant upon the case stated.

The Act in question was approved February 17,1906, P. L. 36, and is entitled: “ An act providing a uniform method of electing certain party officers and delegates to the state and national conventions, and of making nominations for certain public offices; providing for the payment of the expenses of the same; making certain violations thereof misdemeanors, and prescribing penalties for the violations of its provisions,” and is described by Chief Justice Mitchell in Com. v. Blankenburg, 218 Pa. 339, as: “An enactment to systematize, regulate and put under control of positive law, party nominations for public office. It [391]*391is the latest of a series of statutes extending the direct and immediate control of law over methods and details of the exercise of the elective franchise which previously had been left in the unrestricted discretion and control of individuals or party managers. Under the earlier system ballots were prepared by individuals or party officers in any form they desired; nominations were made by party machinery, usually conventions, under party rules and at irregular dates. Justly or unjustly these steps which practically controlled nominations and elections, were exposed to the suspicion of manipulation, not for the convenience of party voters alone, but for undue advantage to individuals and party cliques. The act of 1906, was passed to put an end to this system. ... No candidates for the public offices therein specified shall be nominated in any other manner than as set forth in the act; the principal object of the act was to break up 'snap conventions’ and other devices for unfair ends, under the old system, and one of its principal means of so doing was to enforce uniformity of time as well as methods.”

The right of the plaintiff is to be determined by the interpretation of sec. 10 of the act of 1906, which provides: “The qualifications of electors entitled to vote at a primary, shall be the same as the qualifications of electors entitled to vote at elections, within the election district where the primary is held. Each elector shall prove his qualifications and his identity in the same manner in which electors in the election district in which he offers to vote are, or were as may be, required by law to prove their qualifications or identity on election day; each elector shall have the right to receive the ballot of the party for which he asks; provided, that if he is challenged, he shall be required to make oath or affirmation that at the next preceding general election at which he voted, he voted for a majority of the candidates of the party for whose ballot he asks. Upon executing such affidavit, the voter shall be entitled to receive the ballot for which he has called, and to cast his vote according to law.” At the general election referred to, the electors of Philadelphia voted for candidates to fill eleven offices, of which seven were places on the bench of [392]*392the several courts of the county. The Republican party, the Democratic party and the City party had each nominated the same candidates for these judicial offices, each of the seven candidates being nominated by each of the three parties for the same office for which he had been nominated by the other two, so that a vote cast for the whole ticket of any one of these parties, by the marking of a cross in the party square of either, necessarily involved voting for seven men who were also on the tickets of the other two parties. The defendant, in this case, as judge of the election, was admittedly wrong in refusing to receive the affidavit as tendered; by the Act of June 13, 1840, P. L. 683, he was invested with “power to administer an oath or affirmation to any or all persons requiring or offering to be sworn or affirmed in relation to the right of any person to vote at any election authorized to be held by any law of the commonwealth.

By Act of July 2,1839, P. L. 519, it is provided: “Thatthe judges of elections within the limits of their respective wards, districts or townships, shall have power and are hereby required to decide on the qualifications of any person claiming to vote at any election, whenever the inspectors thereof shall disagree upon the right of such person to vote, but not otherwise, ” so that primarily the affidavit in such a case is for the consideration of the inspectors in the first instance, and in the event of disagreement between them, the judges authorized to decide on the qualifications of the person claiming to vote, but not otherwise. However, it is conceded that under the facts in this case, that phase of it is immaterial, it being stipulated, “That if the court shall be of opinion on the facts stated, that the affidavit which the plaintiff offered to make, complied with the request of the the Uniform Primaries Act and entitled the plaintiff to the ballot of the Republican party at the primary election aforesaid, and that the defendant wrongly refused to permit the said affidavit to be made, judgment shall be entered, ” etc. The act of 1906 is a remedial statute, and in its construction “the old law, the mischief and the remedy are to be kept in mind, so that a liberal construction should be made for the suppression of the mischief complained of and [393]*393the advancement of the desired remedy. There have been a number of recent changes made.in our system of nominating candidates for office and each seemed to be unsatisfactory to the public at large, so that the agitation of the subject resulted in the passage of the act in question, under which it is necessary to determine not only how many votes each candidate has received, but on what 'party ticket the votes have been cast. It is to be observed that a candidate may be voted for by more than one party, but he does not thereby lose his relation to a party, from the mere fact that his name appears in a column of another party. A political party is defined as a company or number of persons ranged on one side, or united in opinion or design in opposition to others in the community; those who favor or are united to promote certain views or opinions.

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Related

State ex rel. Miller v. Flaherty
136 N.W. 76 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1912)

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Bluebook (online)
39 Pa. Super. 388, 1909 Pa. Super. LEXIS 498, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/supper-v-stauss-pasuperct-1909.