Suphpreet Singh v. Warden, Golden State Annex Detention Center, et al.

Opinion

SUPHPREET SINGH, No. 1:26-cv-01614-KES-CDB (HC) Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT v. OF HABEAS CORPUS WARDEN, Golden State Annex Detention Doc. 1 Center, et al., Respondents. Petitioner Suphpreet Singh is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for temporary restraining order. Docs. 1, 2. The Court has previously addressed the legal issues raised by claim one of the petition. See, e.g., Elmer Joel M. C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01622-KES-CDB (HC), 2025 WL 3501200 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2025); Clene C.D. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-CV-01463-KES-SKO (HC), 2026 WL 84302 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2026); W.V.S.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01489-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3236521 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025); Bilal A. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01715-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3648366 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025); Marina V.N. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-CV-01845-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3701960 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2025). The Court set a briefing schedule on the petition and ordered respondents to show cause as to whether there are any factual or legal issues in this case that distinguish it from the Court’s prior orders and that would justify denying the petition. Doc. 5. While respondents oppose the petition, they “submit there are no significant factual or legal issues in this case that materially distinguish it from this Court’s prior Orders in the listed cases.”1 Doc. 6 at 1.2 Respondents have not identified any pertinent factual or legal issues in this case that would distinguish it from the Court’s prior decisions in Elmer Joel M. C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25- CV-01622-KES-CDB (HC), 2025 WL 3501200 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2025), Clene C.D. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-CV-01463-KES-SKO (HC), 2026 WL 84302 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2026), Bilal A. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01715-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3648366 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025), W.V.S.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01489-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3236521 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025), and Marina V.N. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-CV-01845-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3701960 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2025).3 The petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED as to claim one,

1 Respondents allege in a footnote that petitioner violated conditions of the “Alternatives to Detention” monitoring program in which he was enrolled. Doc. 6 at 2 n.2. Respondents cite to a Form I-213 stating that petitioner “has 10 ATD Program violations, with violations of the following types: Missed Biometric Check-In, Scheduled Home Visit Failed, Missed Self-Report Check-in,” but they do not provide an authenticating declaration or any specific information concerning any alleged violation. See Doc. 6-1, Ex. A at 3. Petitioner asserts that he complied with all conditions of his release. See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 82–84. In any event, the alleged violations do not constitute a pertinent distinction between this case and the Court’s prior cases. The record shows that, after the alleged violations, petitioner reported as requested for a scheduled check-in at an ICE office, where ICE arrested him. And while the alleged violations may be relevant to a neutral decisionmaker’s determination as to whether petitioner is entitled to bond, they do not eliminate petitioner’s due process right to such a determination. See E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025).

2 Respondents also request, in the alternative, that the Court hold this case in abeyance pending the appeal in Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842 (9th Cir.), which appears to concern the issue of whether § 1226(a) or § 1225(b) applies to individuals who entered the country without inspection and who were not apprehended by immigration authorities before their detention in 2025. See Doc. 6 at 2. But here immigration officials did previously encounter petitioner and they released him after implicitly determining that he did not pose a flight risk or a danger, and the issue is whether the Due Process Clause requires a pre-deprivation hearing prior to his re-detention. Given the different circumstances in this case, and the nature of the relief petitioner seeks, the Court declines to hold this case in abeyance pending the Rodriguez appeal.

3 Two courts of appeal have addressed whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens who have resided in the United States without having been admitted. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060–62 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding that government was not likely to prevail on the merits that petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---, Nos. 25-20496, 25-40701, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (finding petitioners were subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)). Respondents cite to the Buenrostro-Mendez decision. Doc. 6 at 1. The Court finds the analysis in Castañon-Nava and in the dissent in Buenrostro-Mendez to be more for the reasons addressed in those prior orders.* Respondents are ORDERED to release petitioner immediately. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless they demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical custody is legally justified. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case and enter judgment for petitioner. g | ISSO ORDERED. _ Dated: _ March 13, 2026 4h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Persuasive on the statutory interpretation issue. In any event, the Buenrostro-Mendez decision did not address the due process claim at issue in the present case. 4 The Court need not address petitioner’s other claims as petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks based on the Court’s ruling on claim one.