Supermicro Computer Inc. v. Digitechnic, S.A.

145 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7620, 2001 WL 619506
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJanuary 30, 2001
DocketC-00-0224-CAL
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 145 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (Supermicro Computer Inc. v. Digitechnic, S.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Supermicro Computer Inc. v. Digitechnic, S.A., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7620, 2001 WL 619506 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

Opinion

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY

LEGGE, District Judge.

Now before the court are plaintiffs motion for partial summary adjudication and defendant’s motion for a dismissal or stay *1149 of this action. The motions have been briefed, argued and submitted for decision. The court has reviewed the record of the case, the moving and opposing papers on these motions, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable authorities.

I.

Plaintiff is a California corporation that manufactures computer parts. Defendant is a French corporation that assembles and sells computer network systems. Defendant made fourteen purchases of computer parts from plaintiff between May 1996 and December 1997. In each of the transactions, defendant placed an order with plaintiff via phone or e-mail, and plaintiff shipped the goods to France. Plaintiff included a sales invoice and a user’s manual with each shipment. The sales invoice and user’s manual contained certain terms and conditions, including a limited warran-. ty and limitations of liability.

Beginning in 1998, defendant allegedly experienced electrical problems with some of the parts that it had purchased from plaintiff; specifically, some of the parts caught fire. Defendant demanded $200,400 in replacement costs, and consequential damages of approximately $6,000,000. Plaintiff rejected the demand and claimed that, based on the limited warranty contained in the sales invoices and the consequential damages waiver found in the user’s manual, defendant’s sole remedy was the repair and replacement of any malfunctioning parts.

In December 1998 defendant filed an action in France in the Tribunal de Commerce de Bobginy (the “French Commercial Court.”) The French case has been ongoing since that time and plaintiff has been participating in it. The parties disagree on the posture and scope of the French case. Plaintiff contends that it is an “interim relief procedure” that has no judicial effect. Defendant argues that it is a legal proceeding wherein the parties can be afforded complete relief.

Plaintiff filed this action on January 20, 2000, more than a year after the French action began. The complaint seeks a declaration that: (1) the computer parts were not defective; (2) the parts failed as a result of defendant’s misuse, and (3) even if plaintiff were at fault, defendant’s sole remedy is for repair or replacement. Jurisdiction is based on the Declaratory Judgment Act; 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq.

Plaintiff now moves for partial summary adjudication, solely on the issue of what remedy is available to defendant. Defendant opposes the motion for partial summary adjudication, and moves for a stay or dismissal based on the first-filed French case.

II.

Defendant bases its motion to stay or dismiss on the principle of “International Abstention.” The international abstention doctrine allows a court to stay or dismiss an action where parallel proceedings are pending in the court of a foreign nation. See Sehwarzer et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 2:1326.4 (2000). International abstention is rooted in concerns of international comity, judicial efficiency and fairness to litigants. Id. In short, the doctrine allows a court to abstain from hearing an action if there is a first-filed foreign proceeding elsewhere. Id. The doctrine has been expressly adopted by the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits. See Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1523 (11th Cir.1994); Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters, U.S.A. Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 900-901 (7th Cir.1999).

The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on international abstention. While the facts of this case appear to fit neatly with the doctrine as expressed by the Turner and *1150 Finova courts, it is unnecessary for this court to go that far. Instead, defendant’s motion can be resolved by considering the discretionary nature of the jurisdiction of this court under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

A.

Under the Act, a district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory action, even though subject matter jurisdiction is otherwise proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942). In enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, “Congress ... created an opportunity, rather than a duty, [for a district court] to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants.” See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995).

A district court’s discretion to decline jurisdiction under the Act is broader than any abstention doctrine recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Wilton, the Court explained that “[d]istinet features of the Declaratory Judgment Act, we believe, justify a standard vesting district courts with greater discretion in declaratory judgment actions than that permitted under the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test of Colorado River and Moses H. Cone.” See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995).

In determining whether to exercise its discretion not to hear a case, a court must first “determine whether there are any independent claims in the case that exist apart from purely declaratory relief, that is, claims that would continue to exist if the request for a declaration simply dropped from the case.” (emphasis added). See Snodgrass v. Provident, 147 F.3d 1163, 1167-68 (9th Cir.1998). In other words, if a claim for money is brought along with the declaratory claim, the court has no discretion to decline jurisdiction. Id. Next, the court must then consider the factors that guide the exercise of its discretion as set out by the Supreme Court in Brillhart and Wilton.

In the present action, there are no independent claims. The only claim is one for declaratory relief. See Complaint, ¶ 1. Thus, it is appropriate for the court to take the next step and consider the Brillhart/Wilton factors that guide its discretion.

The “touchstone” factors are that a district court should “avoid needless determination of state law issues; it should discourage litigants from filing declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping; and it should avoid duplicative litigation.” See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol,

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145 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7620, 2001 WL 619506, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/supermicro-computer-inc-v-digitechnic-sa-cand-2001.