Suntrana Mining Co. v. Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc.

157 F. Supp. 544, 17 Alaska 441, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2836
CourtDistrict Court, D. Alaska
DecidedJanuary 2, 1958
DocketNo. 8603
StatusPublished

This text of 157 F. Supp. 544 (Suntrana Mining Co. v. Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Alaska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Suntrana Mining Co. v. Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 544, 17 Alaska 441, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2836 (D. Alaska 1958).

Opinion

TOLIN, District Judge.

This litigation was commenced by a complaint, since amended, wherein plaintiff alleged certain hereinafter described acts of alleged continuing trespass and maintenance of a nuisance. The prayer of the complaint seeks injunctive relief and, as amended, the complaint prays for damages because of losses heretofore suffered. Both defendants raise a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is not well taken nor was it supported by citations except the lease existing between plaintiff and the United States. Following the custom of courts, this [545]*545Court will treat first of the challenge to its jurisdiction.

In 1925 the Ilealy River Coal Corporation entered into a document entitled “Mining Lease of Coal Lands in Alaska” wherein and whereby the United States of America, through the Secretary of the Interior, leased the described lands to said Corporation and granted unto it for a stated time the exclusive right and privilege to mine and dispose of all the coal and associated minerals in, upon or under the described land. By permission of the Secretary of the Interior, the lease was assigned to plaintiff and this action was brought during the term of the lease. Section 7 of Article VII of the lease recites, “That in case any dispute shall arise between the lessor and lessee as to any question of fact, or as to the reasonableness of any requirement made by the lessor under the provisions of this lease, * * * such questions or disputes shall be settled by arbitration in the manner provided for by this section, * * There then follows a detailed recitation of how arbitrators shall be selected, the extent of their duties and the binding effect of their decisions. Both defendants to this litigation insist that this provision in the lease makes it mandatory that a dispute of the character which plaintiff has brought to this Court shall be settled by arbitration. The simple and obvious answer to this contention is that this dispute is not one between the lessor and lessee. It is a dispute between the lessee and two parties whom lessee contends have trespassed and are now trespassing upon the properties described in the lease. General reference has been made, but without citation to any section, to the statutes governing coal lands in Alaska. The Court has found that Title 48 U.S.C.A. beginning at § 432 and continuing through many successive sections, relates to coal lands in Alaska, but nowhere within these Statutes has the Court found any law relating to compulsory arbitration of disputes of the character involved in this litigation. Defendants’ jurisdictional point is, therefore, declared to be without merit.

It is also contended by defendants that the plaintiff is not in fact a lessee for the reason that the document to which reference has been made is not a lease but does no more than grant a profit or license to plaintiff’s predecessor and through unchallenged operation of the assignment to the plaintiff. The importance of this point inheres in both defendants’ contention that a mere licensee does not have the necessary title to support an action for trespass. Section 434 of Title 48 U.S.C.A. refers to “The unreserved coal lands and coal deposits * * * ”, and further recites that “ * * * the Secretary shall offer such blocks or tracts and the coal, lignite, and associated minerals therein for leasing, and may award leases thereof * Section 435 of Title 48 U.S.C.A. refers to privileges of those holding such a lease. Section 438 of the same Title refers to royalties and rentals. Section 438a deals with situations under which rentals may be waived. Section 439 is entitled “Disposal of royalties and rentals received”, and throughout the coal land Sections of Title 48 U.S.C.A., the word “rentals” and other language common to leases is found. A reading of the document itself discloses that it does grant a license, more particularly, “ * * * the exclusive right and privilege to mine and dispose of all the coal and associated minerals in, upon, or under * * But within the same sentence the following is found, “ * * together with the right to construct coke ovens, briquetting plants, by-products plants, and all such other works as may be necessary and convenient for the mining and preparation of coal and associated minerals for market, * * It is important that the rights above referred to are exclusive to the lessee and that in one section of the document the lessee is required to pay a specified rental based upon periods of time rather than upon what is taken from the land, and in another section of the document the lessee is required to pay a royalty based [546]*546upon the quantity of coal shipped or removed from the leased lands. Not only does the instrument appear to be a combination but the parties to the document have treated it as being both a lease and a license and there is nothing in the law of leases or licenses which makes them so antagonistic that they cannot both be declared within the four corners of one agreement. That is what has been done here. Regardless of the legal label by which plaintiff’s interest is classified, it is clear that plaintiff had a right to the immediate possession of the land thus fulfilling one of the classical requirements which must be shown in actions of this nature.

The Court finds that the document in evidence entitled “Mining Lease Of Coal Lands In Alaska” is in fact a lease and is also in fact an exclusive license to take coal from the land.

The more substantial controversy is the one described in plaintiff’s complaint and to which practically all the evidence in the case was directed either in support or refutation of plaintiff’s allegations. The issues on this phase of the case are principally factual, no one contending that the Courts will not appropriately redress the type of trespass pleaded. It appears substantially from the evidence that the Healy River is a stream flowing in a generally westerly direction, and is tributary to the Nanana River, a stream flowing northerly and into the Tanana River which is a direct tributary of the Yukon River that flows into the Bering Sea. Near the confluence of the Healy and Nanana Rivers plaintiff’s predecessor developed a conventional coal mine. The mine has come by appropriate sale and assignment of the lease into the possession of plaintiff Suntrana Mining Co., Inc. The lands thereby under Suntrana’s possession are riparian to the Healy River channel and are situated on both sides of, and under, the river flood plane. In the area above Suntrana’s leasehold defendant Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc. has for some years been engaged in the operation of a coal mine which operates to a large extent in a different mining method. This is also true of defendant A. Ben Shallit, d/b/a Cripple Creek Coal Company. Usibelli and Shallit appear to be lessees and licensees in the same way the plaintiff enjoys those statuses. However, the peculiarity of Usibelli’s and Shallit’s operations is that seams of coal have jutted out of the surface of the earth and these seams extend down below the surface of the earth. All of this land is hilly or mountainous terrain with Suntrana being at the lowest point, Usibelli somewhat higher, and Shallit’s operation still higher in the above-sea level reference. It has been the custom of Usibelli and Shallit to remove the earth which acted as a barrier to immediately reaching the seams of coal by the use of hydraulic mining methods.

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Bluebook (online)
157 F. Supp. 544, 17 Alaska 441, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2836, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/suntrana-mining-co-v-usibelli-coal-mine-inc-akd-1958.