Sunrise Express, Inc. v. Department of Licensing

892 P.2d 1108, 77 Wash. App. 537
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedApril 20, 1995
DocketNo. 16799-9-II
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 892 P.2d 1108 (Sunrise Express, Inc. v. Department of Licensing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sunrise Express, Inc. v. Department of Licensing, 892 P.2d 1108, 77 Wash. App. 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

Fleisher, J.

The Department of Licensing assessed a special fuel tax deficiency against Sunrise Express, Inc. (Sunrise) based on a statutory presumption regarding the rate of fuel consumption in the absence of specific records. The Superior Court affirmed the assessment and Sunrise appeals. We hold the evidence presented by Sunrise is sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Facts

Sunrise is a Washington corporation that operates commercial vehicles in interstate commerce. It is a user of special fuel, subject to the special fuel tax imposed under RCW 82.38.030. Sunrise makes monthly tax payments to the Department of Licensing (the Department), rather than at the pump upon purchase of the fuel. RCW 82.38.090, .150. To ensure payment of the proper tax amount, special fuel users are subject to specific record-keeping requirements under RCW 82.38.140.

The Department conducted an audit of Sunrise to verify the tax amounts reported from February 1,1987, to September 30, 1989. Sunrise submitted records detailing the total mileage its entire fleet traveled during the audit period. Although Sunrise did not submit mileage records by individual vehicle, the Department accepted the total mileage [539]*539amounts. However, Sunrise could not submit records of its fuel consumption. A water tank had burst, flooding its records storage area, and destroying the fuel consumption records.

Because of Sunrise’s lack of fuel consumption records, the Department applied a statutory presumption that Sunrise’s vehicles consumed fuel at the rate of 4.0 miles per gallon. See RCW 82.38.060. Based on the total mileage submitted by Sunrise, the Department concluded that Sunrise owed $15,225.94 in additional fuel taxes.

Sunrise challenged the use of this statutory presumption before an administrative law judge (ALJ). To rebut the presumption, Sunrise presented uncontroverted expert testimony regarding its fleet of trucks and the trucking industry in general. The expert testified that in the early 1970’s when the 4 miles per gallon presumption was enacted, trucking fleets averaged between 3.8 and 4.2 miles per gallon, and that improvements in truck design since then have significantly increased fuel efficiency. Sunrise’s expert further testified that he has spent 12 years working with Sunrise to design a fleet that would operate at between 5.5 and 6.0 miles per gallon.

The ALJ ruled that Sunrise’s claim that its vehicles traveled more than 4 miles per gallon was based upon a variety of hypotheses, suppositions, and presumptions. This formula, according to the ALJ, contained too many variables to overcome the prima facie presumption of RCW 82.38.060.

The Department issued a final order adopting the ALJ’s conclusions. Sunrise appealed the Department’s order to Clark County Superior Court. The court found that the evidence was not sufficiently specific to approximate records of individual vehicles and affirmed the decision. Sunrise appealed. We hold Sunrise’s evidence is sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Analysis

The sole issue on appeal is whether Sunrise presented sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that its vehicles had a fuel consumption rate of 4 miles per gallon.

[540]*540Findings of fact under the Administrative Procedure Act must be supported by substantial evidence. Olmstead v. Department of Health, 61 Wn. App. 888, 893, 812 P.2d 527 (1991); RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). In the present case, however, Sunrise does not challenge any of the findings of fact made by the ALJ. Instead, Sunrise maintains that the findings of fact as a whole are sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption, and therefore challenges the legal conclusion of the judge.

Challenges to an administrative agency’s conclusions of law are reviewed under the error of law standard contained in RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), namely that "[t]he agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law”. When errors of law are alleged, the court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency. However, the court will accord substantial weight to the agency’s view of the law. Jensen v. Department of Ecology, 102 Wn.2d 109, 113, 685 P.2d 1068 (1984).

Under the special fuel tax act, a special fuel tax user pays tax based on the amount of fuel consumed during operations in each particular state, instead of paying the tax at the pump upon purchase. RCW 82.38.030, .090, .140. Special fuel users must maintain specific records, including the number of miles traveled in each state on an individual vehicle basis, the number of gallons purchased, the location and date purchased, and the special fuel license number of the purchaser. RCW 82.38.140. The Department uses these records to verify the user’s tax liability. Failure to keep proper records is a gross misdemeanor under RCW 82.38.270, subjecting the user to a fine of no more than $1,000 and/or 1 year in jail.1

In cases where the necessary records are unavailable, RCW 82.38.060 provides, in part:

In the absence of records showing the number of miles actually operated per gallon of special fuel consumed, it shall be prima facie presumed that not less than one gallon of special fuel was [541]*541consumed for every: (1) Four miles traveled by vehicles over forty thousand pounds gross vehicle weight....

(Italics ours.) RCW 82.38.060.2

A presumption, however, is not evidence and its efficacy is lost when the other party adduces credible evidence to the contrary. In re Indian Trail Trunk Sewer Sys., 35 Wn. App. 840, 843, 670 P.2d 675 (1983), review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1037 (1984). A presumption may be overcome by competent rebutting testimony from either interested or disinterested witnesses. In re Estate of Davis,

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892 P.2d 1108, 77 Wash. App. 537, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sunrise-express-inc-v-department-of-licensing-washctapp-1995.