Sundby v. Landau

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: 25-4180
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DALE SUNDBY, individually and as sole No. 25-4180 beneficiary and sole TRUSTEE of Decl. of D.C. No. 2:24-cv-07276-MCS-BFM Trust, Trust No. 1989-1, Dated: January 26, 1989; EDITH SUNDBY, MEMORANDUM* Plaintiffs - Appellants,

and

STEFANIE SUNDBY,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEWIS LANDAU; JEFFREY MYERS; KATHLEEN MYERS; TROY SLOME; ANDRES SALSIDO, Trustee; STEVEN M. COBIN; CHRISTOPHER MYERS; VICKIE McCARTY; TODD B. COBIN, Trustee; BARBARA A. COBIN, Trustee; DOLORES THOMPSON; KIMBERLY GILL RABINOFF; DOROTHY FASACK; BENNING MANAGEMENT GROUP; MARQUEE FUNDING GROUP, INC.; PLATINUM LOAN SERVICING, INC.; SCOT FINE; RYAN JOE R.J. SOLOVY; DOES, I-X,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Defendants - Appellees,

S.B.S. TRUST DEED NETWORK,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 18, 2026**

Before: CALLAHAN, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Dale Sundby, in his individual capacity and as trustee of the Dale H. Sundby

and Edith Littlefield Sundby Trust No. 1989-1 dated January 26, 1989, and Edith

Sundby appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their

foreclosure-related action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(b). Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir.

2019). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs’ action

because plaintiffs failed to comply with the district court’s order requiring them to

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 25-4180 file an amended complaint or provide notice to the court that they would not

amend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (permitting dismissal “[i]f the plaintiff fails to

prosecute or to comply with . . . a court order”); Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356

F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The failure of the plaintiff eventually to respond

to the court’s ultimatum—either by amending the complaint or by indicating to the

court that it will not do so—is properly met with the sanction of a Rule 41(b)

dismissal.”); Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640-43 (9th Cir. 2002)

(discussing factors to be considered before dismissing a case for failure to comply

with a court order); see also Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403

F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a district court may dismiss sua

sponte under Rule 41(b)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ post-

judgment motion for reconsideration because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any

basis for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS,

Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and

grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)); see also C.D. Cal. R. 7-

18 (setting forth grounds for reconsideration under local rules); Hinton v. Pac.

Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review for

compliance with local rules).

In light of our disposition, we do not consider plaintiffs’ challenges to the

3 25-4180 district court’s orders granting defendants’ motions to dismiss with leave to amend

and denying plaintiffs’ first motion for reconsideration. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen,

78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that where dismissal was a sanction,

interlocutory orders are not appealable).

AFFIRMED.

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