Sundberg v. State

657 P.2d 843, 1982 Alas. App. LEXIS 374

Opinions

OPINION

SINGLETON, Judge.

Russell P. Sundberg was convicted of burglary not in a dwelling, former AS 11.-20.100, and given a five-year sentence. Sundberg was caught in the act of burglarizing a business establishment. During his capture, he was shot by one of the arresting officers. He successfully argued to the trial court that the officers used excessive force in accomplishing the arrest and, as a result, the trial court held that Sundberg had been illegally arrested and suppressed all evidence obtained as fruit of the illegal arrest. The state petitioned the supreme court for review of this order. The supreme court granted the petition and reversed, holding that the evidence was improperly suppressed. State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980). In holding the suppression order improper, the supreme court indicated that it had not been persuaded that the police were customarily using excessive force in making arrests. On remand, Sundberg sought to show that the police in fact were frequently using excessive force in making arrests. The trial court refused to consider this offer of proof, and Sundberg petitioned this court for review of that order. We denied review. Sundberg was then tried and convicted of the burglary. He appeals alleging that his conviction was barred by Criminal Rule 45(g) which provides:

Absolute Discharge. If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, the court upon motion of the defendant shall dismiss the charge with prejudice. Such discharge bars prosecution for the offense charged and for any other lesser included offense within the offense charged.

The time for trial mentioned in this rule is 120 days from the date of initial arrest. See Alaska R.Crim.P. 45(c). Sundberg was arrested on April 30, 1978, and his trial commenced on March 16, 1981, roughly three years thereafter. He concedes, however, that the bulk of the intervening time was properly excluded from consideration under Rule 45 by the terms of Rule 45(d) which exclude certain periods — for example, where motions regarding the accused are pending. Sundberg’s arguments regarding treatment of the various blocks of time under Rule 45 can best be charted as follows:

April 30,1978 Arrest and beginning of 120-day rule

45 days elapsed

June 14,1978 Defendant’s motion to continue omnibus hearing

Tolled

July 25,1978 Defendant’s motion to continue omnibus hearing

Tolled

August 3,1978 Defendant’s motion to continue omnibus hearing

Tolled

August 8,1978 Defendant’s motion to continue omnibus hearing

Tolled

August 9,1978 Defendant’s waiver of time until after December 1,1978

Tolled

November 22,1978 Stay of trial granted

Tolled

May 19,1980 Alaska Supreme Court mandate issued

44 days elapsed

July 2,1980 Defendant’s waiver of time until October 13,1980

Tolled

August 7,1980 Defendant’s motion to supplement record on motion to suppress

Tolled

September 19,1980 Defendant’s motion to supplement record denied

Tolled

October 13,1980 Trial stayed

Tolled

November 7,1980 Defendant’s petition for review denied

40 days elapsed

December 17,1980 Defense motion to withdraw as counsel

Tolled

December 23,1980 Defendant ordered to API for competency exam

Tolled

January 20,1981 Defendant found competent; case set on for calendar call

Tolled

January 27,1981 Hearing at which March 16 date set

48 days elapsed

March 16,1981 Trial date

176 Total days elapsed

Sundberg argues that 176 days chargeable to the state elapsed between the time he was arrested and the time he was tried, thus barring his prosecution. The trial court included the forty-five days from Sundberg’s arrest until his first motion. However, he found that the period of time during which this case was pending on the two petitions for review was a delay resulting from the respective petitions. Specifically, he excluded the forty-four days which elapsed from receipt of the supreme court’s mandate on May 19,1980 until July 2, 1980 and the forty-day period that elapsed from November 7, 1980 until December 17, 1980. The state confesses error on this period of exclusion, and after considering the record we accept this concession. See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972). Judge Carlson concluded that a minimum of thirty days was necessary for the state to mobilize its resources for trial after the supreme court issued its decision, and an additional thirty days was necessary for the same purpose after this court issued its order denying defendant’s petition for review. We agree with the trial court that “[t]he period of delay resulting from” a petition for review encompasses more than merely the time necessary to rule on the petitions for review and includes “all subsequent delay which is occasioned by and attributable to” the petitions in question. Cf. Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 626 P.2d 586, 589 (Alaska App.1981) (period of delay resulting from defendant’s absence includes delay beyond period of actual unavailability); but cf. Vail v. State, 599 P.2d 1371, 1379-80 (Alaska 1979) (excluded period includes entire time supreme court is considering petition for review). Nevertheless, the state concedes, and we hold, that it was under an obligation to present evidence that it needed a specific period of time for mobilization of its resources to try Sund-berg in order to avail itself of this provision and that it failed to do so. Despite prompting from the trial court, the prosecutor did not submit affidavits or otherwise establish that any specific period of time was necessary to gather its witnesses and proceed to trial. In the absence of such evidence, we hold that the period in question was improperly excluded.

Criminal Rule 45(d)(3) excludes from consideration under the rule a period of time resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecution. However, this time is only excluded if the continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the state’s case, the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will be available at the later date. We believe a similar showing was required here. Consequently, we accept the state’s concession of error and hold that the trial court erred in excluding the forty-five days that elapsed between May 19,1980 and July 2,1980 and the forty days that elapsed between November 7, 1980 and December 17, 1980.

This concession requires reversal and dismissal of the charges against Sundberg unless we conclude that the 120 day period commenced anew after the state won a reversal of Judge Carlson’s suppression order. The state argues that we should reject Judge Carlson’s conclusion that the forty-five days from April 30, 1978, when Sund-berg was first arrested, to June 14, 1978, when he made his first motion to continue the omnibus hearing, should be included in the 120 day period allowed to try Sundberg. The state reasons that the 120 day period should have commenced anew after the supreme court issued its mandate reversing Judge Carlson’s decision to suppress Sund-berg’s identification and remanding the case for trial. The state relies on Criminal Rule 45(c)(2) which provides in relevant part:

The time for trial shall begin running, without demand by the defendant, as follows:

(2) If the defendant is to be tried again following a mistrial, an order for a new trial, or an appeal or collateral attack, from the date of mistrial, order granting a new trial, or remand.

We reject this argument for two reasons. First, Sundberg was not “tried again.” He was only tried once. Rule 45(c)(2) applies to the situation where a defendant obtains a new trial in the trial or appellate courts after the commencement of his first trial would otherwise have finally tolled Criminal Rule 45. In State v. Barton, 17 Wash. App. 846, 565 P.2d 830 (1977), Washington’s counterpart to our Criminal Rule 45 was interpreted as having no application once the defendant is initially brought to trial even though his trial ends in mistrial. In that opinion, it is pointed out that the standards of the American Bar Association are to the contrary. Our rule is based on the American Bar Association Standards.

Secondly, Criminal Rule 45(d)(1) specifically addresses the question of interlocutory appeals. It provides in relevant part:

(d) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial:

(1) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to ... interlocutory appeals, ...

See Vail v. State, 599 P.2d 1371, 1379-80 (Alaska 1979).

We are reinforced in this conclusion by consideration of the derivation of Criminal Rule 45. Criminal Rule 45 is based upon the American Bar Association Standards relating to speedy trial. Rule 45(c) is based upon standard 12-2.2 which provides in relevant part:

12-2.2 When time commences to run

The time for trial should commence running, without demand by the defendant, as follows:

(a) from the date the charge is filed, except that if the defendant has been continuously held in custody or on bail or recognizance until that date to answer for the crime or a crime based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, then the time for trial should commence running from the date the defendant was held to answer;

(b) if the charge was dismissed upon motion of the defendant and thereafter the defendant was held to answer or charged with an offense, then the time for trial should commence running from the date the defendant was so held to answer or charged, as above; or

(c) if the defendant is to be tried again following a mistrial, an order for a new trial, or an appeal or collateral attack, then the time for trial should commence running from the date of the mistrial, order granting a new trial, or remand.

The standards contemplate three factual situations: first, where charges are filed and the case proceeds to trial, Standard 12-2.2(a); second, where charges are filed but a dismissal subsequently occurs prior to commencement of trial, Standard 12 — 2.2(b); and third, where charges are filed, the case proceeds to trial, but after commencement of trial proceedings terminate without a determination of guilt or innocence, Standard 12-2.2(c). Where prosecution is interrupted by a dismissal, the standards differentiate between dismissals procured by the defense and those procured by the prosecution. Where the defense procures the dismissal, the time limits begin to run anew if the defendant is held to answer, i.e., if the dismissal is reversed on appeal or prosecution is otherwise reinstated. Where the dismissal is obtained by the prosecution, the situation is covered by Standard 12-2.3 which provides in relevant part:

The following periods should be excluded in computing the time for trial:

(f) if the charge was dismissed upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense or an offense required to be joined with that offense, the period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitations would commence running as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge; ...

Finally, where the trial timely commences but is interrupted by a mistrial or a reversal after judgment, the time commences anew. Thus, the standards incorporate the state’s theory.

In adopting these standards as Alaska’s Criminal Rule 45, the supreme court made some significant deletions. Specifically, the supreme court deleted all of the language in 12-2.2(b), relating to dismissals procured by the defendant, and 12-2.3(f), excluding periods of time where dismissal is procured by the prosecution. In substitution, the supreme court added the following language to Rule 45(c)(1):

The arrest, arraignment, or service upon the defendant of a complaint, indictment or information, relating to subsequent charges arising out of the same conduct, or the refiling of the original charge, shall not extend the time, unless the evidence on which the new charge is based was not available to the prosecution at the time of the original commencement date of the 120 day period and a showing of due diligence in securing the defendant for the original charges is made by the prosecution; ...

In summary, the supreme court’s failure to enact the provisions from the ABA Standards set out above governing recommencement of the 120 day period where a dismissal is set aside or charges are reinstated (which incorporate the state’s theory) establish that only the “delay resulting from” the dismissal was to be excluded. See, e.g., Alaska R.Crim.P. 45(d)(1). We are satisfied that if the supreme court did not intend to require that the time begin anew after the state obtains a reversal of a dismissal on appeal, it necessarily follows that the supreme court did not intend that the period begin anew when the state obtains a reversal of a suppression order.

The state contends that Criminal Rule 45 is unconstitutional because it exceeds the supreme court’s rule-making power in violation of article IV, § 15 of the Alaska Constitution. Similar challenges to court speedy trial rules have uniformally been rejected in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State ex rel. Maines v. Baker, 254 So.2d 207 (Fla.1971); State v. Estencion, 625 P.2d 1040 (Hawaii 1981); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 295 Pa.Super. 61, 440 A.2d 1223 (Pa.Super.1982). The Alaska Supreme Court has on occasion invalidated one of its rules on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146 (Alaska 1972). Nevertheless, we believe that challenges to rules enacted by the supreme court should be made in that court and that the hearing procedure established by Part III of the Appellate Rules provides the state an adequate procedure for testing its constitutional theory.

The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED and this case REMANDED for dismissal of the charges.

COATS, J., dissents.

BRYNER, C.J., not participating.