Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Guzman

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedMarch 14, 2022
Docket5:20-cv-00070
StatusUnknown

This text of Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Guzman (Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Guzman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Guzman, (W.D.N.C. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA STATESVILLE DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:20-CV-00070-KDB-DSC

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

Second Life Equipment, LLC and Michael Guzman,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 127). Defendants, who are not represented by counsel, have not responded to the motion; but the Court has still carefully considered the merits of the motion based on the full record. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the motion and enter Partial Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff. I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., is a rental company offering various products, including construction equipment and industrial tools. In 2008 Sunbelt hired Michael Guzman and in 2016 promoted him to Manager of Fleet Operations. His duties included the disposal of aged equipment, which was often done through third-party auction houses. After his promotion, Guzman created Second Life Equipment, LLC with his wife, Jessica Guzman, and “Eric Dixon.” “Eric Dixon” is a fictitious name that Guzman used to help run Second Life. Second Life was allegedly a purchaser and reseller of used equipment. Between June 2019 and May 2020, Guzman engaged in a ruse to defraud Sunbelt by selling its assets through Second Life and another shell company. Guzman used bidadoo, an online auction house, to sell equipment owned by Sunbelt. Guzman, as “Eric Dixon,” contacted bidadoo and expressed an interest in selling equipment that he claimed had been sold to Second Life by Sunbelt. When bidadoo contacted Guzman, as a representative of Sunbelt, directly to confirm the sale, he

hoodwinked them by confirming “Dixon’s” story. Due to this deception, 398 assets rightfully belonging to Sunbelt were uploaded on Second Life’s customer portal with bidadoo and sold. The proceeds were then deposited into a Wells Fargo account controlled by the Guzmans. The Guzmans used the proceeds to purchase various properties, vacations, and investments in securities. To further conceal this ruse, Guzman manipulated the internal records of Sunbelt. This deceit was achieved by: (1) altering serial numbers for certain equipment in Sunbelt’s system to make it appear that the equipment had been previously sold by Sunbelt, even though in reality it remained in Sunbelt’s possession; (2) falsifying Sunbelt’s records to make it appear that certain equipment had been disposed of or

written off the books as junk when the equipment had not in fact been junked and still belonged to Sunbelt; and (3) manipulating credit remittances from equipment manufactures and trade package partners, by adding or dropping equipment from spreadsheets, while ensuring the dollar value remained the same, so that, while the assets listed might be different, the credit shown would match. In the associated criminal case, United States v. Michael R. Guzman, Case No. 5:21-CR- 31, Guzman pled guilty to counts of wire fraud and money laundering. Guzman further admitted that the proceeds of fraudulently selling Sunbelt’s assets totaled $4,044,475. In this civil matter, Sunbelt now moves for summary judgment against Defendants Guzman and Second Life on Sunbelt’s theft and embezzlement, unjust enrichment, fraud, conversion, North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, North Carolina RICO, and Federal RICO causes of action. II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Variety Stores, Inc.

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)); see United States, f/u/b Mod. Mosaic, LTD v. Turner Constr. Co., et al., 946 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2019). A factual dispute is considered genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Vannoy v. Federal Rsrv. Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of

a genuine issue of material fact through citations to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits in the record. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). “The burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ ... an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, “courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and refrain from weigh[ing] the evidence or mak[ing] credibility determinations.” Variety Stores, 888 F.3d at 659 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lee v. Town of Seaboard, 863 F.3d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 2017)); see Modern Mosaic at *2. “Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the

movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed.1998)). However, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (internal citations omitted). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The mere argued existence of a factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.

Id. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50. In the end, the question posed by a summary judgment motion is whether the evidence as applied to the governing legal rules “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 252. III. DISCUSSION As noted above, the related criminal litigation has been resolved. Consequently, many of the material facts have already been established, and Guzman is precluded from disputing them. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.

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Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Guzman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sunbelt-rentals-inc-v-guzman-ncwd-2022.