Sun Mut. Ins. v. Board of Liquidation

24 F. 4, 1885 U.S. App. LEXIS 2016
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Louisiana
DecidedMay 14, 1885
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 24 F. 4 (Sun Mut. Ins. v. Board of Liquidation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sun Mut. Ins. v. Board of Liquidation, 24 F. 4, 1885 U.S. App. LEXIS 2016 (circtedla 1885).

Opinion

Billings, J.

This matter is submitted upon a-bill of complaint, and affidavits and exhibits, on behalf of the complainants, and affidavits and documents on behalf of the respondents, upon an application for an injunction. The complainants are holders of “extended [5]*5bonds” and of “coupon certificates,” tinder the act of 1882, and as such holders they seek to enjoin the respondents from issuing the bonds provided for under the act of 1884 to judgment creditors, upon the ground that the means provided for the payment of the latter are more or less identical with those sot apart for the payment of the former. After a consideration of the arguments which were urged with such ability upon this question, it seems to me to be unnecessary to pass upon it. Without passing upon this question, even if the construction of the two acts be such as is contended for by complainants, there is, nevertheless, an impediment in the way of enforcing the grant of the act of 1882, so far as relates to the judgment creditors included in the provisions of the act of 1884. Both acts relate to the surplus arising under or out of the taxes levied in pursuance of the act creating the premium bond system and other property. Since this surplus is an annual result for a great number of years, wrought out by the fact that only a portion of the bonded creditors became participants in the scheme, it is in its nature and capacity to be disposed of either by the legislature or by the debtor, subject to the same legal limitations and rules as any other property. Until the legislature bad given to a creditor a grant or legislative permission to share in this property, it might have been impossible for him to present the question of his right to a share in this residue of a tax; but by the act of 1884 judgment creditors have been placed in such a situation that they can lawfully present the question of their right to a participation in this residue to the extent which this act recognizes their right.

It is to be observed that the act of 1884, under which the judgment creditors claim, includes only such judgments as had been or should bo obtained against the city of New Orleans for debts which had an existence prior to the year 1S79. It relates, therefore, only to debts owed antecedently to its passage, and has no reference to debts thereafter arising. The debts represented by the extended bonds and the coupon certificates which form the basis of the claim of the complainants were also pre-existing, having been owed by the city for many years. The debts on both sides of this controversy, therefore, were debts in existence antecedently to the passage of the act of 1882.

The article No. 3,150 (old) of the Civil Code had been in force asa, part of the law of the state since the year 1825. That article is as follows: “The property of the debtor is the common pledge of his creditors.” So far as the legislature allows municipal corporations to become debtors they are, equally with individuals, within the dominion of this law. Since the power of taxation is vested in the legislature so far as concerns the fresh levy of taxes, this rule, however binding in equity and upon the conscience of the legislators, could not be enforced. So far, also, as future debts are concerned, the legislature could to any extent exclude their holders from participation in the property of a debtor. But so far as pre-existing debts are con[6]*6cerned, and so far as relates to any revenue which, though springing from a tax, had come to have the qualities of property, — i. e.} so far as relates to this surplus, and the other property about which this contention is made, — the legislature had no power to mate any transfers or assignment which should not be ratable among all the creditors similarly situated as to the absence of liens. This provision of the statute guarantying to all the creditors this impartial distribution had entered into all these transactions on both sides, both as a limit and a guaranty, and had the force and effect of a paramount law, and restricted the old bondholders from taking, merely by virtue of the act authorizing the issue of these new obligations, any portion of the property of the debtor, which would leave any class of creditors then existing without a proportionate provision or means of payment out of the debtor’s property.

Did the act of 1882, if construed as it is contended for by the complainant, do this ? Using words in a general sense, the debtor had no property upon which a writ of fieri facias could operate. The act of 1876 had, so far as the matter was capable of legislative restriction, limited the authority of the city to levy taxes to 15 mills on the dollar. Five mills of this had been devoted to the premium bonds. By the act of 1882 five mills, if necessary, had been devoted to these extended bonds and coupon certificates. The alimony of the city, using that word to include only the expenses absolutely necessary .to enable the city government to discharge its purely public functions or duties, has been abundantly established to consume at the very least five mills.

The judgment creditors had been deprived by article 1 of the miscellaneous ordinances, subdivision 3, of the constitution of 1879, of all opportunity of using their judgments in the payment of taxes. The hollow and delusive provisions of the act of 1870, N’o. 5, had been judicially declared to be satisfied by the annual devotion on the part of the city of an amount merely nominal for the payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars of judgments. Unless, then, the judgment creditors could participate in that portion of the five-mill premium bond tax which remained after all who had any right thereto had been paid, they were left with a debtor who had been stripped of every means of paying any portion of these judgments. If, then, it was the intention of the legislature, as is contended by the complainants, by the act of 1882 to transfer to the extended bond and coupon certificate holders all of this surplus, and that intention should have operation, it would result that where there were two classes of creditors, with already existing debts, the legislative act could, by a transfer or appropriation of a debtor’s property, give to one class a preference to the exclusion of the other class, to such a degree as to give to one class an immediate and annual source of payment, and postpone to the other all payment for possibly a period of 40 years. I think the judicial decisions of all courts, and especially of our own, have [7]*7declared such a preference prohibited. For the doctrine of the statute compelling equal distribution or provision among or for co-existing creditors, i. e., to prevent any partial appropriation by tho debtor, see Succession of Taylor, 10 La. Ann. 510, and an affirmation of tho law of that case in Milne v. Schmidt, 12 La. Ann. 553. This statutory rule operates upon the legislature as well as upon the debtor. It is no more in the power of law-makers than of debtors to effect an unequal distribution of the debtor’s estate by making an application or transfer thereof among creditors already existing. This also has been judicially declared. In Atchufalaya R. & Banking Co. v. Bean, 3 Rob. 415, the court says:

“I think it clear that the legislature cannot constitutionally, by act subsequent to the creation of a debt, interfere to change or disturb the relation between debtor and creditor, or the relative rank of creditors inter se,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch.
Second Circuit, 2018
State Board of Control v. Banski
276 N.W. 626 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1937)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
24 F. 4, 1885 U.S. App. LEXIS 2016, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sun-mut-ins-v-board-of-liquidation-circtedla-1885.