Summit Bank v. Nadler, Philopena Asso., No. Cv94-0142088 S (Oct. 18, 1995)

Connecticut Superior Court

Summit Bank v. Nadler, Philopena Asso., No. Cv94-0142088 S (Oct. 18, 1995)

1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 12109

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedOctober 18, 1995

DocketNo. CV94-0142088 S

StatusUnpublished

This text of 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 12109 (Summit Bank v. Nadler, Philopena Asso., No. Cv94-0142088 S (Oct. 18, 1995)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Summit Bank v. Nadler, Philopena Asso., No. Cv94-0142088 S (Oct. 18, 1995), 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 12109 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

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Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION The defendant's motion to cite in (#129) and motion to implead (#130) are granted.

The claim that an action is barred because the statute of limitations has lapsed must be pleaded as a special defense. See Practice Book § 164; Forbes v. Ballaro, 31 Conn. App. 235, 239,624 A.2d 389 (1983); Mac's Car City, Inc. v. DeNigris, 18 Conn. App. 525,528, 559 A.2d 712, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 807, 563 A.2d 1356 (1989). Additionally, numerous superior courts have allowed a defendant to be joined in an action for purposes of apportionment even though recovery against the defendant is barred by the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Estate of Mercado v. Hartford Hospital, 9 CSR 609 (June 20, 1994, Mulchay J.); Vinci v. Sabovic,8 Conn. L. Rptr. 495 (March 16, 1993, Rush, J.); Brown v. Ill, 8 CSCR 844 CT Page 12110 (July 21, 1993, Lewis, J.). Furthermore, Public Acts 1995, No. 95-111, § 1(b), which does not apply to the present the action as it was filed prior to July 1, 1995, provides that a claim for apportionment is not barred by the statute of limitations as long as it is filed in accordance with the requirements of such section.

KARAZIN, J.

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[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION The defendant's motion to cite in (#129) and motion to implead (#130) are granted.

The claim that an action is barred because the statute of limitations has lapsed must be pleaded as a special defense. See Practice Book § 164; Forbes v. Ballaro, 31 Conn. App. 235, 239,624 A.2d 389 (1983); Mac's Car City, Inc. v. DeNigris, 18 Conn. App. 525,528, 559 A.2d 712, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 807, 563 A.2d 1356 (1989). Additionally, numerous superior courts have allowed a defendant to be joined in an action for purposes of apportionment even though recovery against the defendant is barred by the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Estate of Mercado v. Hartford Hospital, 9 CSR 609 (June 20, 1994, Mulchay J.); Vinci v. Sabovic,8 Conn. L. Rptr. 495 (March 16, 1993, Rush, J.); Brown v. Ill, 8 CSCR 844 CT Page 12110 (July 21, 1993, Lewis, J.). Furthermore, Public Acts 1995, No. 95-111, § 1(b), which does not apply to the present the action as it was filed prior to July 1, 1995, provides that a claim for apportionment is not barred by the statute of limitations as long as it is filed in accordance with the requirements of such section.

KARAZIN, J.

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1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 12109, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/summit-bank-v-nadler-philopena-asso-no-cv94-0142088-s-oct-18-1995-connsuperct-1995.

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