SUMITH SAMARAKOON, No. 2:25-cv-1271-SCR Plaintiff, v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS YVETTE ALLIVATO and JENNIFER Defendants. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, which was accordingly referred to the undersigned. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which was granted. ECF No. 9 at 7. The undersigned issued a screening order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and concluded that Plaintiff’s Complaint was legally deficient as to several causes of actions, against various Defendants, and for various requested remedies. Id. at 7-16. The undersigned gave Plaintiff 30 days to amend the Complaint, or alternatively to voluntarily dismiss the Complaint as to Defendants Tracy Toledo, Lea May Sarte, Jennifer Tercerro, and Judge Richard Distaso. Id. at 17. Plaintiff has now filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that removes Tercerro and Judge Distaso as defendants but reasserts the Complaint’s claims against Defendants Toledo, Sarte, and Yvette Allivato. ECF No. 10 at 5-6. The Court now concludes that, for screening purposes only, Plaintiff’s claims are still sufficiently cognizable as to Defendant Allivato and directs service. However, it recommends dismissal as to Defendants Toledo and Sarte without further leave to amend. As explained in the Court’s earlier screening order (ECF No. 9), the federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In reviewing the FAC, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will (1) accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions, even if cast as factual allegations. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012). A. Factual Allegations The FAC alleges that Plaintiff lived with his daughter J.S. in their family home in Modesto, California before the events giving rise to this action. ECF No. 10 at 6. He cared for her and homeschooled her for her entire life without abuse or neglect. Id. Sarte, Plaintiff’s ex- wife, retained Toledo to represent her in a custody dispute over J.S.1 Id. On June 21, 2023, six days before child support hearings, an unlawful detainer action was filed against Plaintiff (“June 2023 UD Action”). Id. Based on the timing, the FAC alleges that Toledo had instructed Sarte to file the June 2023 UD Action as a secondary method for removing Plaintiff from the home, knowing that the family court would never directly order Plaintiff to leave while J.S. was living with him. Id. at 7. This action was served by mail after the June 27 child support hearing, which highlights how eviction was a “backup strategy” for Sarte if family court failed. Id. At the June 27 hearing, Toledo argued that because Sarte was paying the mortgage on J.S.’s home, child support should be set at $0 until she moved out. Id. at 8. They also asserted
1 Latter portions of the FAC include allegations of Toledo’s conduct in other cases to demonstrate that she has a pattern defrauding and betraying clients. ECF No. 10 at 54-59. These allegations are irrelevant to the issues presented for screening purposes. the house was Sarte’s separate property, despite Plaintiff having made the down payment in 2012 when they bought the house together. Id. Plaintiff, meanwhile, argued he was being forced out of the house. Id. Nevertheless, the Stanislaus County Superior Court set child support at $0 per month from May 1, 2023, with Sarte instead paying about $1,395 per month in mortgage and utilities. Id. Minutes before the child support hearing, in the same courtroom, Sarte served Plaintiff with a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO) petition she had filed on May 27, 2023. Id. at 8-9. This was the first time Plaintiff knew about the petition, or that a DVRO hearing would commence in just two hours. Id. at 9. The FAC alleges that the delay in notice was meant to prevent Plaintiff from adequately preparing a defense or retaining counsel, despite Sarte maintaining that personal service had been compliant with the California Code of Civil Procedure. Id. Plaintiff raised these issues with Judge Alan Cassidy, who nevertheless proceeded with the DVRO hearing. Id. at 10. The hearing included a break for the parties to attempt resolution, during which Toledo “engaged in intimidating and bullying behavior” while repeating perjurious statements from the DVRO petition. Id. Based on the timing of service and Toledo’s frustration when Judge Cassidy did not grant the requested relief, the FAC alleges that the false DVRO petition was “a tactical maneuver rather than a genuine safety concern” designed to compel Plaintiff to give surrender custody of J.S. Id. Judge Cassidy ultimately found service improper, sanctioned Toledo, and continued the matter for a full trial before Judge Distaso in March 2024. Id. at 11. This trial would address economic issues, Sarte’s DVRO petition, and a DVRO petition Plaintiff had previously filed against Sarte. Id. With the DVRO petition having failed to evict Plaintiff in the interim, Toledo and Sarte proceeded with the June 2023 UD Action. Id. at 12. Despite a different attorney appearing on Sarte’s behalf for the August 3, 2023 hearing, the FAC alleges that Toledo still helped Sarte coordinate the June 2023 UD Action with the DVRO and child support proceedings. Id. All three were part of an attempt to gain leverage in custody proceedings. Id. at 13. At the August 3 hearing, the Court declined to stop the eviction, despite Plaintiff arguing this would cause significant harm to J.S., who had lived there her entire life. Id. at 14. A bailiff present at this hearing later appeared at family court custody proceedings in a different courthouse that were otherwise unrelated to the eviction proceedings. Id. On August 4, 2023, one day after the eviction hearing, Defendant Allivato, Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist and the reunification therapist in J.S.’s custody case, met with J.S. for a court-ordered reunification therapy session. Id. J.S. emerged from this session crying and told Plaintiff that Allivato had promised to explain why they were being evicted from the family home, but never did. Id. Plaintiff comforted J.S. as a parent normally would, but Allivato used this interaction as a pretext for false allegations to Child Protective Services (“CPS”) and a way to conceal her own misconduct in distressing J.S. Id. at 14-15. Later that day, CPS officers entered Plaintiff's residence without a warrant and without exigent circumstances, interrogating J.S. about allegations of sexual abuse without Plaintiff present. Id. at 15. The FAC alleges that Plaintiff reasonably felt forced into consenting to this interview. Id. It further alleges that the timing of this incident, just one day after the eviction, demonstrates coordination among Allivato, Toledo, and Sarte. Id. The FAC therefore concludes that these Defendants also submitted or coordinated the allegations of sexual abuse, emotional harm, and other forms of mistreatment that triggered this CPS investigation. Id. at 16. That investigation’s September 13, 2023 closure report held that these allegations were unfounded, and no CPS referral against Plaintiff has been filed since. Id. At a custody hearing on September 25, 2023, Defendants suppressed the fact that the CPS investigation had been closed for twelve days. Id. at 16-17. Based on the unfounded allegations, the judge issued a custody removal order and ordered Plaintiff to surrender J.S. to the Modesto Police Department without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or a finding of unfitness as a parent. Id. at 17. Plaintiff complied with this order, but Toledo would later falsely accuse Plaintiff of refusing to surrender J.S. Id. at 18. Toledo’s lie was either deliberate or made with reckless indifference, and material to restrictions of Plaintiff’s parental rights in later custody orders. Id. Plaintiff would remain separated from J.S. based on these false allegations until the March 2024 trial, all while Defendants suppressed the “unfounded” closure report and continued to repeat the allegations as if they were credible and ongoing. Id. at 40-41. Plaintiff would also be denied access to records that would have proven his innocence as to these claims. Id. at 41. From the September 25 hearing through November 28, 2023, J.S. and Plaintiff’s only communication was via secret text message. Id. at 18. In those text messages, J.S. told Plaintiff that Allivato admitted to calling CPS and initiating the allegations that led to J.S.’s removal from Plaintiff’s custody. Id. J.S. also said she hated living in San Diego and wanted to come home. Id. at 19. Allivato had threatened to take J.S.’s phone away if she kept communicating with Plaintiff, so J.S. had lied about what she did on her phone because she found their separation unjust. Id. at 19. When Toledo discovered the messages, she immediately moved for contempt against Plaintiff. Id. The FAC interprets the timing of these contempt proceedings as proof that Defendants had been monitoring J.S.’s phone and let the texts accumulate to use as grounds for contempt proceedings. Id. Plaintiff, meanwhile, filed a complaint with the Commission on Judicial Performance, asserting that any order prohibiting him from communicating with his daughter violated his fundamental constitutional rights under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Id. at 20-21. The court never ruled on Toledo’s contempt motion, possibly because doing so meant either acknowledging such orders violated constitutional rights or explicitly prohibiting such protected communication. Id. at 20. The FAC alleges that in any case, Toledo sought through the contempt motion to:
a. Weaponize normal parent-child communication as grounds for punishment; b. Intimidate Plaintiff from exercising his constitutional right to communicate with J.S.; c. Create a record portraying Plaintiff as violating court orders; [and] d. Retaliate against Plaintiff for maintaining contact with his daughter despite Defendants' efforts to completely sever the parent-child relationship. Id. During Plaintiff’s sole supervised visit with J.S. on October 26, 2023, she said she loved him and asked when she could come home. Id. at 36. Melissa Love and Melissa Hale described the visit as “safe, positive, and emotionally affirming” without signs of distress. Id. Despite Allivato not being present, she falsely alleged in a November 9, 2023 treatment summary that this visit traumatized and emotionally harmed J.S. Id. at 37. Knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, Allivato lied about this visit to influence court proceedings and justify permanently severing Plaintiff's contact with J.S. Id. at 38. Toledo filed an ex parte motion to that effect, and the FAC alleges that the timing of the motion further proves collusion between Toledo and Allivato. Id. at 38-39. The circumstances did not merit ex parte relief, as they were based on fabricated allegations after CPS had concluded the last set was unfounded. Id. at 39. The court permanently severed contact without allowing Plaintiff to cross-examine Allivato or provide the actual supervised visit log to prove she was lying. Id. at 39-40. On December 5, 2023, Plaintiff arrived at the courthouse for a scheduled hearing with intent to hand-deliver exculpatory evidence in the form of a redacted copy of CPS’s September 13, 2023 closure report. Id. at 21-22. Plaintiff was then instructed to log into the hearing virtually, therefore limiting his ability to participate. Id. Plaintiff handed the redacted report to Tercerro, a Family Court Services (“FCS”) evaluator and the court-appointed Child Custody Mediator in Plaintiff’s case. Id. at 22. She never acknowledged this evidence during the hearing, or otherwise recommend reunification or restoration of Plaintiff’s parental rights. Id. During the same proceeding in which Plaintiff submitted this evidence, a male bailiff threatened Plaintiff by reaching for his firearm. Id. at 22-23. The FAC interprets the order to call into the hearing rather than physically attend, Tercerro’s disregard of exculpatory evidence, and the bailiff’s gesture as a pattern of retaliation against Plaintiff for asserting constitutional rights. Id. at 23. Tercerro would also continue to serve as both the FCS evaluator and Child Custody Mediator, depriving Plaintiff of an independent evaluation despite demonstrated bias against him. Id. at 30. From September 2023 through April 2024, Allivato submitted various treatment summaries that the court relied on to continue separating Plaintiff and J.S. Id. at 23-24. Plaintiff was repeatedly denied access to these summaries, thereby requiring him to defend against accusations he could not even see. Id. at 24. If, for example, he had access to Allivato’s treatment summary misrepresenting the October 26, 2023 supervised visit, he could have submitted Love and Hale’s visit log to refute it. Id. at 34-35. When Plaintiff appeared in court on February 22, 2024 to request such access, he also asked what to do with the school materials he purchased for J.S. Id. at 29. Because J.S. was homeschooled and those materials reflected her primary method of schooling, this issue directly implicated Plaintiff’s right to direct his child’s education. Id. at 30. In response to Plaintiff’s questions about the materials and the treatment summaries, the court had Plaintiff escorted out of the building by five bailiffs – including one from Plaintiff’s August 2023 eviction hearing at a different courthouse. Id. at 30-31. The FAC alleges that aside from the use of five bailiffs constituting excessive force, having the same bailiff at two different courthouses demonstrates that Plaintiff was being monitored and tracked across proceedings. Id. at 31-32. The custody trial was held on March 20 and 21, 2024. Id. at 42. Toledo and Sarte both perjured themselves by testifying that they were not the ones who filed sexual abuse allegations against Plaintiff with CPS in 2023. Id. Based on the timing of the allegations so soon after eviction proceedings, the FAC alleges that Toledo and Sarte either made or coordinated these allegations. Id. at 42-43. The constant refusal to grant Plaintiff access to unredacted reports frustrates Plaintiff’s ability to prove that Toledo and Sarte were responsible, while infringing his constitutional right to confront his accusers. Id. at 51. In any case, the trial was the first time Defendants openly acknowledged that no sexual abuse had occurred, six months after CPS had declared the allegations unfounded. Id. at 43. This acknowledgment did not reverse Plaintiff and J.S.’s separation. Id. at 43. When Plaintiff tried to submit the September 2023 closure report into evidence during the trial, Judge Distaso resisted by arguing that would require submitting Allivato’s treatment summaries into evidence as well. Id. at 24-25. The court’s hesitation to enter these reports demonstrated to Plaintiff that the court had created an environment conducive to suppressing exculpatory evidence and promoting fabricated evidence. Id. at 25-26. Even after Plaintiff agreed to entry of both parties’ evidence, the court entered Allivato’s treatment summaries but not the exculpatory report. Id. at 26-28. This demonstrates that Judge Distaso coordinated with Defendants to suppress exculpatory evidence and facilitate the use of fabricated evidence against him. Id. at 28, 36. Allivato knew that the court was relying on her treatment summaries while denying Plaintiff access to them, preventing him from challenging their legitimacy, yet continued to submit them and partake in denying him due process. Id. at 33. During a recess from trial, Toledo spoke to the bailiff who restrained Plaintiff at the August 2023 and February 2024 hearings, but they ended the conversation once Toledo caught Plaintiff eavesdropping and recording it. Id. at 44. The FAC alleges that this demonstrated the conversation was improper, particularly as Toledo otherwise had no legitimate reason to talk to a bailiff who had been hostile towards the opposing party. Id. at 44-45. The FAC further alleges that Toledo was coordinating with court security personnel to intimidate Plaintiff. Id. at 45. On April 9, 2024, before the court ruled on the March 2024 trial, Toledo emailed Plaintiff asserting that “You have won and I am afraid of you and my staff is afraid of you.” Id. at 46. The FAC interprets this as proof that the evidence presented at trial established Plaintiff’s innocence and right to custody. Id. at 47. Toledo then falsely asserted that Plaintiff’s erratic behavior had placed her and her staff “in apprehension of harm,” without identifying incidents or statements justifying such fear. Id. The language in Toledo’s email mimicked the legal requirements for obtaining a domestic violence restraining order under California Family Code § 6300. Id. The FAC concludes that Toledo had written this email as predicate for seeking such an order. Id. at 48. Toledo reinforced this narrative by copying three different oversight agencies in her email. Id. at 49. Despite Toledo asserting that Plaintiff had “won,” the court ruled against Plaintiff on April 19, 2024. Id. at 47, 49. Sarte received full custody without visitation for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was required to complete six months of therapy focusing on “emotional boundaries” before he could even request modification of the custody order. Id. at 49. The FAC alleges that Toledo and court officials coordinated to deny Plaintiff relief, despite Toledo having already conceded Plaintiff’s victory. The April 19, 2024 order continued Plaintiff and J.S.’s separation based solely on Allivato’s fraudulent treatment summaries and fabricated evidence, stripping him of parental status in the process by labeling him a “third party.” Id. at 26. This label also stripped Plaintiff of custodial rights, denied him access to the treatment summaries and J.S.’s other records on confidentiality grounds, and effectively refused to acknowledge the constitutional rights he had as a parent. Id. at 27. Labeling him a third-party essentially allowed the court to strip Plaintiff of his parental rights without a finding of unfitness. Id. at 32. The FAC alleges that Toledo had coordinated with Judge Distaso and Allivato for this outcome. Id. at 34. The Clerk’s Transcript of Appeal continued to exclude CPS’s closure report and other exculpatory evidence in Plaintiff’s favor that Judge Distaso attempted to avoid entering into the trial exhibits. Id. at 28-29. Even after Plaintiff complained about this exclusion, only some of the excluded materials were incorporated into the amended record. Id. at 29. The FAC frames this as systemic coordination across courts to prevent Plaintiff from proving his innocence by suppressing favorable evidence. Id. B. Assertions of Law and Causes of Action The FAC includes various legal arguments. Quasi-prosecutorial immunity does not extend to government social workers like Allivato when, as the FAC alleges, she deliberately lied in her treatment summary and omitted material facts as to prejudice Plaintiff. Id. at 80-81 (citing, e.g., Hardwick v. County of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1120-1121 (9th Cir. 2017)). Toledo and Sarte, meanwhile, coordinated with state actors, generated false allegations against Plaintiff, and influenced state reports. ECF No. 10 at 81. The FAC alleges that this is enough to find them liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 81, 85 (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)). Based on the falsehoods in the treatment summaries, the FAC’s first claim alleges that Allivato violated Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 10 at 82-84. The FAC then claims that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, all three Defendants conspired to “fabricate evidence, manipulate judicial processes, and interfere with Plaintiff's constitutionally protected parental rights.” Id. at 84-85. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he temporal alignment, mutually reinforcing conduct, and shared use of fabricated evidence” across various proceedings was “unlikely to have occurred without an agreement.” Id. at 85-86 (citing Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 2002)).2 Third, the FAC claims that the warrantless removal of J.S. from Plaintiff’s custody on 2 Although the FAC purportedly quotes Franklin, the cited phrase does not appear in the opinion. ECF No. 10 at 86; 312 F.3d 423. September 25, 2023 constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 10 at 88-89. CPS’s warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s home and interrogation of J.S., which led to the separation, was triggered by Defendants’ false allegations of abuse. Id. Fourth, the failure to provide Plaintiff with a fair hearing before permanently separating him from J.S., including the right to present exculpatory evidence and cross-examine those who made false accusations against him, constitutes a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 89-91. Finally, Toledo and Sarte denied Plaintiff the right to confront his accusers by making false sexual abuse allegations, perjuring themselves about making those allegations, and frustrating Plaintiff’s efforts to obtain unredacted CPS reports and prove that they lied. Id. at 91-93. Based on these claims, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against all three Defendants (Id. at 95-97); declaratory relief affirming that these actions violated various constitutional rights (Id. at 97); declaratory relief that the relevant state agencies failed to adequately investigate these violations as to Toledo, Allivato, and the judiciary (Id. at 97-98); declaratory relief entitling Plaintiff to obtain unredacted CPS investigative reports (Id. at 98); and attorney’s fees and costs (Id. at 98). A. Moot Issues and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Plaintiff’s FAC resolves some of the issues identified in the Court’s earlier screening order of the initial Complaint. For example, the Court explained that Judge Distaso and Tercerro enjoy judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, respectively, for their conduct in custody proceedings for J.S. ECF No. 9 at 9-13. They are not included as Defendants in the FAC, which purports to only seek relief against “non-immune defendants whose misconduct corrupted the judicial process.” ECF No. 10 at 82. The FAC also removes any request for referral of Defendants’ actions to law enforcement, a remedy the Court previously explained was unavailable in this civil action. ECF No. 9 at 9. The Court also held, however, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred any injunctive relief for the restoration of Plaintiff’s custody of J.S., the disclosure of sealed court records, or the correction of state custody findings. ECF No. 9 at 9. This doctrine prohibits federal district courts from reviewing “the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.” Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, et al., 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986). In Miroth v. County of Trinity, the Ninth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only bars jurisdiction over cases that complain of a legal injury caused by a state court judgment, rather than by an adverse party during state court proceedings. See 136 F.4th at 1148 (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003)). It noted that the Supreme Court had limited the doctrine to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1149 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine does not bar district court litigation concerning state court decisions that an adverse party obtained through forged evidence or other falsehoods because “[e]xtrinsic fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by that court.” Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1150 (quoting Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2004)). In summary, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court judgment.” Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1151 (quoting Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140 (emphasis original)). Although the FAC omits most of requested relief from the Complaint that was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the FAC still requests a finding that Plaintiff is entitled to an unredacted copy of CPS investigative reports that concerned allegations of sexual abuse. ECF No. 10 at 98. This would effectively reverse the state court’s decision to deny Plaintiff access to those unredacted reports. See ECF No. 10 at 51. Nor does the FAC allege that Defendants deceived the court to prevent the release of those reports. Despite dismissing Judge Distaso as a Defendant, Plaintiff accuses him of colluding with Defendants to suppress exculpatory evidence, admit fabricated evidence, and deny Plaintiff access to the reports that were used against him. Id. at 28-29, 34, 36. In sum, the FAC asks this Court to overrule the state court’s decision to protect the identity of those who apparently reported Plaintiff to CPS for alleged sexual abuse. This remedy is unavailable under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and should be stricken from the FAC. B. Conspiracy Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 As with the Complaint, the FAC purports to be a “civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” with each claim alleging a violation of a constitutional right. ECF No. 10 at 1, 82-93. The first claim alleges that Allivato violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by fabricating evidence to support such separation. Id. at 82-84. The second claim, “Conspiracy to Violate Civils Rights,” alleges violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment by all three Defendants that collectively led to Plaintiff and J.S.’s permanent separation. Id. at 84, 87. The third and fourth claims further allege that all three Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by using false allegations to prompt CPS’ warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s home (id. at 88), and the Fourteenth Amendment by denying him due process before terminating his right to care and custody of his daughter (id. at 89-90), respectively. Finally, the fifth claim alleges that Sarte and Toledo infringed his Fourteenth Amendment right to confront accusers, as part of his right to due process, by denying they made the sexual abuse allegations that contributed to Plaintiff and J.S.’s separation. Id. at 91-92. The Court previously found that claims for violations of constitutional rights may proceed against Allivato, whom Plaintiff had adequately accused of judicial deception that exceeds a social worker’s quasi-prosecutorial immunity. ECF No. 9 at 11-12 (citing Rieman v. Vazquez, 96 F.4th 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2024)); see also ECF No. 10 at 80-82 (reiterating that the FAC’s allegations against Allivato constitute judicial deception). At issue is whether the FAC adequately pleads that Toledo and Sarte conspired with Allivato, such that liability under § 1983 claims plausibly may extend to them even as private actors. “A private individual may be liable under § 1983 if she conspired or entered joint action with a state actor.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441. “To prove a conspiracy between the [state] and [the private party] under § 1983, [the plaintiff] must show an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Id. (cleaned up); accord O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145, 1159 (9th Cir. 2023). “The defendants must have, ‘by some concerted action, intend[ed] to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another which results in damage.’” Mendocino Env’t Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999). “Such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants.” Id. “For example, a showing that the alleged conspirators have committed acts that ‘are unlikely to have been undertaken without an agreement’ may allow a jury to infer the existence of a conspiracy.” Id. “To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441. The FAC largely infers coordination between Defendants based on the timing of their various actions in relation to each other. See ECF No. 10 at 85-86. Allivato met with J.S. on August 4, 2023, the day after Toledo and Sarte had succeeded in evicting Plaintiff from J.S.’s childhood home, which in turn occurred after a judge had deferred ruling on the DVRO petition Toledo and Sarte filed against him. Id. at 11-14. Allivato misrepresented her observations of J.S., who was upset about losing her home, to justify allegations against Plaintiff that led to a CPS investigation. Id. at 14-17, 86. Twelve days after the investigation was closed, Toledo used those allegations to justify removing J.S. from Plaintiff’s custody. Id. at 17-18. Toledo would later move for contempt against Plaintiff for communicating with J.S. via text messages during their separation, something that Allivato had warned J.S. against doing. Id. at 18, 20. Allivato then purportedly misrepresented J.S.’s behavior during Plaintiff’s October 2023 supervised visit. Id. at 36-37. Toledo cited this treatment summary in an ex parte motion to permanently sever Plaintiff’s contact with J.S., which the court granted without permitting him to cross-examine Allivato or submit exculpatory evidence. Id. at 36-40. Allivato continued to submit treatment summaries through April 2024, which Plaintiff could not access and therefore could not dispute at trial. Id. at 23-24, 34-35. The court relied on these treatment summaries even as it refused Plaintiff’s attempts to submit exculpatory evidence, like the CPS closure report proving that the original abuse allegations against him were unfounded. Id. at 26-28, 36. Toledo and Sarte, meanwhile, perjured themselves by testifying that they played no role in the initial allegations. Id. at 42-43.3
3 The second claim’s summary of events then discusses facts that purportedly demonstrate collusion between Toledo, the court, and bailiffs. ECF No. 10 at 86-87. These allegations do not help show Toledo to be “acting jointly with state actor Allivato,” which would be necessary to The FAC lacks the allegations needed to plausibly show that these are actions taken to further a conspiracy, rather than a combination of coincidence and causation. Plaintiff repeatedly hinges his allegations as to the CPS investigation, for example, on the assumption that Toledo and Sarte guided Allivato to accuse Plaintiff of sexual abuse to begin with. Id. at 16, 42-43. This allegation is especially critical to the fifth claim, denial of the right to confront Plaintiff’s accusers, which the FAC does not levy against Allivato. Id. at 91-92. Yet the FAC also admits that Plaintiff does not know the source of these accusations in light of redactions to the relevant reports.4 Id. at 51, 91-93. Without a foundation for the accusation that Toledo and Sarte guided Allivato to accuse Plaintiff of sexual abuse, the only connection between Allivato’s reports and Toledo and Sarte’s actions is that Toledo used the reports as evidence to separate Plaintiff and J.S. See ECF No. 10 at 26-28, 38-39. This later use of the reports for litigation purposes does not plausibly show that Toledo or Sarte improperly influenced what Allivato wrote in them. Reliance on negative reports is a normal step by opposing counsel in litigation concerning custody disputes. That Toledo cited Allivato’s reports does not plausibly suggest that Defendants conspired to ensure that those reports would support Sarte’s case. Plaintiff also effectively admits that some of Toledo’s conduct at issue was justified. The FAC frames the accumulation of texts between J.S. and Plaintiff as proof that Defendants were monitoring J.S.’s communications and allowed the texting to continue so Toledo could move for contempt. Id. at 19. If Plaintiff was barred from communicating with J.S., however, Toledo cold have easily moved for contempt as soon as she learned about any texts in that exchange. Meanwhile, Plaintiff attempts to justify violating the order by arguing that it violated his constitutional right to communicate with his child, and that he filed a complaint with the Commission on Judicial Performance to that effect. ECF No. 10 at 20. This did not give him the right to violate such an order. Toledo was within her right to seek judicial intervention the moment she discovered that J.S. and Plaintiff were texting each other, whether or not J.S. lied to
plausibly state a claim for conspiracy liability under § 1983 (ECF No. 10 at 87). 4 As discussed above, the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue an order reversing the state court’s decision to redact the identity of Plaintiff’s accuser(s). See supra III.A. Allivato in the process. See id. at 19. Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Allivato misrepresented his relationship with his daughter, and that Toledo used those misrepresentations to separate them from each other. He has not adequately pled facts showing that Toledo and Sarte conspired with Allivato in effecting such alleged deception. Plaintiff therefore has not pled sufficient facts to state a claim against Toledo or Sarte under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on conspiracy liability. Because this is the only basis for holding private citizens liable for constitutional violations, Toledo and Sarte should be dismissed from all four claims raised against them in this action. As the fifth claim is not asserted against Allivato, the fifth claim should be dismissed in its entirety. C. Conclusion As before, the FAC pleads sufficient facts to state a claim against Defendant Allivato based on judicial deception for screening purposes. To the extent that this deception led to a deprivation of Plaintiff's due process rights, Plaintiff may be entitled to monetary damages and declaratory relief under § 1983 if he prevails in this action (so long as that declaratory relief does not seek to operate as an end-run around the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Eicherly v. O'Leary, 721 Fed. Appx. 625, 627 (9th Cir. 2018)). This screening determination does not preclude Allivato from moving to dismiss any claims against her after appearing in this action. The FAC does not, however, plead sufficient facts to state a claim against Defendants Toledo and Sarte. Plaintiff has not plausibly shown they are state actors subject to suit under § 1983. All causes of action should be dismissed against them, and the fifth cause of action (which is not asserted against Allivato) should be dismissed in its entirety. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1213. The Court granted leave to amend the Complaint to allege “an actual conspiracy between Toledo, Sarte, and one or more state actors, rather than a series of coincidental actions that proved adverse to Plaintiff's constitutional rights.” ECF No. 9 at 15. As discussed above, the FAC’s attempt to do so results in a more comprehensive accounting of such coincidences. See supra III.B. It is unlikely that further amendment would yield a different result. Leave to amend should be denied. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Service of the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10) is appropriate for Defendant Yvette Allivato; 2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to issue forthwith, and, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3), the U.S. Marshal is directed to serve within ninety days, all process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, without prepayment of costs; 3. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff the following: one USM-285, one summons, a copy of the First Amended Complaint, and an appropriate form for consent to trial by a magistrate judge; 4. Plaintiff is directed to supply the U.S. Marshal, within 15 days from the date this order is filed, all information needed by the Marshal to effect service of process, and to promptly file a statement with the court that said documents have been submitted to the United States Marshal. The Court anticipates that, to effect service, the U.S. Marshal will require, for each defendant in ¶ 1, above, at least: a. One completed summons; b. One completed USM-285 form; c. One copy of the endorsed filed First Amended Complaint, with an extra copy for the U.S. Marshal; d. One copy of the instant order; and e. An appropriate form for consent to trial by a magistrate judge. 5. In the event the U.S. Marshal is unable, for any reason whatsoever, to effect service on Defendant Allivato within 90 days from the date of this order, the Marshal is directed to report that fact, and the reasons for it, to the undersigned. 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on the U.S. Marshal, 501 “I” Street, Sacramento, CA, 95814, Tel. No. (916) 930-2030. 7. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed as to Defendant Allivato. 8. Plaintiff's request for docket correction (ECF No. 6) is DENIED as moot given that the supplemental memorandum that is the subject of that request was properly filed in the instant action as ECF No. 5. 9. The Clerk of the Court shall randomly assign a district judge to this action. Moreover, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: This action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Defendants Lea May Sarte and Tracy Toledo. These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” The plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). DATED: December 30, 2025 )
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18