Sullivan v. United States

149 F.2d 753, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2669
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJune 15, 1945
DocketNo. 13050
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 149 F.2d 753 (Sullivan v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sullivan v. United States, 149 F.2d 753, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2669 (8th Cir. 1945).

Opinion

SANBORN, Circuit Judge.

The sole question for decision in this case is whether the sentence imposed upon the appellant under the second count of an indictment was excessive. The appellant on March 20 1940, was indicted for two offenses: burglary of the post office at Thunder Hawk, South Dakota, on November 18, 1939, under one count: and theft of government property at the same time and place, under a second count. An endorsement upon the indictment showed that count one was based upon § 315, 18 U.S.C.A., and count two upon § 82, 18 U.S.C.A.1

Count two charged: “That Frank H. Sullivan and William H. Oestreich, on or about the eighteenth day of November, 1939, at Thunder Hawk, in the County of Corson, in the State and District of South Dakota, in the northern division thereof and within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, the sum of One Hundred Seventy-six and 63/ioo Dollars ($176.63), in currency and coins, the exact denominations thereof being to the Grand Jurors aforesaid unknown, lawful money of the United States, then and there being the personal property of and belonging to the United States of America, did unlawfully, wrongfully -and feloniously steal, take, carry away and purloin for their own use, with intent then and there, and thereby, to steal and purloin said sums of money, contrary to the Statute of the United States in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America.”

The appellant on March 22, 1940, entered a plea of guilty to the indictment. He was sentenced to imprisonment for five years under count one, and for ten years under count two, the sentences to run consecutively. On October 2, 1944, he petitioned the District Court to vacate the judgment and to correct the sentence imposed under count two, on the ground that it was excessive. His petition was denied, and he has appealed, asserting that the opinion of this Court in Robinson v. United States, 142 F.2d 431, entitled him to the relief for which he had applied.

The appellant contends that the offense charged in count two of the indictment is the offense defined in § 313, 18 U.S.C.A.2 That section provides a maximum penalty of imprisonment for three years for the offense which it defines. He also contends that if § 313 does not apply to count two, § 100,18 U.S.C.A.,3 does apply. Section 100 provides a maximum penalty of imprison[755]*755tnent for five years for the offense which it defines.

The decision of this Court in Robinson v. United States, 142 F.2d 431, does not compel the conclusion that the sentence imposed upon the appellant Sullivan under count two was excessive. That count did not state that the money stolen by the appellant was “property in use by or belonging to the Post Office Department.” The basis for the decision in the Robinson case was that the indictment against Robinson alleged that the money taken was “a part of the postal revenues of the Post Office Department”, and therefore charged that the stolen money was property belonging to the Post Office Department, within the meaning of § 313, 18 U.S.C.A.

So far as § 100, 18 U.S.C.A., is concerned, we think that it relates to embezzlement and kindred misappropriaticpis and purloinings of public moneys and property, and that it does not prescribe, and was not intended to prescribe, the maximum penalty for such a theft of property of the United States as was charged in the indictment in suit. See Crabb v. Zerbst, 5 Cir., 99 F.2d 562, 564, 565.

We have no doubt that count two of the indictment was good under § 82, 18 U.S. C.A., the statute which was relied upon by the United States Attorney in drafting that count and by the District Court in imposing sentence. See and compare Jolly v. United States, 170 U.S. 402, 407-408, 18 S.Ct. 624, 42 L.Ed. 1085; Dockter v. White, 8 Cir., 25 F.2d 74; Morrison v. White, 10 Cir., 34 F.2d 244.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Leeman
287 F. Supp. 279 (D. Nebraska, 1967)
Melvin Joseph Conerly v. United States
350 F.2d 679 (Ninth Circuit, 1965)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
149 F.2d 753, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2669, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sullivan-v-united-states-ca8-1945.