Sullivan v. Swift & Co.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Sullivan v. Swift & Co.

153 So. 2d 30, 1963 Fla. App. LEXIS 3676

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 30, 1963

DocketNo. 62-620

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 153 So. 2d 30 (Sullivan v. Swift & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sullivan v. Swift & Co., 153 So. 2d 30, 1963 Fla. App. LEXIS 3676 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of adverse summary decrees of the trial judge, dismissing her complaint for recision of a mortgage and granting the appellee’s counterclaim for foreclosure of said mortgage.

Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the appellant, which we are required to do in reviewing summary decrees or judgments [see: Pritchard v. Peppercorn and Peppercorn, Inc., Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 769; Humphrys v. Jarrell, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 404], it appears that there was no genuine issue of a material fact which would as a matter of law permit the appellant to rescind or defeat the mortgage in question upon the ground of duress. See: Jones v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., Fla.App.1959, 109 So.2d 582; [31]*31Duncan Plastering Company v. Giffen Building Specialties, Inc., Fla.App.1962, 138 So.2d 532.

Therefore, the actions of the chancellor are affirmed.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of adverse summary decrees of the trial judge, dismissing her complaint for recision of a mortgage and granting the appellee’s counterclaim for foreclosure of said mortgage.

Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the appellant, which we are required to do in reviewing summary decrees or judgments [see: Pritchard v. Peppercorn and Peppercorn, Inc., Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 769; Humphrys v. Jarrell, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 404], it appears that there was no genuine issue of a material fact which would as a matter of law permit the appellant to rescind or defeat the mortgage in question upon the ground of duress. See: Jones v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., Fla.App.1959, 109 So.2d 582; [31]*31Duncan Plastering Company v. Giffen Building Specialties, Inc., Fla.App.1962, 138 So.2d 532.

Therefore, the actions of the chancellor are affirmed.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

153 So. 2d 30, 1963 Fla. App. LEXIS 3676, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sullivan-v-swift-co-fladistctapp-1963.

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