Sullivan v. Sullivan

757 S.E.2d 129, 295 Ga. 24, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 687, 2014 WL 1266263, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 254
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedMarch 28, 2014
DocketS14F0006
StatusPublished

This text of 757 S.E.2d 129 (Sullivan v. Sullivan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 757 S.E.2d 129, 295 Ga. 24, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 687, 2014 WL 1266263, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 254 (Ga. 2014).

Opinion

HINES, Presiding Justice.

Pursuant to Rule 34 (4) of this Court, Kristen Marie Sullivan (“Wife”) was granted a discretionary appeal from the final judgment and decree of divorce (“Decree”) dissolving her marriage to Christopher Boyd Sullivan (“Husband”). The focus of the appeal is the equitable division of the appreciation of an interest in a closely-held corporation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

In 1997, Husband began working for Envirotech Environmental Services, Inc. (“Envirotech”), a closely-held Subchapter S corporation. In 1998, Husband purchased 150 shares of stock in Envirotech ($1.00 per share), and made an additional capital contribution of $35,000. Three years later, on September 29,2001, Husband and Wife were married. During the next year, Husband sold 50 shares of his stock for a total purchase price of $11,800. Husband retained 100 shares of the 1,000 issued shares of stock. As a minority shareholder, Husband was apportioned K-l income to be recorded on his tax return, but the actual cash was retained in the company. 1 The company paid any taxes associated with the K-l income.

On or about January 1, 2011, Husband and Wife separated, and husband filed for divorce on March 7, 2011. At the bench trial of the issues remaining in the divorce action, 2 Wife maintained that she was entitled to an equitable division of the appreciation of the value of Husband’s 100 shares of Envirotech stock from the date of the parties’ marriage to the date of their divorce. Husband asserted that the 100 shares of stock should not be considered to be marital property and should be awarded solely to him because they were acquired prior to the marriage, and any increase in value of the 100 shares that *25 occurred during the course of the marriage was not attributable to Wife or the marital unit but to outside market forces.

In the Decree, which was entered on September 19, 2012, the superior court found, inter alia, the following. The parties stipulated that Husband owned 100 shares of Envirotech stock; Husband purchased the 150 original shares of stock with money gifted to him by his mother; Husband held the position of Operations Manager for the company, and received a gross monthly income of $6,790; 3 at trial, Wife presented the testimony of an expert on business valuation, and the expert opined that the value of Husband’s 100 shares of stock at the time of trial was $780,000; the expert’s prepared valuation reviewed Envirotech’s earnings only from 2005 through 2011; no evidence was presented as to the value of the stock at the time of the parties’ marriage; in arriving at his opinion, the expert did not acknowledge any discounts in the stock value due to marketability or Husband’s minority shareholder status; and there was no expert testimony about Husband’s role in Envirotech.

Citing Halpern v. Halpern, 256 Ga. 639 (352 SE2d 753) (1987), the superior court found that there was no evidence presented as to what role, if any, Husband played in the increase in value of the stock; there was no evidence that Wife was the cause of any appreciation in the stock value, and that inasmuch as there was no evidence presented as to the value of the 100 shares of stock at the time of the parties’ marriage, there was no evidence of appreciation in value occurring during the marriage for the court to consider. Consequently, the superior court awarded the entirety of the 100 shares of stock and any appreciation to Husband.

1. Certainly, a spouse’s interest in a closely-held corporation may be a marital asset subject to equitable division in a divorce; this is so even when the business interest was started as the result of separate pre-marital funds. Jones-Shaw v. Shaw, 291 Ga. 252, 253 (728 SE2d 646) (2012). The key is whether there is an appreciation in the value of the business interest during the course of the marriage as a result of the spouses’ individual or joint efforts. Id. However, appreciation in value of the asset during the marriage does not render it a marital asset subject to equitable division if the appreciation is solely a result of market forces. Id. Thus, the determinative factors are the asset’s *26 increase in value, if any, during the marriage, and that any such gain be due to spousal effort, either separately or in conjunction with the other spouse. Id.

Necessarily, before determining whether any appreciation is subject to equitable division, the trial court must first be able to calculate what, if any, amount of appreciation occurred during the marriage. Jones-Shaw, 291 Ga. at 253. This means that the trial court must be able to determine the value of the interest both on the date of marriage and on the date of divorce. Id. at 254. Three principal methods for determining the value of a closely-held corporation are: the income or capitalized earnings method; the market approach method; and the cost approach method. Id. The trial court has the discretion to choose which valuation method it will employ, including whether it will choose the valuation method of one party over another or to perform its own calculation. Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274, 275 (705 SE2d 839) (2010). The party seeking the equitable division of the appreciation has the burden to establish the interest’s true market value at the time of marriage and at the time of divorce. See Barber v. Barber, 257 Ga. 488, 489 (3) (360 SE2d 574) (1987). Furthermore, opinion testimony does not establish any fact as a matter of law; consequently, the factfinder is not bound by the opinion testimony of witnesses as to value of the property involved, even if such testimony is uncontradicted. Dept. of Transp. v. Brannan, 278 Ga. App. 717, 718 (629 SE2d 481) (2006).

2. Wife contends that the superior court erred when it found there was no evidence of the amount of appreciation that occurred during the marriage. She complains that the court should have conducted a “source of funds” analysis, as outlined in Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 75-76 (377 SE2d 666) (1989), to determine what portion of that appreciation should have been awarded to her. To that end, she has offered two figures from which she asserts the superior court could have calculated the appreciation.

First, Wife offers that her expert testified that the value of Husband’s shares was $39,000 at the time of their marriage. Her expert arrived at this figure at trial by estimating the basis of Husband’s 100 shares in 2002 to be $24,000, and then appreciated that figure over a ten-year period at a five percent interest rate ($39,000). Wife argues that given the market value of Husband’s shares at the time of trial was $780,000, the superior court should have calculated the appreciation to be $741,000. However, there is no evidence that an individual’s basis in a stock share of a closely-held corporation necessarily reflects that share’s market worth on any particular date. Consequently, the superior court cannot be found to *27 have erred for declining to accept the $39,000 figure as representative of the stock shares’ true market value at the time of the parties’ marriage.

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Related

Wood v. Wood
655 S.E.2d 611 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2008)
Barber v. Barber
360 S.E.2d 574 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1987)
Halpern v. Halpern
352 S.E.2d 753 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1987)
Thomas v. Thomas
377 S.E.2d 666 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1989)
Bass v. Bass
448 S.E.2d 366 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1994)
Simmons v. Simmons
706 S.E.2d 456 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2011)
Miller v. Miller
705 S.E.2d 839 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2010)
Barton v. Barton
639 S.E.2d 481 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2007)
Jones-Shaw v. Shaw
728 S.E.2d 646 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2012)
Department of Transportation v. Brannan
629 S.E.2d 481 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
757 S.E.2d 129, 295 Ga. 24, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 687, 2014 WL 1266263, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 254, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sullivan-v-sullivan-ga-2014.