Sullivan v. State Board of Tax Administration

288 N.W. 300, 290 Mich. 664, 1939 Mich. LEXIS 752
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 15, 1939
DocketCalendar 40,441
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 288 N.W. 300 (Sullivan v. State Board of Tax Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sullivan v. State Board of Tax Administration, 288 N.W. 300, 290 Mich. 664, 1939 Mich. LEXIS 752 (Mich. 1939).

Opinion

Potter, J.

Relator asks mandamus directing respondent to reinstate bim as referee in tbe Detroit branch office of tbe State board of tax administration and for payment of wages claimed to be due. He claims bis peremptory dismissal January 13, *666 1939, because Ms services no longer would be required and for the good of tbe service, was violative of tbe civil service act (Act No. 346, Pub. Acts 1937 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1937, § 402-1 et seq., Stat. Ann. 1939 Cum. Supp. § 3.951 et seq.) and of the veterans’ preference act (Act No. 205, Pub. Acts 1897 tl Comp. Laws 1929, § 900 et seq.], as amended by Act No. 66 and Act No. 67, Pub. Acts 1931 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1935, §§ 900, 901, 903-1; Stat. Ann. §§4.1221-4.1225]).

Relator’s rights are governed by the law as it existed at the time of his discharge January 13,1939. The civil service act (Act No. 346, Pub. Acts 1937) was then in force.

The veterans’ preference act (1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 900, as amended by Act No. 66, Pub. Acts 1931 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1935, § 900, Stat. Ann. § 4.1221]) at the time of relator’s removal provided it should apply to honorably discharged soldiers, sailors and marines. The civil service act (Act No. 346, § 14, subd. 2, Pub. Acts 1937 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1937, § 402-14, subd. 2, Stat. Ann. 1939 Cum. Supp. § 3.964, subd. 2]) included, among war veterans, active nurses. The veterans’ preference act required two years’ residence in the State to be entitled to its benefits. The civil service act required no residence in the State. It was open to residents and nonresidents alike. The veterans’ preference act required residence in the county in which the office or position was located for at least one year. Under the civil service law, there was no requirement of residence in the county. The veterans ’ preference act required the veteran should be possessed of other requisite qualifications which should he at least equal to those of other applicants. Under the civil service act, war veterans who had attained the minimum earned rat *667 ings should have five points if they had not been determined to be eligible for disability compensation from the United States through the veterans’ administration, or ten points if they had been determined to be eligible for such disability compensation, added to their earned ratings.

The veterans’ preference act (1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 901, as amended by Act No, 67, Pub. Acts 1931 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1935, § 901, Stat. Ann. §4.1222]) provided the employee might be discharged for official misconduct, habitual, serious or wilful neglect in the performance of duty, extortion, conviction of intoxication, conviction of felony or incompetency, without the consent or approval of the governor. The civil service act (Act No. 346, § 17, subd. 3, Pub. Acts 1937 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1937, § 402-17, subd. 3, Stat. Ann. 1939 Cum. Supp. § 3.967, subd, 3]) provided:

“An appointing authority may dismiss a classified employee whenever he considers the good of the service to be served thereby. Any removal or separation of -an employee from the classified service shall be deemed to be a dismissal except as herein specifically provided. In every such case of dismissal, the appointing authority shall, before the effective date thereof, give written notice of his action to the director, The director shall make such investigations of the circumstances surrounding the dismissal and the fairness thereof as he may consider desirable and shall, not later than ten days after submission of the notice of dismissal, report to the commission his findings as to the justice of the dismissal. The dismissed employee may file with the commission a statement in writing concerning the dismissal. The commission, after consideration of the director’s report and the statement of the employee, if made, and after such investigation of *668 its own as it deems desirable, may, not later than thirty days after receipt of the director’s report, present its findings and recommendations to the appointing authority. If such report is submitted and if, within ten days after its submission, the appointing authority decides to rescind or modify his original action, such decision shall be reported in writing to the director and shall become effective immediately. If the commission does not submit a report of findings and recommendations to the appointing authority within forty days after submission of the notice of dismissal to the director, or if such report of findings and recommendations is submitted and no report of rescission or modification is submitted to the director within ten days thereafter, the original action of the appointing authority shall become final and binding and shall not be subject to appeal or farther review.”

Under the veterans’ preference act (1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 901, as amended by Act No. 67, Pub. Acts 1931 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1935, § 901, Stat. Ann. §4.1222]), where the veteran had been removed, transferred, or suspended other than in accordance with the provisions of the act, he could file a written protest with the officer whose duty under the provisions of the act it was to make the removal, transfer, or suspension, within 30 days from the day such veteran was removed, transferred, or suspended. Otherwise, the veteran waived the benefits and privileges of the act. Under the civil service act (Act No. 346, Pub. Acts 1937), no one has a right to compel the appointing power to restore an employee who has been discharged. The applicable provisions of the statute are above quoted. The statute provides only that a written statement concerning the dismissal may be filed.

Under the veterans’ preference act (1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 901, as amended by Act No. 67, Pub. Acts *669 1931 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1935, § 901, Stat. Arm. § 4.1222]), the relator, a State employee, was entitled to a hearing before the "governor; while under the civil service act (Act No. 346, § 17, subd. 3, Pub. Acts 1937), he was entitled only to an investigation of the cause of his removal. There was no power to compel his reinstatement. The only preferential treatment accorded a war veteran under the civil service act in force at the time of relator’s discharge was additional credits on account of his war service. Otherwise, he was in all respects governed by the civil service act.

The civil service act (Act No. 346, Pub. Acts 1937 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1937, § 402-28, Stat. Ann. 1939 Cum. Supp. § 3.978]) further provided:

“Seo. 28. Repeal. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed. Act number two hundred five of the public acts of eighteen hundred ninety-seven, as amended, being sections nine hundred to nine hundred three, inclusive, of the compiled laws of nineteen hundred twenty-nine, is hereby repealed only insofar as inconsistent with the provisions of this act.”

The veterans’ preference act and the civil service act were particularly inconsistent with each other so far as the power of removal, the right to a hearing, and the result of the hearing were concerned.

The legislature of 1939 acted upon the assumption that Act No. 346, Pub.

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Bluebook (online)
288 N.W. 300, 290 Mich. 664, 1939 Mich. LEXIS 752, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sullivan-v-state-board-of-tax-administration-mich-1939.