Sullivan v. Beason

37 So. 3d 706, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 294, 2010 WL 2367277
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
DecidedJune 15, 2010
Docket2008-CA-01827-COA
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 37 So. 3d 706 (Sullivan v. Beason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sullivan v. Beason, 37 So. 3d 706, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 294, 2010 WL 2367277 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

BARNES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Shelby Beason moved for modification of custody of his and Candice Beason Sullivan’s minor children. The chancellor granted the modification of custody, awarding physical custody of the children to Shelby and granting visitation to Candice and requiring her to pay child support *707 for the children. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s decision, Candice appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. On February 9, 2005, the Neshoba County Chancery Court granted Candice and Shelby a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The judgment of divorce incorporated the parties’ separation and property settlement agreement, which gave primary physical custody and care of their two minor children, Cole and Micaela, to Candice. The property settlement agreement was not included in the record for our review. However, the chancery court took judicial notice of the divorce judgment and property settlement agreement at trial.

¶ 8. On December 5, 2007, Shelby filed a motion to modify custody in the Neshoba County Chancery Court. Shelby’s motion alleged that a material change in circumstances had occurred in Candice’s home which had adversely affected Cole and Mi-caela. Specifically, Shelby alleged that Candice failed to provide a stable home for the children and was morally unfit to retain custody of the children. Shelby requested that the chancery court grant him sole legal and physical custody of the children, allowing Candice only restricted visitation with the children. On December 6, 2007, Shelby filed a motion for temporary relief, seeking custody of the children while his motion to modify custody remained pending. The chancery court granted the temporary change in custody, finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred in Candice’s home which was adverse to the children. The temporary custody order gave Shelby custody of the children and restricted Candice’s visitation. The temporary order prohibited Candice from visiting with the children in her home.

¶ 4. Candice filed an answer and defenses and a motion to dismiss in response to Shelby’s motion to modify custody. Additionally, Candice filed a counter-complaint for contempt and modification, arguing that Shelby had failed to meet his support obligations for the children and that custody of the children should be returned to her. The chancery court held a hearing of the matter over three days — February 25, 2008, and June 12-13, 2008.

¶ 5. At the conclusion of the hearing, the chancery court issued a bench opinion continuing the temporary custody arrangement, lifting the restrictions on Candice’s visitation with the children, and taking the matter under advisement. On August 29, 2008, the chancery court issued a written opinion denying Candice’s motions and granting Shelby’s motion to modify custody. The chancellor found that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the entry of the judgment of divorce and custody agreement. After finding a material change in circumstances, the chancellor reviewed the evidence and conducted an analysis of the evidence pursuant to Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss.1983). The chancery court granted custody of the two minor children to Shelby and allowed Candice visitation. The chancery court removed the restrictions previously imposed on Candice’s visitation.

¶ 6. Candice argues on appeal that the chancellor erred in finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred in her home and that any such change had had an adverse impact on the children.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. On appeal, this Court will not disturb a chancellor’s factual findings regarding custody modification unless the chancellor’s findings are “manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or the proper *708 legal standard was not applied.” Duke v. Elmore, 956 So.2d 244, 247 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2006).

DISCUSSION

¶ 8. When seeking a modification of child custody, the noncustodial parent must prove that: a material change in circumstances has occurred in the custodial parent’s home since the most recent custody decree, the material change adversely affects the child, and a modification of custody is in the best interest of the child. Giannaris v. Giannaris, 960 So.2d 462, 467-68 (¶ 10) (Miss.2007). Any change in custody must be predicated on the conduct of the custodial parent that poses a danger to the mental or emotional health of the child. Id. at 467 (¶ 9) (quoting Morrow v. Morrow, 591 So.2d 829, 838 (Miss.1991)). The chancellor must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a material change in circumstances has occurred. Creel v. Cornacchione, 831 So.2d 1179, 1183 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Ash v. Ash, 622 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Miss.1993)). Further, the party seeking the modification of custody bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a material change in circumstances has occurred in the custodial home. Mabus v. Mabus, 847 So.2d 815, 818 (¶ 8) (Miss.2003) (citing Riley v. Doerner, 677 So.2d 740, 743 (Miss.1996)).

¶ 9. The chancellor reviewed testimony from nineteen witnesses before determining that a material change in circumstances adverse to the children’s well-being had occurred in Candice’s home. Specifically, the chancellor noted that the home environment Candice created for the children was “dysfunctional and hostile,” and Candice’s conduct since the divorce was “immoral.” The chancellor found the father’s home a more suitable and stable environment for the children.

¶ 10. In support of his position that a material change in circumstances had occurred in Candice’s home since the divorce, Shelby presented testimony from eleven witnesses, including himself. The witnesses consisted of the children’s grandparents and teachers, Candice’s former romantic interests, and others from their community who knew Candice and the children. These witnesses revealed a series of relationships Candice had after her divorce from Shelby which the chancellor found to have an adverse impact on the children.

¶ 11. First, Shelby presented the testimony of Billy Todd, whom Candice was dating at the time of her divorce from Shelby. Billy testified that he stayed overnight at Candice’s home when the children were present, approximately three nights per week. Billy testified that he would always leave before the children awoke in the morning. Billy also testified that he maintained his own residence and did not live with Candice and the children, as Shelby suggested. However, the chancellor found in his opinion that “the testimony is abundantly clear, not only through Mr. Todd, but through the testimony of Shelby Beason, that Mr. Todd was living with [Candice] in the presence of the minor children.”

¶ 12. Following her relationship with Billy, Candice began dating and, only a few months later, married Levi Sullivan. Levi testified that he and Candice often fought in front of the children.

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Bluebook (online)
37 So. 3d 706, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 294, 2010 WL 2367277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sullivan-v-beason-missctapp-2010.