Sullivan v. Assalone, 93-883 (1997)

CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island
DecidedMarch 6, 1997
DocketKC 93-883
StatusPublished

This text of Sullivan v. Assalone, 93-883 (1997) (Sullivan v. Assalone, 93-883 (1997)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sullivan v. Assalone, 93-883 (1997), (R.I. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

DECISION
This matter is before the Court for decision on the question of whether priority should be accorded to a certain secured proof of claim filed in receivership. The pertinent facts are as follows.

John K. Sullivan (hereinafter referred to as the Plaintiff) holds a one-third ownership interest in Star-Brite Laundromat, Inc.(hereinafter referred to as Star-Brite), a closely-held Rhode Island corporation. The remaining two-thirds is owned by John R. Assalone (hereinafter referred to as J. Assalone) and/or Bonnie Lee Assalone (hereinafter referred to as B. Assalone). To capitalize this corporation, both Plaintiff and J. Assalone initially loaned Star-Brite $13,500,1 and later, when Star-Brite needed additional financing, Plaintiff made an additional $4,000 loan.2 Plaintiff and the Assalones were the sole shareholders of Star-Brite, and all were officers and directors.

Pursuant to a 1981 lease covering the laundromat premises, Star-Brite (lessee) was bound to DeNomme, Inc. (lessor) for, among other things, rent, real estate taxes assessed, and all utilities (which presumptively includes sewer use fees).3 Said lease was personally guaranteed only by J. Assalone. On September 10, 1994, because Star-Brite was delinquent on the aforementioned obligations owed to DeNomme under the lease, a special meeting of Star-Brite's board of directors was called at which time it was decided, in a 2 to 1 vote, to borrow $20,000 from Asco Group, a business owned, at least in part, by the Assalones.4 To evidence the debt, B. Assalone (as President of Star-Brite) signed a promissory note to Asco Group. Moreover, a security agreement dated that same day was also executed granting Asco a security interest in all of Star-Brite's assets, including its fixtures, equipment, inventory, receivables, and proceeds.5

While this was going on, Plaintiff had filed suit (in October of 1993) against J. Assalone, B. Assalone, ASCO, and Star-Brite seeking repayment of the aforementioned loans made to Star-Brite alleging, inter alia, that Star-Brite's assets were being mismanaged and/or misappropriated. On January 5, 1996, Star-Brite was petitioned into permanent receivership pursuant to the application of plaintiff.6 Ultimately, on August 19, 1996, a consent order regarding payment of non-insider third party claims was signed by all pertinent parties and entered into record. This order acknowledged the aforementioned unsecured claims of both Plaintiff and the Assalones against Star-Brite as well as the secured claim asserted by Asco. However, these claims were voluntarily subordinated to the valid claims of all third party, non-insider creditors of Star-Brite.

In light of the above consent order, the sole issue to be decided by this Court concerns the remaining claims of Plaintiff, the Assalones, and Asco against the balance of funds left in the receivership estate after payment of the non-insider claims by the receiver as well as payment of all administrative expenses of the proceeding. Asco claims a first priority lien on remaining monies in the amount of $20,000 plus interest and costs, and it wants any surplus paid first to it. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that both he and the Assalones should be treated as unsecured creditors as to all claims.

With these facts as background, the Court will now turn to its analysis of this matter predicated upon the law.

It is well settled that the claims of officers, directors, and/or shareholders of an insolvent institution are subject to heightened scrutiny and even dissimilar treatment. See, e.g.,Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). Courts are particularly watchful in these situations because of the fiduciary status that such insiders must observe vis-a-vis the corporation when the individual acts both for himself and for the corporation. Tanzi v. Fiberglass Swimming Pools, Inc.,414 A.2d 484, 488-89 (R.I. 1980) (citing Point Trap Co. v. Manchester,98 R.I. 49, 54, 199 A.2d 592, 596 (1964)). See also Washburn v.Green, 133 U.S. 30, 43 (1890).

The mere fact of an insider relationship by itself, however, is insufficient to warrant equitable subordination of said insider's claim. In Re Hyperion Enterprises, Inc., 158 B.R. 555, 563 (D.R.I. 1993).7 Insider status goes only to determining the standard under which the creditor's conduct is reviewed which, in this context, is one of simple unfairness. Id. See also 308 U.S. at 306 (noting that the burden is on the insider to show the good faith of the transaction and its underlying fairness to the corporation and those interested therein).8 Where the claimant is an insider of the debtor, the proponent of equitable subordination need only show that the claimant breached a fiduciary duty or engaged in conduct that is somehow unfair. InRe Colonial Poultry Farms, 177 B.R. 291, 301 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mo. 1995). Thus, it follows that if an insider or fiduciary uses his/her power to control in pursuit of his/her own personal gain to the detriment of the other creditors, such claims will generally be subordinated. See Olney v. The Conanicut Land Co.,16 R.I. 597, 600, 602 (1889); Matter of Fabricators, Inc.,926 F.2d 1458, 1467 (5th Cir. 1991); In Re N D Properties, Inc.,799 F.2d 726, 732 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that such action for one's own benefit constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty); In ReHohenberg, 191 B.R. 694, 704 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Tenn. 1996).

In the instant case, J. Assalone — majority stockholder, officer, and director of Star-Brite (a close corporation), clearly was an insider of the debtor-corporation and as such, he owed strict fiduciary duties both to it and to its creditors, of which Plaintiff is one. See Long v. AtlanticPBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 256 n. 8 (R.I. 1996) (citing Wilkes v.Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848-53,353 N.E.2d 657, 661-64 (1976)); 16 R.I. at 599-600. See also 308 U.S. at 306. Under these circumstances, his action in having Asco (another of his corporations) loan money to Star-Brite while taking a security interest in its assets is immediately suspect. The case at bar, however, presents an unusual scenerio; in light of the aforementioned consent order, the sole remaining creditors of Star-Brite are, in effect, Plaintiff and J.

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Related

Richardson's v. Green
133 U.S. 30 (Supreme Court, 1890)
Pepper v. Litton
308 U.S. 295 (Supreme Court, 1939)
Tanzi v. Fiberglass Swimming Pools, Inc.
414 A.2d 484 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1980)
Blasbalg v. Tarro (In Re Hyperion Enterprises, Inc.)
158 B.R. 555 (D. Rhode Island, 1993)
Hohenberg v. Hohenberg (In Re Hohenberg)
191 B.R. 694 (W.D. Tennessee, 1996)
Point Trap Company v. Manchester
199 A.2d 592 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1964)
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.
353 N.E.2d 657 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1976)
Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc.
681 A.2d 249 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1996)
Olney v. Conanicut Land Co.
5 L.R.A. 361 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1889)
Estes v. N & D Properties, Inc.
799 F.2d 726 (Eleventh Circuit, 1986)

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Bluebook (online)
Sullivan v. Assalone, 93-883 (1997), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sullivan-v-assalone-93-883-1997-risuperct-1997.