Sullivan, M., et ux. v. Werner Co., Aplts.

Opinion

[J-1-2023] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

MICHAEL AND MELISSA SULLIVAN, H/W : No. 18 EAP 2022 : : Appeal from the Judgment of v. : Superior Court entered on April 15, : 2021 at No. 3086 EDA 2019 : (reargument denied June 23, 2021), WERNER COMPANY AND LOWE'S : affirming the Judgment entered on COMPANIES, INC., AND MIDDLETOWN : November 19, 2019 in the Court of TOWNSHIP LOWE'S STORE #1572 : Common Pleas, Philadelphia : County, Civil Division at No. : 161003086. APPEAL OF: WERNER COMPANY AND : LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC. : ARGUED: March 8, 2023

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: December 22, 2023 We granted allowance of appeal to consider whether evidence of a product’s

compliance with industry and governmental safety standards is admissible in products

liability cases following this Court’s decision in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328

(Pa. 2014). Because we conclude compliance evidence remains inadmissible, we affirm

the order of the Superior Court.

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

As legal background, Pennsylvania has adopted Section 402A of the Second

Restatement of Torts as the law of strict products liability. Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853,

854 (Pa. 1966). Section 402A provides: (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.

In Tincher, this Court overruled Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., Inc., 391 A.2d

1020 (Pa. 1978). Azzarello and its progeny had held that Section 402A contained

negligence concepts, such as “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous,” that

had no place in strict products liability jury instructions because they confused the jury.

Instead, Azzarello concluded the trial court had to decide, as a matter of law, whether

“recovery would be justified; and only after this judicial determination [was] made [was]

the cause [of action] submitted to the jury to determine whether the facts of the case

support[ed] the averments of the complaint.” Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1026. In Tincher,

this Court reaffirmed that Pennsylvania was a “Second Restatement jurisdiction,” 104

A.3d at 399, and overruled Azzarello’s narrow construction of Section 402A that

prevented the jury from considering negligence-related rhetoric and concepts, id. at 376.

The Tincher Court explained that a seller of a product has a duty to provide a

product that is free from “a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer

[J-1-2023] - 2 or [the consumer’s] property.” Id. at 383 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A(1)) (brackets in original). To prove a breach of this duty, “a plaintiff must prove

that a seller (manufacturer or distributor) placed on the market a product in a ‘defective

condition.’” Id. at 384. The Tincher Court then analyzed the evidence necessary to prove

a defective condition in a design defect case, holding “the cause of action in strict products

liability requires proof, in the alternative, either of the ordinary consumer’s expectations

or of the risk-utility of a product.” Id. at 401. Under the consumer expectations test, “the

product is in a defective condition if the danger is unknowable and unacceptable to the

average or ordinary consumer.” Id. at 387. Under the risk-utility test, “a product is in a

defective condition if a ‘reasonable person’ would conclude that the probability and

seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of taking

precautions.” Id. at 389. The Court stated that a plaintiff may proceed under either theory,

or both theories in the alternative. Id. at 408.

Significant to this opinion, this Court had concluded, when Azzarello was the law,

that evidence of industry and governmental standards was not admissible in strict

products liability cases because such evidence went to the reasonableness of the

manufacturer’s design choice, which improperly injected negligence concepts such as

due care into strict liability cases and misled the jury from the product’s design. Lewis v.

Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., Inc., 528 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1987); see also Gaudio

v. Ford Motor Co., 976 A.2d 524, 544 (Pa. Super. 2009) (listing cases extending Lewis to

evidence of compliance with government standards). The Tincher Court discussed

Lewis’s conception of strict liability and its conclusion that compliance evidence was not

relevant to the condition of the product and therefore inadmissible in strict liability actions.

Tincher, 104 A.3d at 368. However, Tincher did not overrule Lewis or decide whether

evidence of compliance with industry and government standards was admissible in a

[J-1-2023] - 3 design defect case. Id. at 410 (stating “[t]his [o]pinion does not purport to either approve

or disapprove prior decisional law . . . relating to foundational or subsidiary considerations

and consequences of our explicit holdings.”). Instead, the Tincher Court recognized:

[T]he decision to overrule Azzarello and articulate a standard of proof premised upon alternative tests in relation to claims of a product defective in design may have an impact upon other foundational issues regarding manufacturing or warning claims, and upon subsidiary issues constructed from Azzarello, such as the availability of negligence-derived defenses . . . . These considerations and effects are outside the scope of the facts of this dispute[.] Id. at 409 (citation omitted). 1 Additionally, the Court noted that the “common law

regarding these considerations should develop within the proper factual contexts against

the background of targeted advocacy.” Id. at 410.

Following Tincher, our Court has not addressed the admissibility of evidence of

industry or government standards. However, the Superior Court, in Webb v. Volvo Cars

of North America, 148 A.3d 473 (Pa. Super. 2016), concluded “the overruling of Azzarello

does not provide this panel with a sufficient basis for disregarding the evidentiary rule

expressed in Lewis and Gaudio.” 148 A.3d at 483. Specifically, the Webb Court was not

persuaded that Tincher undermined Lewis’s rationale that a design defect could be

widespread in an industry. Id. Additionally, the Superior Court noted that Webb was not

a post-Tincher case because it was tried under Azzarello and pending on appeal when

Tincher was decided, allowing the parties to brief and argue the effects of Tincher. Id.

Because of the procedural posture of the case, the Superior Court opined that “the

continued vitality of the prohibition on government and industry standards evidence is a

1 As alluded to, “[t]here are three different types of defective conditions that can give rise

to a strict liability claim: design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure-to-warn defect.” Phillips v. A-Best Prods. Co., 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 (Pa. 1995).

[J-1-2023] - 4 question best addressed in a post-Tincher case.” Id. This Court denied allocatur in Webb.

Webb v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 168 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 2017).

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Against this legal background, the relevant factual and procedural history of this

case is as follows. Appellee Michael Sullivan was seriously injured at a jobsite when the

platform of a six-foot tall mobile scaffold collapsed, causing him to fall through the scaffold

to the ground. The platform of the scaffold was secured to the frame by two spring-loaded

deck pins that the user rotated to cover the platform after it was seated in the scaffold.

Sullivan brought a strict liability action against Appellants Werner Company (Werner) and

Lowe’s Companies, Inc. (Lowe’s), alleging that the mobile scaffold system was defectively

designed because it was possible for a user to inadvertently rotate the deck pins off the

platform during normal use. 2

Before trial, Sullivan filed a motion in limine to preclude Appellants from admitting

into evidence any industry or government standards. Mot. in Lim., 4/11/19 (R.R. at 105a).

The motion noted that Appellants’ expert, Erick Knox, Ph.D, P.E., submitted a report

suggesting the scaffold met federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) regulations and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards.

Sullivan attached as an exhibit Knox’s expert report, which stated that the product’s

“spring loaded inverted ‘L’ shaped pin is the design of choice by most manufacturers,”

and “[t]his design is compliant with ANSI and OSHA safety standards and is a reasonably

safe design for the function of holding a properly seated platform in position.” Id. at Ex.

A, ESi Investigative Report, 11/13/18 (R.R. at 145a); see also id. (R.R. at 148a) (opining

the product met ANSI A10.8-2011 Scaffold Safety Requirements and OSHA 1926

2 Sullivan also brought a negligence claim, which he withdrew at trial. N.T., 4/29/19, at 120 (R.R. at 411a). His wife also asserted a consortium claim that did not succeed at trial. N.T., 5/10/19, at 7 (R.R. at 2154a).

[J-1-2023] - 5 Subpart L). Sullivan argued that such evidence was inadmissible under Pennsylvania

law, citing to Lewis, Normann v. Johns-Manville Corp., 593 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa. Super.

1991), and Carrecter v. Colson Equipment Co., 499 A.2d 326, 330 (Pa. Super. 1985).

Mot. in Lim., 4/11/19 (R.R. at 107a). Further, Sullivan maintained that Tincher did not

affect this admissibility of evidence standard, as the Superior Court affirmed in Webb. Id.

In response, Appellants argued that they would provide fact witnesses and expert

testimony to establish the scaffold met OSHA and ANSI standards, which they contended

was admissible post-Tincher because such evidence was “relevant and probative of the

issue of product defect; whether the manufacturer acted reasonably; and/or whether the

product is unreasonably dangerous.” Resp. in Opp’n to Sullivan’s Mot. in Lim., 4/22/19

(R.R. at 162a). After hearing oral argument on the motion during trial, the trial court

granted the motion and precluded any evidence of industry and government standards

by deferring to the Webb decision. N.T., 4/30/19, at 4-10 (R.R. at 547-53a) (noting “I

wouldn’t be comfortable either way with this one, I’m going to grant the motion to preclude

talk about industry standards. The [S]uperior [C]ourt has the final word on it”).

Because Sullivan attempted to prove the scaffold was defective through the risk-

utility theory, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

Under the risk utility test[,] a product is defective if a reasonable person would conclude that the possibility and seriousness of harm outweighed the burden or cost to the manufacturer of making the product safe.

To decide whether the product is defective under this test, you should consider the following factors: The usefulness and desirability of the product, its utility to the user and to the public as a whole, the safety aspects of the product, the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury, the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe, the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility, the user’s ability

[J-1-2023] - 6 to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product, the user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their availability, because of the general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product or the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.

You may not consider any negligence, that is lack of due care, by Plaintiff, Michael Sullivan, when performing this test for defectiveness. Rather, you must consider what product a reasonable manufacturer would design, given all the factors listed above. N.T., 5/9/19, at 113-14 (R.R. at 1181a-82a).

During its deliberations, the jury asked the trial court “[d]oes OSHA inspect every

product that is put on the market, especially those with patent?” N.T., 5/9/19, at 142 (R.R.

at 2117a). The trial court responded that it could not answer that question and instructed

the jury not to consider OSHA in any way during its deliberations. Id. Additionally, the

jury asked to physically inspect an exemplar scaffold that was introduced as evidence

during trial. Id. at 143 (R.R. at 2118a). The trial court permitted the jurors to examine it

with court staff present, outside the presence of the attorneys and the trial judge, and

defense counsel covered the ANSI and OSHA certification stickers with exhibit stickers

so the jury would not see them during its inspection. Id. at 148-49 (R.R. at 2123-24a).

The next day, the jury also asked to see three other scaffolds that were not involved in

the accident, which the trial court permitted after counsel obscured the certification

stickers. N.T., 5/10/19, at 4-5 (R.R. at 2153-54a). Ultimately, the jury found New Werner

and Lowe’s liable on the design defect claim and awarded Sullivan $2.5 million in

damages. Id. at 7 (R.R. at 2154a).

Following trial, Appellants filed a motion for post-trial relief, arguing in part that they

were entitled to a new trial because “[t]he court improperly precluded defendant from

presenting evidence that its product complied with relevant industry standards and OSHA

regulations, a significant issue raised by the jury at the outset of their deliberations.” Mot.

[J-1-2023] - 7 for Post-Trial Relief, 5/20/19, at 14 (R.R. at 232a) (emphasis in original). In his response

to the post-trial motion, Sullivan relied on Webb, which he asserted “affirmed that, post-

Tincher, evidence of compliance with government and industry standards is still

inadmissible.” Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for Post-Trial Relief, 5/30/19, at 29 (R.R. at 269a).

The trial court denied Appellants’ motion for post-trial relief. Order, 9/12/19 (R.R.

at 291a). In its opinion, the trial court explained it was persuaded by the Superior Court’s

analysis in Webb concluding there was no justification post-Tincher to abandon the

prohibition on evidence of government or industry standards. Trial Ct. Op., 8/3/20, at 16.

Appellants appealed to the Superior Court.

In a unanimous published opinion, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court.

Sullivan v. Werner Co., 253 A.3d 730 (Pa. Super. 2021). The Superior Court provided

three reasons that it found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence

of the manufacturer’s compliance with industry and government standards. First,

following Tincher, the court recognized Section 402A of the Second Restatement remains

the standard which Pennsylvania courts use to determine whether a product is

“unreasonably dangerous,” and Section 402A provides that a product that is designed

and manufactured with “all possible care” can still be defective. Sullivan, 253 A.3d at 746.

Second, the Superior Court acknowledged that Tincher’s overruling of Azzarello cast

some doubt on Lewis and Gaudio. Id. However, the court noted Tincher stated that its

impact on subsidiary issues, such as this one, should develop as common law within the

proper factual contexts, and no Pennsylvania court has held that Tincher implicitly

overruled Lewis or Gaudio. Id. Third, the Superior Court observed that a manufacturer’s

compliance with industry or government standards goes to whether it exercised due care

but not to whether it defectively designed the product. Id. at 747. The court continued

that under Section 402A, “it is irrelevant if a product is designed with all possible care,

[J-1-2023] - 8 including whether it has complied with all industry and governmental standards, because

the manufacturer is still liable if the product is unsafe.” Id. Finding that Tincher did not

explicitly or implicitly overrule pre-existing precedent excluding compliance evidence and

that Section 402A provides a reason to exclude such evidence, the Superior Court

concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence in this case.

Id. at 747-48.

III. ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court granted Appellants’ petition for allowance of appeal to consider the

following issue:

Was it an error of law, under the product liability principles this Court established in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), to prevent the jury from considering the product’s compliance with pertinent industry and governmental safety standards, where this exclusion of evidence:

(1) was contrary to Tincher’s expressed intent to provide juries with greater, rather than less, ability to decide if an unreasonably dangerous defect exists in a product;

(2) was contrary to Tincher’s recognition that strict liability and negligence substantially overlap in product liability cases, particularly as to the “risk/utility” defect theory plaintiffs pursued in this case; and

(3) would once again leave Pennsylvania product liability law in a distinct minority position, concerning admissibility of compliance evidence. Sullivan v. Werner Co., 279 A.3d 1183 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam).

This Court generally reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including the

decision to grant or deny a motion in limine, for an abuse of discretion. “An abuse of

discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a

different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

[J-1-2023] - 9 prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.”

Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 379 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Grady v. Frito-Lay,

Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1046 (Pa. 2003)). Further, a decision that overrides or misapplies

the law constitutes an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277,

1281 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. McAleer, 748 A.2d 670, 673 (Pa. 2000)).

However, we exercise plenary review when a trial court’s evidentiary ruling turns on a

question of law. Schroeder v. Jaquiss, 861 A.2d 885, 889 n.8 (Pa. 2004). Here, the issue

turns on a question of law, i.e., the admissibility of evidence of compliance with

governmental or industry safety standards in strict liability design defect cases.

IV. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Appellants argue that compliance evidence should be admissible, when relevant,

following Tincher and the adoption of Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. They

emphasize Tincher reshaped products liability law by overruling Azzarello, removing the

absolute separation of negligence and strict liability, returning to the jury Section 402A’s

“unreasonably dangerous” element, rejecting the notion that product suppliers are

“guarantors” of the product’s safety, and endorsing a composite test incorporating

consumer expectations and risk-utility. Appellants’ Brief at 18.

Because Tincher returned the unreasonably dangerous inquiry to the jury,

Appellants contend we should reinstate “the pro-admissibility evidentiary principles that

existed pre-Azzarello.” Id. at 19. Before Azzarello, Appellants explain, compliance

evidence was admissible as relevant to proving product defect. Id. at 19-20 (discussing

Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1968)). Appellants also note that this Court

held evidence of a manufacturer’s customary practice was admissible as tending to show

that the product was not defective or unreasonably dangerous when it left the

manufacturer’s control. Id. at 20 (citing Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 242 A.2d 231,

[J-1-2023] - 10 235 (Pa. 1968). The evidence was admissible even though it also tended to show due

care because “[i]t is elementary that evidence admissible for one purpose is not rendered

inadmissible because it would be inadmissible for another purpose and the jury might

improperly consider it for that other purpose.” Id. at 20 (quoting Bialek, 242 A.2d at 235).

Further, Appellants clarify that courts held either party could introduce compliance

evidence on the question of whether a product was unreasonably dangerous under

Section 402A. Appellants’ Brief at 21 (citing Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 281

A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Super. 1971) (permitting evidence of the seller’s compliance with

Federal Aviation Agency regulations to show the product was not unreasonably

dangerous)). Appellants urge us to return to this pre-Azzarello common law holding that

compliance evidence is admissible.

To bolster their pre-Azzarello common law argument, Appellants assert that

Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, adopted in 1998, endorse a liberal

approach to relevancy, defining relevant material as evidence that “has any tendency to

make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Id. at 22

(quoting Pa.R.E. 401(a)). The combination of Tincher and the Rules of Evidence, in

Appellants’ view, favors the admission of compliance evidence, which they claim goes to

the “material fact” in strict liability of the existence of a “defective condition unreasonably

dangerous.” Id. (quoting Tincher, 104 A.3d at 400).

Appellants argue that Tincher’s overruling of Azzarello must extend to Lewis. Id.

at 24. They contend that Lewis’s per se exclusion of compliance evidence was based on

Azzarello’s conception of strict liability in which the seller was the guarantor of product

safety, and the jury did not decide whether the product was unreasonably dangerous. Id.

at 25. Because Tincher overruled Azzarello on these points, Appellants assert “Tincher

demolished Lewis’ Azzarello-based reasoning, leaving nothing standing.” Id. at 26.

[J-1-2023] - 11 Moreover, Appellants criticize Lewis for sidestepping a relevancy analysis and instead

applying Azzarello. Id. at 30. They also note that “Lewis recognized that, in other

jurisdictions applying the same defect standards that Tincher now follows, standards

compliance evidence is ‘relevant to the question of whether a product design is

‘unreasonably dangerous[.]’’” Id. at 31 (quoting Lewis, 528 A.2d at 593-94). Accordingly,

as the Lewis per se exclusionary rule is inconsistent with Tincher and the Rules of

Evidence, Appellants urge us to discard Lewis in favor of a relevance-based rule in which

compliance evidence is generally admissible. Id. at 33-34. 3

To support their relevance-based approach, Appellants invoke Tincher’s

composite approach to product defect, employing both the consumer expectations and

risk-utility tests. Id. at 34. They argue that compliance evidence is relevant in this

composite framework. Id. at 37. Seizing on Tincher’s description of the risk-utility test as

reflecting the “negligence roots of strict liability” and centered on a “post hoc” analysis of

“whether a manufacturer’s conduct in manufacturing or designing a product was

reasonable,” Appellants maintain the risk-utility test “captures ‘traditional negligence’

principles, such as the reasonable foreseeability of harm caused by the defendant’s

action.” Id. at 38 (quoting Tincher, 104 A.3d at 404-05). In Appellants’ view, industry

standards and governmental regulations contribute to the condition of the product. Id. 4

3 Amici curiae Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform, Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association, and American Property Casualty Insurance Association argue that we should overrule Lewis and eliminate the per se exclusion of compliance evidence in design defect cases. Amici Br. at 5. Amici view Lewis’s bright-line rule as incompatible with Tincher’s holding that the consumer expectation and risk/utility tests apply in strict liability. Id. at 9. Further, Amici assert that plaintiffs pursuing a design defect case are challenging the choices in the manufacturer’s design. Id. at 11. Depriving the jury of compliance evidence, in Amici’s view, forces the jury to decide whether the design was defective in a vacuum. Id. at 12. 4 Amicus curiae Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel (PADC) maintains compliance evidence is relevant in design defect cases because government and industry (continued…)

[J-1-2023] - 12 Appellants claim that compliance evidence is relevant to juries deciding the risk/utility

question: “[w]ithout this highly probative information, a jury of laypersons is forced to rely

solely on the often limited opinions of the parties’ paid litigation experts, or else to make

uninformed guesses about how a manufacturer should appropriately balance safety,

feasibility, and cost.” Id. at 39. 5 Appellants highlight that this case illustrates that point

because the jury during its deliberations asked whether OSHA inspects every product

that is put on the market. Id. at 40.

Additionally, Appellants discuss persuasive authority supporting their position.

Appellants state that “[a]t least 45 states and the District of Columbia consider compliance

evidence admissible.” Id. at 41-42 (citing Daller & Daller, “Product Liability Desk

Reference: A Fifty-State Compendium” (Wolters Kluwer, 2021 mid-year); 1 Owen & Davis

on Products Liability § 6:9, at 578 and 591 (4th ed. Supp. 2021)). 6 Appellants emphasize

standards are the starting point for the design of any product, and compliance evidence relates to several elements of the risk/utility test and the consumer’s expectations, such as “acknowledged risks, the product’s utility, and the feasibility or wisdom of alternative designs.” PADC’s Amicus Br. at 23. Likewise, Amicus curiae the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC) argues that compliance evidence is relevant because manufacturers rely on industry and government standards as guideposts when designing a product. USCC’s Amicus Br. at 6. Further, Amicus suggest compliance should be a defense to products liability claims to incentivize manufacturers to comply with safety standards. Id. at 8. 5 Amicus curiae International Association of Defense Counsel (IADC) argue that compliance evidence can be relevant to the risk/utility factors and to the credibility of experts, but it should not be categorically admissible or inadmissible. IADC’s Amicus Br. at 3. Instead, if it is relevant, it should be subject to the ordinary rules of evidence, including Rule 403’s exclusion of evidence when certain dangers outweigh the probative value. Id. at 10. Here, it was relevant to several risk/utility factors and should have been admitted in IADC’s view. Id. at 5-7. 6 Amicus curiae The Product Liability Advisory Council (PLAC) offers a chart detailing the

case law of other jurisdictions, showing most jurisdictions have held compliance evidence is admissible. PLAC’s Amicus Br. at 3-12. PLAC notes these decisions are “rooted in the fundamental norms of faith in the jury system and commitment to maximum transparency in the factfinding process.” Id. at 13.

[J-1-2023] - 13 that the jurisdictions from which Tincher derived the composite test, California and Illinois,

have held standards compliance evidence is admissible in strict liability. Id. at 42-43

(discussing Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp., 424 P.3d 290 (Cal. 2018), and Calles v. Scripto-

Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. 2007)).

Appellants criticize the Superior Court’s reliance on Webb for the proposition that

“the Lewis/Gaudio evidentiary prohibition remained good law” after Tincher. Id. at 46

(quoting Sullivan, 253 A.3d at 743). Instead, Appellants point out that Webb demurred

on the question, expressing a preference to address the question in a post-Tincher case.

Id. (citing Webb, 148 A.3d at 483). Further, Appellants fault the Superior Court for

attempting to reinstate the divide between the due care and conduct of the manufacturer

and the condition of the product, which they view as “parrot[ing] Azzarello without using

the name.” Id. at 47. Appellants assert the Superior Court should have recognized that

compliance evidence has a Rule 401 tendency to prove both the manufacturer’s conduct

and the condition of the product. Id. Even if the evidence remains inadmissible as to the

manufacturer’s conduct, Appellants claim it should be admissible on the product defect

issue and reemphasize that “evidence admissible for one purpose is not rendered

inadmissible because it would be inadmissible for another purpose[.]” Id. at 47-48

(quoting Bialek, 242 A.2d at 235). If misleading the jury is a concern in a particular case,

Appellants propose that “such issues may be alleviated in the usual way, with limits on

argument and jury instructions.” Id. at 48. 7 In sum, Appellants’ position is that compliance

7 Amicus curiae The Pennsylvania Defense Institute (PDI) maintains Tincher rendered

Lewis’s exclusionary rule obsolete because Lewis was based on the premise that negligence concepts have no place in strict liability. PDI argues that under the Rules of Evidence, all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by law. Because compliance evidence is relevant, Amicus contends it should be admissible, subject to limiting instructions to assist the jury in properly considering it. PDI’s Amicus Br. at 13 (“[c]omparison of a finished product to a regulation or standard yields direct evidence, requiring no process of inference, about its condition, quality and fitness[,]” which does not implicate a manufacturer’s due care).

[J-1-2023] - 14 evidence should be admissible when relevant, subject to the other rules of evidence, as

the trial court may limit its improper consideration with jury instructions.

In contrast, Sullivan argues compliance evidence pertains solely to due care, which

is ultimately irrelevant because Section 402A states that a seller is strictly liable “although

the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of [its] product.”

Sullivan’s Brief at 23 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A). Tincher, in

Sullivan’s view, maintained Section 402A as the standard for product liability and did not

overrule Lewis. Id. at 26. Sullivan further notes that Tincher declined to adopt the Third

Restatement of Torts, which includes negligence principles in its characterization of

design defect and permits the admissibility of the product’s compliance with applicable

safety standards and regulations as nonconclusive evidence of product defect. Id. at 28-

29 (discussing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 2, 4). 8 Sullivan

8 The Third Restatement defines the three categories of product defect as follows:

A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:

(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product;

(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe;

(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the (continued…)

[J-1-2023] - 15 argues that Appellants are attempting to achieve a result that is inconsistent with the

framework for products liability that Tincher articulated. Id. at 30.

Additionally, Sullivan accuses Appellants of misrepresenting Tincher to support

their argument that Tincher eliminated the divide between negligence and strict liability.

Id. at 31. For instance, Sullivan notes that Appellants cite Tincher as stating the divide is

unnecessary because “[i]n design cases the character of the product and the conduct of

the manufacturer are largely inseparable,” which Sullivan points out is a quote from then-

Justice Saylor’s concurrence in Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1015 (Pa.

2003) (Saylor, J., concurring), and the Tincher Court did not adopt that statement as

Pennsylvania law. Id. at 32. Similarly, Sullivan notes that Appellants purport to quote

provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2. Additionally, the Third Restatement specifically addresses compliance evidence as follows: In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate instructions or warnings:

(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation renders the product defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation; and

(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.

Id. § 4.

[J-1-2023] - 16 Tincher for the notion that it “tempered [strict liability] by a negligence-based concept of

defect,” when that is also a quote from then-Justice Saylor’s concurrence in Phillips, not

a statement of the Tincher Court. Id. at 32-33. Further, Sullivan asserts that Appellants

incorrectly portray Tincher as stating that the risk-utility test “has all the earmarks of

determining negligence,” where that was the Tincher Court’s parenthetical description of

the Supreme Court of Illinois’ decision in Blue v. Environmental Engineering, Inc., 828

N.E.2d 1128, 1140-41 (Ill. 2005), and not a statement of Pennsylvania law. Id. at 33-34.

Accordingly, Sullivan argues that Appellants’ brief “repeatedly quotes Tincher out-of-

context in support of its theme that Tincher supposedly dismantled the wall between

negligence and strict liability[.]” Id. at 34.

Sullivan continues that our decision in Roverano v. John Crane, Inc., 226 A.3d 526

(Pa. 2020), shows that our Court has preserved the distinction between negligence and

strict liability claims. Id. at 35. In concluding that Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act did not

require a jury to apportion strictly liable defendants’ shares of liability on a percentage

basis, Sullivan notes that our Court “reaffirmed that ‘strict liability is ‘liability without fault.’’”

Id. at 37 (quoting Roverano, 226 A.3d at 538). Sullivan recognizes that we explained that

negligence notions are not applicable in strict liability based on Tincher’s statement that

“the tortious conduct at issue [in strict liability] is not the same as that found in traditional

claims of negligence and commonly associated with the more colloquial notion of ‘fault.’

In this sense, introducing a colloquial notion of ‘fault’ into the conversation relating to strict

product liability in tort detracts from the precision required to keep this legal proposition

within rational bounds.” Id. at 37 (quoting Roverano, 542-43) (brackets added). Based

on our analysis in Roverano, Sullivan argues Appellants’ claim that Tincher made strict

liability “more negligence-like” is inapt, and Sullivan faults Appellants for failing to

acknowledge Roverano. Id. at 39.

[J-1-2023] - 17 Responding to Appellants’ reliance on persuasive authority, Sullivan urges us to

look to post-Tincher Pennsylvania intermediate court rulings. Id. at 40. Sullivan highlights

that the Superior Court in Webb concluded that Tincher’s overruling of Azzarello did not

undermine the evidentiary rule of Lewis and Gaudio. Id. at 40-41. Additionally, in Dunlap

v. Federal Signal Corp., 194 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2018), Sullivan notes the Superior

Court affirmed the exclusion of compliance evidence at the summary judgment stage to

establish the effectiveness of the plaintiff’s alternate design. Id. at 42-43. Sullivan points

out that the Superior Court’s decision in this case was consistent with Webb and Dunlap.

Here, in Sullivan’s account, the Superior Court acknowledged the risk-utility factors

supplied by Dean John Wade 9 and listed in Tincher, but it did not see the relevance of

compliance evidence to those factors. Id. at 44. Rather, Sullivan agrees with the Superior

Court that compliance evidence is not relevant under Section 402A because Section

402A imposes liability regardless of the seller’s care, and compliance evidence shows

only due care. Id. at 46. 10

In response to Appellants’ citation to other states’ rulings on compliance evidence,

Sullivan initially notes that fourteen other states’ highest courts permit compliance

9 See infra p.22-23 n.11.

10 Amici curiae American Association for Justice, Pennsylvania Association for Justice, et

al. (AAJ), argue that “unreasonably dangerous” applies to the nature of the product, not to the manufacturer’s conduct in complying with industry or government standards. Thus, Appellants’ approach of focusing on compliance is not relevant to the issue of whether the product was unreasonably dangerous and defectively designed. “The conduct of the manufacturer should not be judged by reference to other manufacturers; it is the product which must be judged as either sufficient or deficient, a focus that the Tincher court reaffirmed.” AAJ’s Amici Br. at 25 (emphasis in original). Similarly, amici curiae The Center for Auto Safety and The Attorneys Information Exchange Group (CAS) argue that compliance evidence goes to the manufacturer’s due care and distracts the jury’s focus from the facts of the case and the product at issue. CAS’s Amici Br. at 8, 16.

[J-1-2023] - 18 evidence under certain circumstances. Id. at 55. Sullivan claims, without citation, that

some of these jurisdictions follow the Third Restatement while one does not recognize

strict liability causes of action (Delaware). Id. at 56 (citing Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md.,

Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980)). Sullivan distinguishes California’s approach because

that state shifts the burden of proof to defendants to prove that the product is not defective

after the plaintiff shows the product caused an injury. Id. Additionally, Sullivan notes that

the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the Calles decision Appellants cite, held a plaintiff can

introduce evidence of a defendant’s noncompliance with industry or government safety

standards, but it did not hold a defendant can introduce evidence of its compliance with

such standards. Id. at 62 n.3 (discussing Calles, 864 N.E.2d at 260).

Regarding Appellants’ invocation of Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401 and 402,

Sullivan contends Appellants waived their argument by failing to raise it in the trial court

and the Superior Court. Id. at 47-49. In addition to the Rules of Evidence argument,

Sullivan contends Appellants have waived any argument that stare decisis considerations

weigh in favor of overruling Lewis. Id. at 52. Moreover, Sullivan argues stare decisis

considerations counsel against overruling Lewis, raising the legislature’s inaction since

Lewis was issued in 1987 and the potential upheaval in product liability cases from

overruling Lewis. Id. at 53-55. For these reasons, Sullivan asks us to affirm the Superior

Court’s decision that compliance evidence remains inadmissible post-Tincher.

In their reply brief, Appellants dismiss Sullivan’s waiver argument as

“hypertechnical” and contend their invocation of the Rules of Evidence simply provides

additional legal authority in support of their basic theory that Lewis is no longer good law.

Appellants’ Reply Brief at 1 n.1 (citing HIKO Energy, LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 209

A.3d 246, 262 (Pa. 2019)). On the merits, Appellants reiterate the main points from their

principal brief described above. In sum, Appellants’ view is that compliance evidence is

[J-1-2023] - 19 admissible but not dispositive. Appellants acknowledge that if a trial court finds the

evidence unhelpful or prejudicial, it may exclude it under Pa.R.E. 403. Appellants

conclude that “[s]tandards compliance is relevant evidence in product liability litigation,

and consistent with Tincher and Pennsylvania law, juries should hear all relevant

evidence—nothing more, nothing less. The Court should allow juries to weigh this

evidence in their deliberations and to give it the weight they believe it deserves.” Id. at

26.

V. ANALYSIS

We conclude that evidence of compliance with industry standards is inadmissible

under the risk-utility test in strict products liability cases. In this regard, we reaffirm the

post-Tincher validity of the rule announced in Lewis.

As discussed above, in Lewis, this Court concluded that evidence of industry

standards and a product’s widespread design within an industry “go to the

reasonableness of the [defendant’s] conduct in making its design choice, [and] that such

evidence would have improperly brought into the case concepts of negligence law.”

Lewis, 528 A.2d at 594. The Lewis Court explained that the proper focus of a design

defect case is on the characteristics of the product and not the conduct of the

manufacturer. Id. at 593. The Court recognized that Azzarello was “in harmony” with

focusing on the product and prohibiting the introduction of “negligence concepts” in strict

liability cases, and the Court further emphasized that “the Restatement (Second) of Torts

makes it clear that the imposition of strict liability for a product defect is not affected by

the fact that the manufacturer or other supplier has exercised ‘all possible care.’” Id. The

Lewis Court also reasoned that industry standards evidence “would have created a strong

likelihood of diverting the jury’s attention from the [defendant’s product] to the

reasonableness of the [defendant’s] conduct in choosing its design.” Id. at 594.

[J-1-2023] - 20 Accordingly, Lewis held compliance evidence was inadmissible as it had “a tendency to

distract the jury from its main inquiry or confuse the issue.” Id.

Although Tincher overruled Azzarello, it did not overrule Lewis or criticize its

reasoning. In returning to the jury the decision of whether to impose strict liability, the

Tincher Court emphasized strict liability remained a distinct theory from negligence:

Nevertheless, the tortious conduct at issue [in strict product liability] is not the same as that found in traditional claims of negligence and commonly associated with the more colloquial notion of ‘fault.’ In this sense, introducing a colloquial notion of ‘fault’ into the conversation relating to strict product liability in tort detracts from the precision required to keep this legal proposition within rational bounds. Tincher, 104 A.3d at 400. Further, while recognizing that strict liability “overlaps in effect

with the theories of negligence and breach of warranty,” the Court distinguished strict

liability as “effectuat[ing] a further shift of the risk of harm onto the supplier than either

negligence or breach of warranty theory by combining the balancing of interests inherent

in those two causes of action.” Id. at 401-02 (emphasis in original). The duty involved in

strict liability—to produce and/or market a product without “a defective condition

unreasonably dangerous”—is different from the duty of due care in negligence. Id. at 383

(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)).

To prove a breach of this duty in design defect cases, Tincher replaced the

Azzarello standard with a “composite test” in which the consumer-plaintiff may show a

defective condition through either (or both) the consumer expectations test or the risk-

utility test. Id. at 401. In its thorough exposition of the development of strict liability, the

Court explained that the consumer expectations test, based on the consumer’s

expectation that a seller placing a product on the market impliedly represents the product

is not unreasonably dangerous, derived from the breach of warranty roots of strict liability.

Id. at 402-03. Meanwhile, the risk-utility test, focusing on the manufacturer’s risk-benefit

[J-1-2023] - 21 calculus, reflected its negligence strands. Id. at 403-04. Regardless of which test is used,

the duty is to provide a product free from a defective condition unreasonably dangerous

to the consumer, and liability may be incurred irrespective of fault. Id. at 403 (recognizing

all definitions of defect “effectuat[e] the single policy that those who sell a product are held

responsible for damages caused to a consumer by the reasonable use of the product.”).

In articulating the composite test to prove a defect, the Tincher Court did not address the

viability of the Lewis rule going forward. Id. at 410.

We examine the Lewis rule in light of the factors that a jury must consider when

applying the risk-utility test. Under the risk-utility standard, “a product is in a defective

condition if a ‘reasonable person’ would conclude that the probability and seriousness of

harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of taking precautions.” Id. at

389. In its discussion of the risk-utility standard, the Tincher Court enumerated the risk-

utility factors identified by Dean Wade, 11 but noted the difficulty using those factors in a

11 The so-called “Wade factors” are:

(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the public as a whole.

(2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.

(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe.

(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.

(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.

(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their availability, because of general public (continued…)

[J-1-2023] - 22 typical design defect case. Id. Instead, the Tincher Court adopted the composite test as

set forth by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443

(Cal. 1978), which contained a nonexclusive list of risk-utility factors: “the gravity of the

danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the

mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved

design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would

result from an alternative design.” Barker, 573 P.2d at 455. 12 As noted above, the trial

court in this case instructed the jury to consider the following factors, which are verbatim

six of the Wade factors:

The usefulness and desirability of the product, its utility to the user and to the public as a whole, the safety aspects of the product, the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury, the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe, the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility, the user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product, the user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their availability, because of the general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product or the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.

knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.

(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.

Tincher, 104 A.3d at 389-90 (quoting John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-838 (1973)). 12 The Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions (PA-JIICIV) are modeled

after the Barker factors. See PA-JIICIV 16.20 and Subcommittee Note.

[J-1-2023] - 23 N.T., 5/9/19, at 113-14. Regardless of the formulation of the risk-utility test, the focus is

clearly on the characteristics of the product.

We reaffirm Lewis and hold that evidence of a product’s compliance with

governmental regulations or industry standards is inadmissible in design defect cases to

show a product is not defective under the risk-utility theory. To be clear, compliance

evidence is simply evidence of the ultimate conclusion that a product complies with

government regulations or industry standards, i.e., that a government agency or industry

organization would deem the product not defective. It is not evidence of the underlying

attributes of the product that make it compliant with regulations or standards, which is

presumably admissible subject to the ordinary Rules of Evidence. We agree with the

Lewis Court’s assessment that the focus of a design defect case must be limited to the

characteristics of the product, and not the conduct of the manufacturer or seller. See

Lewis, 528 A.2d at 593. Compliance evidence does not prove any characteristic of the

product; rather, it diverts attention from the product’s attributes to both the manufacturer’s

conduct and whether a standards-issuing organization would consider the product to be

free from defects. Neither of these considerations are pertinent to a risk-utility analysis.

The standards that the trial court ruled inadmissible were issued by OSHA and

ANSI. Because Appellants did not submit the standards to the trial court in the form of

an offer of proof when the trial court ruled on the motion in limine, it is unclear which

specific standards Appellants sought to introduce. 13 Generally, those standards govern

conduct. OSHA standards seek to regulate the conduct of employers and employees to

13 Even agreeing with the evidentiary concerns expressed in Justice Donohue’s concurring opinion, our analysis remains apt as evidence that a manufacturer designed its product to conform to ANSI, OSHA, or any third-party standards goes to the manufacturer’s due care in designing a product and results in a sub-trial on the weight due to those standards,” which diverts the jury’s focus from the product. See Concurring Op. (Donohue, J.) at 7-8. Again, the focus is on the product’s characteristics, not the manufacturer’s conduct.

[J-1-2023] - 24 ensure safe and healthful working conditions. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 651. ANSI

standards seek to regulate a manufacturer’s conduct in designing and manufacturing a

product. Accordingly, compliance with those standards reflects on the manufacturer’s

conduct and not any attribute of the product itself. That OSHA or ANSI would deem a

defendant’s conduct compliant with its standards is not relevant to the risk-utility test and

diverts the jury’s attention from the relevant inquiry.

We disagree with Appellants that “Tincher demolished Lewis’ Azzarello-based

reasoning.” Appellants’ Brief at 26. As discussed above, Lewis based its exclusion of

compliance evidence on both Azzarello and Section 402A of the Second Restatement.

See Lewis, 528 A.2d at 594. Tincher reaffirmed that Pennsylvania is a Second

Restatement jurisdiction. Further, to maintain the distinction between strict liability and

negligence, we cannot permit negligence concepts such as fault and due care to creep

into strict liability. See Tincher, 104 A.3d at 400 (“introducing a colloquial notion of ‘fault’

into the conversation relating to strict product liability in tort detracts from the precision

required to keep this legal proposition within its rational bounds.”). Compliance evidence

shifts the jury’s focus away from the characteristics of the product and suggests that the

jury consider the manufacturer’s conduct or an organization’s safety standards. While

Appellants assert that compliance evidence is relevant to whether a product is

unreasonably dangerous and the condition of the product, evidence that a third-party

does not consider the product defective or that a manufacturer complied with those

standards does have any tendency to make any of the risk-utility factors outlined above

more probable.

In essence, Appellants are proposing that we adopt the Third Restatement of Torts’

approach to compliance evidence, which states that “a product’s compliance with an

applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation is properly considered in

[J-1-2023] - 25 determining whether the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be

reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as a matter

of law a finding of product defect.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§ 4. However, Tincher refused to adopt the Third Restatement, explaining its approach

was “problematic” for numerous reasons, including that its limitation of strict liability to

cases where an alternate design existed and its special evidentiary rules (including its

position on compliance evidence in Section 4) may not be “consistent with the public

policy that compensation is available for an injury caused by any type of defective

product.” Tincher, 104 A.3d at 395-96. Ultimately, Tincher concluded the Third

Restatement’s approach was an insufficient reflection of the law and decided to retain the

Second Restatement, explaining “[u]nlike the Third Restatement, we believe that the

Second Restatement already adopted, and properly calibrated, permits the plaintiffs to

tailor their factual allegations and legal argumentation to the circumstances as they

present themselves in the real-world crucible of litigation, rather than relying upon an

evidence-bound standard of proof.” Id. at 399. Because Tincher considered and rejected

the Third Restatement, we reject Appellants’ attempt to move us toward the Third

Restatement in this case.

Further, Appellants’ argument that Tincher recognized that strict liability and

negligence overlap is misplaced. As explained above, Tincher recognized that the risk-

utility test reflects the negligence roots of strict liability. However, Tincher did not adopt

the risk-utility test to incorporate negligence concepts such as fault and due care into strict

liability. Instead, Tincher was careful to distinguish the duty involved in strict liability from

the duty of due care in negligence. See Tincher, 104 A.3d at 383. One method to prove

a product was in a “defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” i.e., in breach of the

strict liability duty, is the risk-utility test. Tincher rejected Appellants’ position that this test

[J-1-2023] - 26 incorporates negligence considerations. See id. at 400 (“the tortious conduct at issue is

not the same as that found in traditional claims of negligence and commonly associated

with the more colloquial notion of ‘fault.’”).

Lastly, Appellants’ argument that our decision places Pennsylvania in a minority

position regarding the inadmissibility of compliance evidence is unavailing. Our decision

is based on our analysis and application of Pennsylvania precedent regarding the

development of strict product liability. We adhere to Section 402A’s principle that strict

liability may be imposed even if a defendant exercised “all possible care.” Strict liability

remains distinct from negligence in that it imposes liability without fault. It reflects the

“social and economic policy of this Commonwealth,” which is that “those who sell a

product (i.e., profit from making and putting a product in the stream of commerce) are

held responsible for damage caused to a consumer by the reasonable use of the product.

The risk of injury is placed, therefore, upon the supplier of the products.” Tincher, 104

A.3d at 381-82 (citations omitted). The focus in a design defect case must remain on the

product and not on the manufacturer’s conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that Lewis

remains the law and evidence of a products’ compliance with industry or government

standards is not admissible in design defect cases to show a product is not defective

under the risk-utility theory.

[J-1-2023] - 27 VI. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the Superior Court’s decision that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in granting Sullivan’s motion in limine to preclude the admission

of any industry or government standards at trial.

Justices Dougherty and Wecht join the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court. Justice Donohue files a concurring opinion.

Chief Justice Todd files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brobson joins.

[J-1-2023] - 28