Succession of Von Hoven

19 So. 766, 48 La. Ann. 620, 1896 La. LEXIS 470
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMarch 9, 1896
DocketNo. 11,953
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 19 So. 766 (Succession of Von Hoven) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Succession of Von Hoven, 19 So. 766, 48 La. Ann. 620, 1896 La. LEXIS 470 (La. 1896).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nici-iolls, O. J.

Opponent’s contention that the sales made by him were not judicial sales is not tenable. The property was advertised to be sold and was sold under an order of court “ in the matter of the succession of Jacob Von Hoven.” Bids were offered [623]*623and accepted and adjudications made on the faith of such being the character of the sales. Ajudicatees at those sales would be entitled to the full protection of the consequences flowing from them as being judicial sales and could not be made to occupy the position of parties purchasing through conventional sales, a position entirely different from that resulting from judicial sales.

It is claimed that the sales were not “ succession,” but “ partition ” sales, and that as partition sales they were “voluntary” or “ agreed sales ” between the parties in interest.

Article 1294 of the Civil Code defines a voluntary partition, as “ one made among all the co-heirs present and of age, and by their mutual consent.” The parties interested in this succession were of age and present, but it is a mistake to suppose they were agreed among each other “as to their respective rights.” Issues of most serious character were raised betweenthem and submitted for adjudication to the District Court. It is true that all parties recognized the necessity of a partition, and that that partition was to be effected by litigation; also that there was no difference of opinion as to the terms of sales, but the sales made in the course of the proceedings did not constitute the partition; they were incidents of the partition, means leading to the ultimate end, the judicial adjustment of rights. It is an error to suppose that a mere concurrence of opinion among heirs as to some of the details to be followed in the making of the sales has the far-reaching consequence of altering the legal character of the proceedings. The succession of Von Hoven is still under administration; the very proceeding is evidence of that fact, for this case comes to us on appeal from ah opposition filed by appellant to the account of the executrix. In the opinion heretofore rendered by us all issues between the parties were ordered to be referred for adjustment to the final account to be filed by the executrix.

The sales made in this ease were for the double purpose of paying the debts and determining the rights of the widow and heirs. The mere form in which these matters have been presented works no change in the fact that they are forced legal proceedings. But the “agreement” among the heirs and the widow in this case on which opponents relies brought no change in the manner of proceeding from that required by the judgment of the court. The parties agreed that the French advertisement should be omitted, but [624]*624this agreement was not carried out, for upon the refusal of the auctioneer to advertise he was ruled into court to show why he should not be made to do so, and he was ordered to proceed under the judgment, and that order he obeyed by making publication both in French and English. There was, therefore, no departure from legal requirements upon which any one could base a legal objection to the sale. The agreement referred to authorized “ the auctioneer to change the advertisements at the proper time, so as to describe the lots after the plans are made thereof, or in any way that the auctioneer thinks best to the interest of all parties,” but in no respect was this authorization made use of to change the situation from what it should have been had it not been written. The action of the auctioneer in describing the lots as he did and making the sales thereof as he did was not a deviation fromthe orders of the court. The judgment did not direct the auctioneer to sell the properties in block, and had he acted in the exercise of his own judgment as to what was best to be done in the premises independently of any “ agreement ” or authorization to him to do so, his course would have been sustained had he carried it to execution without opposition or objection from the parties concerned. We are not called on here to discuss what the legal effect would have been by way of resistance or avoidance had the auctioneer, by reason of a consent between heirs to waive a formality made necessary by the law to be followed, omitted this formality nor who could have taken advantage of it. Were such objection taken it would be made to rest precisely upon the ground that the sales ordered to be made were “ judicial sales ” and could legally be made as nothing else. Opponent can raise no issue as to the character of the sales; he had no interest in the property before the same and has had none since. In Haché vs. Ayraud, 14 An. 174, this court held that a sale to effect a partition under a decree of the court must be made to the highest bidder at public auction and that it was a judicial sale. The defendants in that case admitted the propriety of a partition by licitation. In the Succession of Macarty, reported in the 32 An. page 7, the auctioneer who made the sales in that proceeding presented to this court propositions very similar to those pressed on us here, but these views were not sustained by the Supreme Court. The court in that ease was called to pass upon the question of the commissions to which an auctioneer was entitled. The suit was a partition suit in which one of the heirs was a minor. [625]*625The District Court allowed the auctioneer two and a half per cent, commissions on the shares of the majors, but reduced it on the-minor’s share.

An examination of the transcript in that case shows that eighteen different pieces of real estate were sold by the auctioneer. Testimony was adduced to show that two and a half per cent, was the usual and reasonable charge made by auctioneers in the parish of Orleans on the amount of sales of real estate, including partition sales.” The court quoting See. 160 of the Revised Statutes said its provisions were plain; that the property sold was alleged to be and was sold by the auctioneer as succession property, and moreover he himself acknowledged that it partly belonged to a minor; that for these reasons he could legally charge on the entire amount of the-sale the lowest of the commissions fixed by law. The sale of the property having amounted to forty thousand dollars, judgment was-rendered in favor of the auctioneer for two hundred and twelve-dollars. The decision in that case controls this in respect to the commissions chargeable. The next question is as to the costs of' advertisements. It will be noticed that the claim on this account is presented, not by the proprietors of the newspapers as amounts due to them, but by the auctioneer as being an amount due to him.

It will be further noticed that the executor and heirs acquiesce in. advertisements as having been properly inserted in the Picayune and the Times-Democrat. Had the claims been placed on the account as-due to those papers themselves, the fact that they were entitled to some extent to remuneration would be admitted, as the heirs raised no issue as to the propriety and legality of the particular paper in which the insertions were made. Had matters been shaped as we have supposed, under the circumstances stated, the New Orleans Bee-(the French newspaper) would have been driven to an opposition as having been entirely left out. Upon such an opposition it would have been clearly entitled to be paid some amount. The debatable question would have been the amount to which it was-entitled.

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Bluebook (online)
19 So. 766, 48 La. Ann. 620, 1896 La. LEXIS 470, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/succession-of-von-hoven-la-1896.