Judgment rendered April 9, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 56,133-CA No. 56,134-CA (Consolidated Cases)
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
SUCCESSION OF VALERIE BRYAN BRASWELL
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 632,226
Honorable Brady D. O’Callaghan, Judge
THOMAS, SOILEAU, JACKSON Counsel for Appellants, & COLE, LLP Kenneth Pardee and By: Steven E. Soileau Debra Pardee
WEEMS, SCHIMPF, HAINES Counsel for Appellees, & MOORE, APLC Julie Bryan White, By: Kenneth P. Haines Jennifer Bryan Clark, Kyle A. Moore Suzanna Braswell Sharman and William Bryan
Before COX, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ. THOMPSON, J.
A chronically ill woman was accompanied by her caregiver to an
attorney and executed, in quick succession, two separate wills. The scheme
of having two wills was to give the false impression to the decedent’s family
that she was leaving the majority of her property to her sisters, when in
reality, the first will was revoked and her caregiver was the primary
beneficiary of the second will. The second will was kept secret from the
decedent’s family until after her death. The decedent’s sisters probated the
first will, and the caregiver subsequently probated the second will. The
matters were eventually consolidated, and after a trial, the trial court
determined that the decedent lacked the capacity to execute either will and
that she had been unduly influenced by her caregiver. With both wills
declared null, the decedent’s daughter inherited her property through
intestacy. The caregiver and her husband now appeal this judgment. For the
following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Valerie Braswell (“Valerie”) suffered from chronic health problems,
including COPD and cervical stenosis, that left her virtually a quadriplegic.
She was divorced and had one child, Suzanna Leigh Braswell (“Suzanna”),
and two sisters, Julie Bryan White (“Julie”) and Jennfier Bryan Clark
(“Jennifer”). Due to her health condition, from 2017 through 2020, Valerie
and her mother were both living in Heritage Manor Stratmore nursing
facility in Shreveport, Louisiana. With the onset of Covid in 2020, Valerie’s
father, Bill Bryan (“Bill”), elected to move into a home that could
accommodate Valerie and her mother, and they moved home. Valerie’s two sisters lived in Texas but would visit the home
approximately once a month. Bill needed help caring for Valerie and her
mother, so he hired Debra Pardee (“Debra”) and Stephanie Barbo
(“Stephanie”) from the nursing home to be their caretakers. Debra and
Stephanie worked alternating 12-hour shifts in Bill’s home from 8 a.m. to 8
p.m., with Debra primarily caring for Valerie. Valerie’s mother died in
February of 2021.
On April 20, 2021, two months after her mother’s death, Valerie was
driven by Debra, and they left Bill’s home to “run errands.” They first went
to a doctor’s appointment for Valerie, where she met with the doctor and his
nurse practitioner. Next, they stopped by Valerie’s bank, where Valerie was
taken inside, and Debra was added to her bank account. From the bank, they
next went to the office of attorney Patricia Miramon (“Miramon”), who is
primarily an estate planning attorney. Valerie and Debra had previously
communicated with Miramon about executing a will for Valerie.
While at Miramon’s office, Valerie told Miramon that her sisters
hated her, and Bill was pressuring her to create a will in favor of her sisters.
She wanted to show them a will to get them to stop pressuring her, while
secretly intending for there to be a second will in favor of Debra that she was
not going to show her family. She also told Miramon she did not have a
good relationship with her daughter. Valerie executed the two wills in quick
succession. In the first will, she bequeathed two pieces of furniture to her
daughter, Suzanna, and left the remainder of her estate to her sisters as her
universal legatees (the “first will”). Three minutes later, Valerie executed a
second will that revoked the first will and bequeathed the same pieces of
2 furniture to Suzanna and the remainder of her estate to Debra (the “second
will”). Valerie returned home and showed the first will to Bill, but she and
Debra kept the existence of the second will a secret. Valerie died a few
months later, on August 11, 2021.
On August 21, 2021, Valerie’s sisters filed a petition for probate of
the first will, with no mention of the undisclosed second will. An order
making the first will executory was signed and filed on August 23, 2021 in
docket number 632,226 in the First Judicial District Court. On September 2,
2021, Debra filed a petition for probate of statutory testament under a new
docket number, docket number 632,443, also in the First Judicial District
Court, and an order filing and executing the second will was signed on
September 8, 2021. At that moment, there were competing wills and
corresponding orders.
On October 22, 2021, Debra filed a rule to annul probate and rescind
orders of appointment co-executors and independent executorship in the
matter filed by Valerie’s sisters. On February 7, 2022, the trial court granted
the rule to annul, and the two separate matters were consolidated. Numerous
motions were then filed by the parties, and the matter was set for trial to
address the sisters’ claims of undue influence exerted by Debra and
Valerie’s lack of testamentary capacity.
A bench trial began on July 27, 2023. The first witness to testify was
nurse practitioner Laura Perkins (“Perkins”). She testified that she works at
Willis-Knighton Medical Center at Internal Medical Center, where she is a
nurse practitioner, and the court qualified her as an expert nurse practitioner.
Perkins began seeing Valerie in 2017 at the Heritage Manor Stratmore
3 nursing facility. She testified that she remembers Valerie better than other
patients because she was needy and liked to be seen by medical personnel.
Valerie had severe COPD and was oxygen dependent. She testified that
Valerie had sitters to help with activities of daily living, or ADLs, including
bathing, personal hygiene, feeding, and cooking. Valerie could not drive,
had very little control over her upper extremities, and had cervical spine
disease that caused her a great deal of pain. She testified Valerie was almost
quadriplegic and had depression and anxiety.
Perkins described Valerie’s lack of what she considered “executive
function,” which she testified was the “ability to make decisions, complex
decisions, ability to do things that take more than one step, the ability to act
like an adult.” She testified that people who lack executive function are
more vulnerable to their environment. Perkins testified that she saw Valerie
on the day she executed the wills and that she did not have the executive
function to execute the wills. Perkins described that Valerie was so anxious
on April 20, 2021, she needed her medication increased and that her
weakness had dramatically increased. Perkins testified, “I don’t think she
could have made those kinds of decisions a year before, and certainly not
that day I saw her.” Perkins testified that she did remember Valerie’s father
visiting her in the nursing home but not her sisters. On cross-examination,
Perkins testified that there was nothing in Valerie’s chart about the loss of
executive function.
Attorney Miramon testified that she sends potential clients
information sheets to fill out before their first meeting and Valerie came in
with her sheet filled out. Miramon testified:
4 She told me that she was being pressured by her father and her sisters to do this will leaving everything to them and that she didn’t want that. And that she had a bad relationship with her sisters. And that they hated her. They wanted her dead. They didn’t want her to live with her dad. Her dad was putting a lot of pressure on her. And she had—she wanted me to do two separate wills.
Miramon acknowledged that Valerie could not write on her own, and
someone else had handwritten in that Debra Pardee should inherit Valerie’s
estate. She testified that Valerie signed the first will at 4:35 p.m. and
revoked it at 4:38 p.m. Miramon testified that she knew Valerie’s intention
was always to revoke the first will soon after signing it. She did not want
her family to know about the revocation of the first will until after she died.
After Valerie revoked the first will, she executed the second will, which
leaves the hope chest and antique desk to Suzanna and all of her remaining
property to Debra. If Debra is unable to receive the property, then the
property would go to Debra’s children, Crystal Todd Pryor, Jesse Quintana
Todd, and Chase Duran Todd.
Miramon stated that when Valerie came to her office, she was in an
electric wheelchair, but Miramon did not ask her about the specifics of her
condition or medications. On the day they executed the wills, they also
created and executed a new power of attorney for Valerie, naming Kenneth
Pardee (“Kenneth”), Debra’s husband, as the power of attorney with Debra
as the alternative agent. Miramon noted that she does normally ask people
who come to her for estate planning a series of basic questions about
themselves to make sure they are lucid and can answer. Miramon testified
that Valerie seemed lucid and capable, and she did not seek a doctor’s note
about her capacity.
5 Also testifying at trial was Dr. Robert Hernandez, an internal
medicine doctor, who confirmed that he began treating Valerie in October of
2017. When Dr. Hernandez began treating Valerie at the nursing home, she
had cervical myelopathy with weakness in her upper and lower extremities,
severe COPD, was on oxygen, and had a history of anxiety and depression.
Dr. Hernandez saw her once a month, and his nurse practitioner saw her
more often on a regular basis. The COPD caused chronic respiratory failure.
He testified that Valerie’s anxiety medications can cause confusion,
disinhibition, and problems with mental functioning and cognitive ability.
Dr. Hernandez testified:
Q: Now if Ms. Miramon had written you a letter and inquired as to provide a letter that Ms. Braswell was capable of executing a will in April of 2020, would you have written that letter?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: I just didn’t think she was capable of making those higher— higher ordered complex decisions.
*** Q: So from your observations and treatment of her, knowing what her medical condition was and her medications that she was on, do you think that Ms. Braswell in March or April of 2021 was capable of formulating a plan like that [the two-will plan] on her own?
Dr. Hernandez also testified that Valerie could be easily influenced due to
her lack of executive function and that Valerie never expressed that her
sisters disliked her. He confirmed that he never witnessed anything negative
between Valerie and her father, who was often with her during her
appointments. Under cross-examination, he testified that Valerie had never
6 undergone any cognitive testing or ever been diagnosed with dementia or
Alzheimer’s.
Julie White, Valerie’s sister, testified that they had a normal sister
relationship and that she did not hate Valerie. Valerie never told her that she
wanted to leave all of her property to Debra. Julie testified that she
discussed with her father that he was going to give Debra $75,000 to add a
handicapped room onto her house for Valerie after he passed away. Julie
testified that all of her father’s money was going to go to Valerie’s care after
he was dead and that there was never a plan for Valerie to go back into a
nursing home. Julie stated that Debra drained Valerie’s bank account before
her death using her power of attorney.
Bill, Valerie’s father, testified that Valerie was not capable of entering
into contracts with other people. He testified that Valerie was dependent on
her caregivers for her every need. He stated that he had no idea that Valerie
was going to Miramon to create a will until she came home and showed him
the first will. He did not know about the second will until after Valerie had
died. On cross-examination, he testified that Valerie knew who and where
she was and was cognizant of what was going on around her.
Crystal Pryor testified that she is Debra’s daughter and that she heard
Valerie say that her sisters did not like her. She testified she never saw her
mother trying to unduly influence Valerie or take advantage of her. On
cross-examination, she testified that she interacted with Valerie about ten
times in total and did not know the extent of her medical problems.
Stephanie Barbo testified that she and Debra worked separate 12-hour
shifts for Valerie and her mother, while she was alive. She testified that
7 Valerie told her that her sisters hated her and that she did not have a
relationship with her daughter. She testified that she heard Valerie’s father
tell Valerie that she had to sell her home or go back into a nursing home.
She and Debra have been friends since they were teenagers.
Kenneth Pardee, Debra’s husband, testified that Valerie was very
smart and wanted Debra to have everything of hers because her sisters were
going to have plenty after their father’s death. He testified that he did not
know what was in the second will, even though he was the executor of the
will. Testimony clearly shows that Kenneth did not understand the
difference between a will and a power of attorney. He testified he never
made any financial decisions for Valerie and did not authorize his wife to
remove any money from Valerie’s accounts. He did not authorize his wife
to sign as Valerie’s power of attorney on the sale of her house. He did not
authorize the removal of $85,900 from Valerie’s account by his wife.
Debra testified that Valerie told her that she wanted to create a will so
that her father and sisters would stop threatening to put her back in a nursing
home. She testified that she felt so badly for Valerie that she offered for
Valerie to come live with her and her husband after her father died. She
acknowledged that she drafted a $65,000 check out to herself from Valerie’s
account for improvements to her home. She testified that Valerie was fine
on April 20, 2021, when she went to the doctor and to Miramon’s office.
Debra alleged that she did not know about the two-will scheme. She
believed Valerie had capacity and did not influence Valerie. She testified
that Bill and Valerie told her what to write down on Miramon’s
questionnaire, including that Debra would inherit all her personal property.
8 She testified that Bill was aware that Valerie was going to Miramon’s office.
She stated that Valerie executed a power of attorney that granted her the
right to act as power of attorney but admitted that she has never produced a
copy of the power of attorney that grants her that authority. On cross-
examination, Debra testified that Bill and Julie told her to withdraw the
$85,900 from Valerie’s account days before Valerie died because they
wanted her to have the money.
Suzanna testified that she and her mother had a strained relationship,
but they never went more than 10 years without speaking, as had been
suggested by Debra. Suzanna testified that she went with her grandfather to
see her mom in the nursing home when she lived with Bill in 2019. On
cross-examination, Suzanna admitted to several criminal convictions and
that she never visited her mother after Bill moved her into the home in 2020.
Debra challenged the standing of Julie and Jennifer to object to the
second will. After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the trial court
found that Julie and Jennifer had standing as the universal legatees of the
first will to challenge the validity of the second will. The trial court’s
judgment then summarized the testimony and evidence presented at the trial
and noted its impressions of the veracity and credibility of the witnesses. It
noted that it found Bill and the medical providers’ testimonies credible and
informative and that it found the Pardees’, Crystal’s, and Stephanie’s
testimonies problematic and not credible. The court found that on April 21,
2021, “Valerie did not have the mental and emotional capacity to deliberate
her actions and knowledgeably and act independently to make an
unconfused and uninfluenced decision to execute a will.” The court further
9 found that Valerie was unduly influenced, and the evidence showed a
substitution of volition. The court specifically found that the timing and
deceptive circumstances of the wills, coming when Valerie was grieving the
death of her mother and was having her medications adjusted, was
troublesome. The trial court found that both wills were null and any orders
probating them and any orders arising therefrom were vacated. The court
ordered that Valerie died intestate and Suzanna, as her only child, was her
sole intestate heir. The Pardees have appealed this judgment.
DISCUSSION
The Pardees have asserted three assignments of error, which will be
addressed below.
First Assignment of Error: The court erred in finding that collateral relations who had no standing would inherit nothing had any right to challenge the validity of the Last Will and Testament of Valerie Braswell.
In their first assignment of error, the Pardees contend that the trial
court erred in finding that Julie and Jennifer had standing to challenge the
validity of Valerie’s second will. They contend that Julie and Jennifer, as
collateral relations, have no standing to challenge the second will.
La. C.C.P. art. 681 states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,
an action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest
which he asserts.” While the exception of no right of action tests whether
the plaintiff has a “real and actual interest” in the action, it does not raise
questions of the plaintiff’s ability to prevail on the merits or whether the
defendant may have a valid defense. Succession of Sylvester, 16-372 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 12/14/16), 215 So. 3d 368, writ denied, 17-00265 (La. 4/13/17),
218 So. 3d 119. The court assumes the “petition states a valid cause of
10 action for some person and questions whether the plaintiff in the particular
case is a member of the class that has a legal interest in the subject matter of
the litigation.” Howard v. Admrs. of Tulane Educ. Fund, 07-2224 (La.
7/1/08), 986 So. 2d 47. The introduction of evidence is permitted to support
or controvert an exception of no right of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931.
The burden of proof establishing the exception of no right of action is
on the exceptor. The determination of whether a plaintiff has a right to bring
an action raises a question of law, which requires de novo review. La.
C.C.P. art. 5051 provides that the articles of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure “are to be construed liberally, and with due regard for the fact that
rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end in
themselves.”
La. C.C.P. art. 2972, which is included in the chapter providing
general rules of procedure for succession proceedings, states that an
opposition to a petition, motion, or other application for an order or
judgment in a succession proceeding shall allege the interest of the opponent
in filing the opposition. Section (b) of the Official Revision Comments to
La. C.C.P. art. 2972 further explains that a person must have a “justiciable
interest” to file an opposition in a succession proceeding. “The definition of
this interest has been left for the determination of the courts, and the
requirement has been stated only implicitly in the term ‘interested person’.”
Id. Louisiana courts recognize that one must have a justiciable interest in
the succession proceeding in order to have standing to maintain an action to
annul the testator’s testament. See Succession of Brandt, 21-131 (La. App. 5
Cir. 12/29/21), 334 So. 3d 1041.
11 This court addressed a similar issue in Succession of Kilpatrick, 356
So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1978), wherein it determined that a bank named
as the decedent’s executor and trustee of a trust established in a 1976 will
had a right of action to file a petition to annul a probated will executed by
the decedent a year later. The executors for the 1977 will filed an exception
of no right of action against the bank, arguing that it did not have a real or
actual interest in annulling the 1977 will because it was not an heir or
beneficiary under the 1976 will. The bank argued that it had a right of
action to annul because it was named as the executor and trustee of the 1976
will.
This Court found that because the bank would have a pecuniary
interest as the executor and because it was the universal legatee of the 1976
will, the bank possessed a justiciable interest in the action to annul the later
will. Other courts have affirmed that an interested party has a justiciable
interest in opposing a succession proceeding if they will be able to benefit
from the attack. Succession of Brandt, supra; Estate of Mallet v. Mallet, 527
So. 2d 30 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1988); Succession of Moran, 485 So. 2d 623 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 1986).
In the present matter, our de novo review of the record indicates that
Julie and Jennifer had standing to attack the second will, as the heirs and
legatees of the first will. While the particular facts of this case are complex
and purposefully confusing by the actions of various parties, including the
decedent herself, it remains that Julie and Jennifer argued the second will
was the product of undue influence. While the trial court ultimately found
both wills were tainted by a lack of capacity, the argument still existed at the
12 time the second will was challenged by Julie and Jennifer as the product of
undue influence but the first will was not, giving them the opportunity to
inherit under the first will. Considering that the articles of civil procedure
are to be construed liberally, we find that Julie and Jennifer had standing to
challenge the second will, as the heirs of the first will. This assignment of
error is without merit.
Second Assignment of Error: The court erred in finding that the plaintiffs proved by clear and convincing evidence that Valerie Braswell lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed her Last Will and Testament. The court created a new standard stating the decedent lacked “executive function” making ability, instead of simply determining whether she had mental capacity to understand that she was executing a will and the effects thereof.
The Pardees contend that the trial court erred in finding there was
clear and convincing evidence that Valerie did not have the capacity to
execute the second will. They note the lay testimony stating that she knew
who and where she was on April 20, 2021, and the fact that her medical
providers never diagnosed Valerie with dementia or Alzheimer’s.
All persons have capacity to make and receive donations inter vivos
and mortis causa, except as expressly provided by law. La. C.C. art. 1470.
Capacity to donate mortis causa must exist at the time the testator executes
the testament. La. C.C. art. 1471. There is a presumption in favor of
testamentary capacity. In re Succession of Furlow, 44,473 (La. App. 2 Cir.
8/12/09), 17 So. 3d 475. Testamentary capacity means the donor must be
able to comprehend generally the nature and consequences of the disposition
he is making. La. C.C. art. 1477. A person who challenges the capacity of a
donor must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the donor lacked
capacity at the time he executed the testament. La. C.C. art. 1482. The issue
13 of capacity is factual in nature; the ultimate finding that the testator either
possessed or lacked capacity cannot be disturbed unless clearly wrong or
manifestly erroneous. Succession of Furlow, supra. The court may consider
medical evidence, other expert testimony, and lay witness testimony. As
such, there is no “litmus paper” test to apply in the evaluation of mental
capacity. La. C.C. art. 1477, Revision comment (f).
In will contest cases, absent a finding of manifest error, the factual
findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed
on appeal. Succession of Moore, 54,338 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/30/22), 339 So.
3d 12, writ denied, 22-00973 (La. 10/4/22), 347 So. 3d 859. The factfinder
is required to assess the credibility of all witnesses, whether they be lay
people or experts, to determine the most credible evidence. Expert testimony
is to be weighted the same as any other evidence, and the trier of fact can
accept or reject, in whole or in part, any expert opinion. Such credibility
determinations are factual issues to be resolved by the trier of fact and
should not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Id.
The trial court was presented with conflicting testimony regarding
Valerie’s capacity to execute the wills on April 20, 2021. Our inquiry is
whether the result reached by the trial court was manifestly erroneous.
Debra testified that the two-will scheme was entirely Valerie’s idea and that
she knew what she was doing the day she executed the wills. Miramon
testified that Valerie seemed capable of executing the wills and she did not
think she needed to get a doctor’s note on capacity. Bill and Julie testified
that they did not think Valerie was capable of creating the two-will scheme
but believed her capable of executing the first will. Significantly, both of
14 Valerie’s treating medical team testified that she did not have the capacity to
execute the wills on April 20, 2021. Dr. Hernandez testified that if Miramon
had contacted him about a letter as to Valerie’s capacity, he would not have
signed such a letter.
The trial court’s reasons for judgment are extensive and specifically
reference the credibility of each witness and their testimony. The trial court
found Perkins and Dr. Hernandez to be credible and noted “the two medical
caregivers who actually saw Valerie on the day she executed the disputed
testaments both unequivocally stated that she lacked capacity.” We cannot
say that this determination by the trial court was manifestly erroneous. In
the face of conflicting evidence and testimony, the trial court was in the best
position to make credibility determinations, and this court will not disturb
such determinations on appeal. This assignment of error is without merit.
Third Assignment of Error: The trial court erred in finding that Debra Pardee asserted undue influence over Valerie Braswell, such that the latter’s own intentions were substituted for those of Valerie Braswell.
Finally, the Pardees contend that the trial court erred in finding that
Debra asserted undue influence over Valerie. A donation inter vivos or
mortis causa shall be declared null upon proof that it is the product of
influence by the donee or another person that so impaired the volition of the
donor as to substitute the volition of the donee or other person for the
volition of the donor. “Mere advice, or persuasion, or kindness or
assistance, should not constitute influence that would destroy the free agency
of the donor and substitute someone else’s volition for his own.” In re
Succession of Gilbert, 37,047 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/5/03), 850 So. 2d 733, writ
denied, 03-1887 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So. 2d 493. La. C.C. art. 1483 states:
15 A person who challenges a donation because of fraud, duress, or undue influence, must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. However, if at the time the donation was made or the testament executed, a relationship of confidence existed between the donor and the wrongdoer and the wrongdoer was not then related to the donor by affinity, consanguinity or adoption, the person who challenges the donation need only prove the fraud, duress, or undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence.
“Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence, taken as
a whole, shows that the fact or cause sought to be proven is more probable
than not.” Crowell v. City of Alexandria Through Synder, 558 So. 2d 216
(La. 1990).
The trial court’s finding of, or failure to find, undue influence is fact
intensive, and such a finding cannot be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
manifest error. Succession of Gilbert, supra. Reversal is warranted only if
the appellate court finds that no reasonable factual basis for the trial court’s
finding exists in the record and that the finding is clearly wrong. Id. When
seeking to annul a donation on the basis of undue influence, it is not
sufficient to merely show that the donee exercised some degree of influence
over a donor; instead, the challenger must show that the donee’s influence
was so substantial that the donee substituted his or her volition for that of the
donor. To annul a testamentary disposition on the basis of undue influence,
the influence must be operative at the time the testament is executed. Id.
When the evidence shows that the execution of a testament was well within
the discretion of the testator, the court should find that the testator’s volition
has not been substituted by the volition of any donee. Id.
Because Valerie and Debra had established a relationship of
confidence and were not related by affinity, consanguinity, or adoption, only
16 a preponderance of the evidence was required to show undue influence. In
re Succession of Gilbert, supra. Here, the evidence is sufficient to support
the trial court’s finding of undue influence by Debra over Valerie. As noted
above, the trial court made credibility determinations based on witness
testimony and found that Debra’s testimony that she was unaware and
uninvolved in the two-will scheme to be implausible. The trial court
determined that the evidence showed that the Pardees, Stephanie, and
Crystal took advantage of a critically ill woman after witnessing the conflict
within her family after the death of her mother. The court gave great
credence to Valerie’s medical team’s testimony that she did not have the
capacity on April 21, 2021, to execute the wills and that her overall mental
and physical health made her susceptible to influence from those around her.
We do not find this conclusion, based on the evidence presented in the
record, to be manifestly erroneous. As such, this assignment of error is
likewise without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Costs
of this appeal are assessed to appellants Kenneth Pardee and Debra Pardee.
AFFIRMED.