Succession of Tebo
This text of 358 So. 2d 337 (Succession of Tebo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Succession of Emma C. TEBO.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
*338 Breard Snellings, Sessions, Fishman, Rosenson, Snellings & Boisfontaine, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Dudley D. Flanders, Richard T. Simmons, Flanders & Flanders, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.
Before REDMANN, GARSAUD and De SONIER, JJ.
REDMANN, Judge.
By rule to traverse the descriptive list of the assets in this succession, a niece and a grandniece of decedent assert the effectiveness of inter vivos acts of decedent:
1. to donate checking account balances to the grandniece and a great-grandnephew by means of blank checks drawn by decedent to the niece's order, with written, dated and signed[1] instructions to the niece, which the niece carried out prior to decedent's death, to close out the two checking accounts and to deliver the balances to the named grandniece and great-grandnephew; and
2. to donate certain bearer bonds located in decedent's bank box and specifically described in a note addressed to the grandniece, written by decedent but undated and unsigned and by decedent's order and in her presence delivered to the niece (who is that grandniece's mother) at the same time the blank checks and their instructions were delivered, when the niece had written standing authority from decedent to enter the bank box and "remove at will" its contents, but did not get the bonds from the box and deliver them to her daughter (the named grandniece) because the relatives (including the residuary legatee) who had keys to the box would not give her a key to enable her to do so and, presumably, she and her daughter would not force the issue either by enlisting decedent's aid (decedent was then hospitalized but alert and lived two months longer) or by asserting her independent right to enter the bank box against the bank (through court proceedings if necessary).
The judgment appealed from held both acts ineffectual. We reverse as to the cashed checks and affirm as to the bonds.
The purely gratuitous donation inter vivos must be in the form of an act before notary public and two witnesses under penalty of nullity, La.C.C. 1536 and 1538, except that, as art. 1539 provides,
The manual gift, that is, the giving of corporeal movable effects, accompanied by a real delivery, is not subject to any formality.
Here there was no notarial donation. Thus no donation inter vivos was effected unless the described acts constituted manual gifts.
*339 The Checks
Because cash is considered a corporeal movable which may be donated by manual gift, the gift of an amount of money represented by the donor's check is a valid manual gift if "reduced to possession" by being cashed by the donee (prior to the donor's death), Succession of De Pouilly, 1870, 22 La.Ann. 97: "The check was the means or the vehicle of delivery." The principle which thus allowed De Pouilly to make a valid manual gift (upon fulfillment of his order), by ordering in writing his bank to deliver cash to a named donee, is equally applicable to allow our donor, Miss Tebo, to make a valid manual gift (upon fulfillment of her orders), by ordering in writing her bank to deliver cash to her named niece, whom she further ordered in writing to deliver the cash to the two intended donees.[2] We are unable to distinguish the one-written-order situation in De Pouilly from the two-written-orders situation before us.
Prior to Miss Tebo's death the grandniece accepted this donation to herself by physically accepting the cash, thus completing the donation.[3] The minor great-grandnephew's case is different although we reach the conclusion that an acceptance was made for him. Presumably because the written instructions were addressed to both the niece and a niece-in-law (enclosing two sets of blank checks, one payable to the order of the niece and the other to the niece-in-law), the niece delivered the money for the great-grandnephew to the niece-in-law, who is the grandmother of the great-grandnephew for whom the cash was intended. However, that niece-in-law and her husband (the grandparents) had reservations about the gift (in part because of an erroneous notion that gifts within three years prior to death were invalid) and therefore did not deliver the cash to the minor's father, as administrator of the minor's estate, C.C. 221. Nevertheless the grandfather did place the money in a savings account identified as for the benefit of the minor. We deem this an acceptance by an ascendant which is valid even though the ascendant not be the tutor of the minor, C.C. 1546.
Accordingly the cash actually transferred by both cashed checks was the subject of valid manual donations inter vivos, and the checking account balances are erroneously listed in the descriptive list of decedent's assets (as due from the niece).
The Bonds
Bearer bonds may also be transferred by manual gift, Succession of McCrocklin, 1962, 242 La. 404, 137 So.2d 274, althoughas in any manual giftdelivery must be had to make the gift effective, Succession of Land, 1947, 212 La. 103, 31 So.2d 609. The delivery required by the law is delivery by the donor or (as in the case of the checks in De Pouilly and here) by another acting upon the donor's orders.
We hold the bonds not manually given because there was no showing of delivery by the donor, nor of any order by the *340 donor for delivery by another. The absence of physical delivery may be ignored under the circumstances. The residuary legatee could not be allowed to increase his own legacy by preventing the testatrix from completing delivery, through the niece, of an inter vivos gift. Were that the case the residuary legatee (and other legatees who prevented delivery) should be estopped to assert non-delivery. But that is not the case. No delivery order by the testatrix to the niece is shown and therefore, had the niece gained entry to the bank box and physically delivered the bonds to her daughter, there would still have been no valid manual gift. The niece's understanding that she (or the niece-in-law) had orders to deliver the bonds arose from the facts that: (1) decedent's general note of instruction regarding the packet of several notes was "If I am very ill give this to [the niece-in-law and the niece] immediately", with the word immediately underscored thrice, indicating present urgency rather than testamentary intent; (2) the wording of the note to the grandniece included "these are to be used for down payment for housekeep interest to add to principal", indicating donative intent;[4] and (3) decedent had long previously given authority to niece and niece-in-law individually to enter the bank box and remove at will its contents, thus making it possible for either to obtain the bonds and to deliver them to the grandniece. (Decedent had also twice told the niece "there were some important envelopes in her desk that had to do with [the grandniece and great-grandnephew] . . . but what was in them I had no idea.") The niece's inference that decedent intended a present manual gift to be perfected by niece or niece-in-law's obtaining and delivering the bonds is a reasonable inference. But a reasonable inference is an insufficient foundation for an agent's power of attorney, or mandate, to make a donation: "to alienate . . . or do any other act of ownership, the power must be express", C.C. 2996; "the power must be express . . .
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358 So. 2d 337, 1978 La. App. LEXIS 2720, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/succession-of-tebo-lactapp-1978.