Succession of Tanner

24 So. 2d 642, 1946 La. App. LEXIS 326
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 31, 1946
DocketNo. 2774.
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 24 So. 2d 642 (Succession of Tanner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Succession of Tanner, 24 So. 2d 642, 1946 La. App. LEXIS 326 (La. Ct. App. 1946).

Opinions

Eugene M. Tanner departed this life on March 6, 1945, intestate, leaving surviving him as his heirs, his wife, Agnes R. Tanner, his mother, Mrs. Bertha Henderson Walker, a full brother, Benjamin Hardee Tanner, and a half brother, Howard Dee Walker, leaving separate and community property. The separate property was inherited by the mother, his brother and half-brother. The community property was inherited by the wife and mother. During the existence of the community, decedent purchased with community funds United States War Savings Bonds which were registered in the name of Eugene M. Tanner or Agnes R. Tanner, having a total cash value of $48,150, and United States War Savings Bonds which were registered in the name of Agnes R. Tanner or Eugene M. Tanner, having a total cash value of $6,750, or a grand total cash value of $54,900. In the taking of the inventories in the estate, these War Savings Bonds were omitted therefrom.

On a rule against the tax collector to fix the inheritance tax, the heirs alleged that these War Savings Bonds did not form any part of decedent's estate in that the bonds were issued and registered by the Treasury of the United States under and pursuant to the laws governing the issuance of such bonds with particular reference to Circular No. 530, Fifth Revision, which specifically provides: "If either co-owner dies without having presented and surrendered the bonds for payment to a Federal Reserve Bank on the Treasury Department, the surviving co-owner will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner of the bond and payment will be made only to him * * *. Upon proof of the death of one co-owner and appropriate request by the surviving co-owner the bond will be re-issued in the name of such survivor alone, or in his name with another individual as co-owner, or in his name payable on death to a designated beneficiary." Therefore, the heirs contend that under this provision, the bonds belong exclusively to Agnes R. Tanner, and no inheritance tax is due thereon.

In the rule, they set out the inheritance tax to be due by the heirs, respectively: Benjamin H. Tanner, $234.72; Howard Dee Walker, $44.87; Mrs. Agnes Richard Tanner, $159.46, and Bertha H. Walker, $210.06, making a total of $649.11, based upon the properties inventoried.

In answer to the rule, the tax collector admitted that the inheritance tax was correctly computed if the bonds would be omitted, but expressly averred that the said bonds should be included in the computation of the tax.

On trial of the rule, the trial judge held that the bonds were a part of the community estate left by the decedent Eugene M. Tanner, and accordingly one-half of the actual value of said bonds were subject to the inheritance tax of this State. He fixed the inheritance tax due by the respective parties: Benjamin H. Tanner, $234.72; Howard Dee Walker, $44.87; Agnes R. Tanner, $446.83 and Mrs. Bertha H. Walker, $523.73. The heirs have appealed.

In this court, we are concerned only with the inheritance tax due by Mrs. Agnes R. Tanner and Mrs. Bertha H. Walker in that the trial judge fixed the inheritance tax due by Benjamin H. Tanner and Howard Dee Walker as claimed in the rule. The question presented is whether the War Bonds, registered as aforesaid, constitute a part of the community estate of the decedent, or whether they belong solely and exclusively to the survivor, Agnes R. Tanner.

The bonds in question were issued pursuant to 31 U.S.C.A. § 757c, subsection a, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, to issue United States savings bonds, the proceeds of which shall be available to *Page 644 meet any public expenditure. Under this subsection, the various issues and series of the savings bonds were to be in such forms, offered in such amounts, and subject to any restrictions on their transfer, as the Secretary of the Treasury may from time to time prescribe.

In pursuance to this authority, amongst other regulations, as contained in official circular No. 530, 5th revision, the Secretary of the Treasury provided that: "If either co-owner dies without having presented and surrendered the Bonds for payment to a Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasury Department, the surviving co-owner will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner of the Bonds and payment will be made only to him." This regulation is made a part of the bond by reference.

The question presented in this case is res nova in the State of Louisiana. The question, however, has been presented to the courts of other States, to the United States Court of Claims and the Federal District Courts. The law and the result of these decisions may be summarized as follows:

[1] (1) The bonds in controversy constitute a contract between the United States and the purchasers of these bonds, and the rights of the survivor arise solely from this contract.

[2, 3] (2) Congress is given the power under the Constitution in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 2, "to borrow Money on the credit of the United States." That power cannot be burdened or impeded or in any way affected by the actions of any State. Issuance of the involved savings bonds is an exercise of this power.

(3) Article 6, Clause 2, provides, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

[4-6] (4) Because the Federal Government is a party to the contract, this is a Federal contract which is necessarily controlled by the Federal law. It is based upon the exercise of the power delegated to Congress to borrow money on the credit of the United States. The borrowing power necessarily includes the power to fix the terms of the government's obligation. The Treasury regulations are within the authority given the Secretary of the Treasury by the Congress and have the force of Federal law.

[7] (5) Rules and regulations prescribed by administrative bodies and officers and which are adopted pursuant to authority of an act of Congress, so long as they are reasonably adapted to the enforcement of the act, and are not in conflict with express statutory provisions, have the force and effect of law. They likewise become the supreme law of the land.

(6) The regulations provide in part that the form of registration "will be considered as conclusive of suchownership and interest"; that the bonds are not transferableand are payable only to the owners named; that they may not besold or hypothecated; that they are payable solely to the registered owner or co-owner during their lifetime, and that, after the death of the registered owner, or the co-owner, the surviving co-owner shall be recognized as the "sole and absolute owner," and that the bonds will be paid or re-issued in accordance with the regulations as though it were registered in the name of the surviving co-owner. (Italics ours.)

[8] (7) Each of these bonds, together with the Statutes, Treasury regulations, and circulars constitute a valid and binding contract determining the rights of the parties therein and ownership and title of the said bonds are controlled by 31 U.S.C.A. § 757c and the aforesaid Treasury Regulations and Circulars. See United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., D.C.Pa., 50 F. Supp. 73, and the cases and annotations therein cited; Warren v. United States, 68 Ct.Cl. 634 (Texas statutes involved) certiorari denied, 281 U.S. 739, 50 S.Ct. 346, 74 L.Ed. 1154; In re Deyo's Estate, 180 Misc. 32, 42 N.Y.S.2d 379

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Bluebook (online)
24 So. 2d 642, 1946 La. App. LEXIS 326, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/succession-of-tanner-lactapp-1946.