HAMITER, Justice.
Mrs. Elizabeth Franzheim Reese institut•ed this action in which she attacks the last will and testament of her late grandmother, Mrs. Lillie Weir Simms. According to her petition, filed in the succession proceedings of the testatrix, plaintiff attempts to (1) annul certain trust provisions contained in the will, (2) nullify the will’s probate insofar as the trust provisions are concerned, •■and (3) cancel the district court’s judgment which sent into possession the various persons named in such provisions.
All whose interests would be affected by the attack were made defendants, namely, the beneficiaries of the trusts, the trustees, the testamentary executors, and plaintiff’s 'brother and sister.
The district court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, as prayed for. Various defendants then appealed to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, where the judgment was affirmed. 175 So.2d 113. (As pointed out in a footnote in the Court of Appeal opinion, “The last testament of Mrs. Lilly Weir Simms provides that if any legatee or devisee contests it or by legal procedure interferes with the handling of the estate, then that legatee or devisee shall take nothing under her will or out of her estate. For this reason, Kenneth Franzheim, II, has appealed only in his capacity as executor and trustee, and not individually. For the same reason Mrs. Lilly Franzheim Mc-Cullar has appealed only in her capacity as provisional administratrix.”)
The litigation is presently before us on writs of certiorari granted on the separate applications of some of the defendants. 175 So.2d 111-112.
The case was tried in the distinct court on a stipulation of facts and on certain pertinent exhibits. According to the record the testatrix (plaintiff’s grandmother), whose domicile was in Texas, died on May 1, 1957. She was survived by only one child, Mrs. Bessie Simms Franzheim, who was the mother of this plaintiff and of Kenneth Franzheim, II and Lillie Franzheim McCullar, the latter two being among the defendants herein. In her will Mrs. Simms bequeathed to her daughter one-third of her Louisiana property. The remaining two-[183]*183thirds she left in trust for the benefit of Kenneth Franzheim, II, Lillie Franzheim McCullar, and various great grand-children. Among the latter were plaintiff’s three minor children who are also defendants in this action. These trust bequests are the ones, assailed in this proceeding. (The controversial provisions of the testament are quoted in full in the opinion of the Court of Appeal. Because of the conclusion we have reached with regard to plaintiff’s right to proceed in this action, as hereinafter discussed, we deem it unnecessary to detail them in this opinion.)
Mrs. Simms’ succession was opened in Texas, her domicile. In the proceedings there the will was probated and the testamentary executors confirmed. These executors later commenced ancillary probate proceedings in the district court for Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, and therein sought to have the testament made executory with respect to the Louisiana property affected thereby. On the joint petition of such executors and of Mrs. Franzheim, individually, a judgment was rendered on July 21, 1958, sending the legatees (including the trustees) under the will into possession of the Louisiana estate.
On December 15, 1959, Mrs. Bessie Simms Franzheim, who also was domiciled in Texas, died, she being survived by the three above named children, including this plaintiff. She left a will in which she bequeathed to her son (Kenneth Franzheim, II) and to one of the two daughters (Mrs.. Lillie Franzheim McCullar) certain specified property located in Louisiana; and, after a number of particular bequests, she designated those two children as her residuary-legatees. Her said son, and W. P. Hamblem and Alden K. Boddeker were named executors. The plaintiff was not mentioned in: Mrs. Franzheim’s will.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a suit in Texas: attacking the validity of her mother’s wilL Later, with respect to that testament, ancillary probate proceedings were commenced in Louisiana on the petition of Mrs. McCullar, a resident of this state; and therein' she was appointed provisional administratrix of her mother’s estate inasmuch as the-testamentary executors could not act until their right to do so under the will had been established in the Texas litigation. (In this-connection plaintiff, in her brief to this-court, notes “ * * * Mrs. Franzheim left a will, the validity of which was litigated in Texas, and during the pendency of these proceedings (the instant litigation) its validity was upheld in Texas. Thereafter, it was probated in ancillary proceedings in Plaquemines Parish, as will appear from the substitution of the Testamentary Executors named therein for the Provisional Administratrix in the Succession of Franzheim by order in the Court of Appeal dated December 23, 1964. * * * ”) Also see Reese v. Franzheim, Tex.Civ.App., 381 S.W.2d 329.
[185]*185Pending the attack on her mother’s will in the Texas courts, the plaintiff, on November 27, 1961, filed the instant action in her grandmother’s ancillary succession proceeding, she seeking (as we have said) to set aside the trust bequests in the will of Mrs. Simms, the will’s probate and the judgment sending the several legatees (including the trustees) into possession. In this action plaintiff contends that the assailed trust provisions constituted prohibited substitutions under the laws of Louisiana, and, consequently, they and the judgment purporting to perpetuate them were null and void and of no effect with respect to the Louisiana properties, the result being that her grandmother died intestate as to those bequests so that such properties were inherited by the testatrix’s sole forced heir (plaintiff’s mother) and should now properly form a part of her mother’s succession.
Mrs. Simms’ testamentary executors have filed in this court an exception of no right of action in which there is alleged a want of interest in the plaintiff, the ex-ceptors pointing out that she is a stranger to the estate of her grandmother for the reason that she was not an heir of Mrs. Simms and that she acquired no seizin in the succession of her mother, Mrs. Franzheim. (We note that this exception was not filed on behalf of all of the defendant litigants. But we consider this of no. importance inasmuch as the failure of right or interest in a plaintiff to institute suit may be noticed by this court of its own motion. Code of Civil Procedure Article 927.)
In the pertinent portions of the brief of plaintiff, where she asserts the basis of her right to proceed in the instant litigation, she contends: “ * * * It is not contended by Mrs. Reese that she is the heir of her grandmother. She is the heir of her mother and as such, asserts the same right which her mother had to establish the absolute nullity of the disputed dispositions of Mrs. Simms’ will. This is manifest from Articles 944 and 945 of the Civil Code. The heir being considered as having succeeded to the deceased from the instant of his death, the * * * effect of this right is to authorize the heir to institute all the actions, even possessory ones, which the deceased had a right to institute and to prosecute those already commenced, for the heir in everything repre-, sents the deceased and has a full right in his place as well for his rights as his obligations. * * * ” In support of this, contention plaintiff relies primarily on Hoggatt v. Gibbs, 12 La.Ann. 770 and Gahn v. Brown et al., 160 La.
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HAMITER, Justice.
Mrs. Elizabeth Franzheim Reese institut•ed this action in which she attacks the last will and testament of her late grandmother, Mrs. Lillie Weir Simms. According to her petition, filed in the succession proceedings of the testatrix, plaintiff attempts to (1) annul certain trust provisions contained in the will, (2) nullify the will’s probate insofar as the trust provisions are concerned, •■and (3) cancel the district court’s judgment which sent into possession the various persons named in such provisions.
All whose interests would be affected by the attack were made defendants, namely, the beneficiaries of the trusts, the trustees, the testamentary executors, and plaintiff’s 'brother and sister.
The district court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, as prayed for. Various defendants then appealed to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, where the judgment was affirmed. 175 So.2d 113. (As pointed out in a footnote in the Court of Appeal opinion, “The last testament of Mrs. Lilly Weir Simms provides that if any legatee or devisee contests it or by legal procedure interferes with the handling of the estate, then that legatee or devisee shall take nothing under her will or out of her estate. For this reason, Kenneth Franzheim, II, has appealed only in his capacity as executor and trustee, and not individually. For the same reason Mrs. Lilly Franzheim Mc-Cullar has appealed only in her capacity as provisional administratrix.”)
The litigation is presently before us on writs of certiorari granted on the separate applications of some of the defendants. 175 So.2d 111-112.
The case was tried in the distinct court on a stipulation of facts and on certain pertinent exhibits. According to the record the testatrix (plaintiff’s grandmother), whose domicile was in Texas, died on May 1, 1957. She was survived by only one child, Mrs. Bessie Simms Franzheim, who was the mother of this plaintiff and of Kenneth Franzheim, II and Lillie Franzheim McCullar, the latter two being among the defendants herein. In her will Mrs. Simms bequeathed to her daughter one-third of her Louisiana property. The remaining two-[183]*183thirds she left in trust for the benefit of Kenneth Franzheim, II, Lillie Franzheim McCullar, and various great grand-children. Among the latter were plaintiff’s three minor children who are also defendants in this action. These trust bequests are the ones, assailed in this proceeding. (The controversial provisions of the testament are quoted in full in the opinion of the Court of Appeal. Because of the conclusion we have reached with regard to plaintiff’s right to proceed in this action, as hereinafter discussed, we deem it unnecessary to detail them in this opinion.)
Mrs. Simms’ succession was opened in Texas, her domicile. In the proceedings there the will was probated and the testamentary executors confirmed. These executors later commenced ancillary probate proceedings in the district court for Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, and therein sought to have the testament made executory with respect to the Louisiana property affected thereby. On the joint petition of such executors and of Mrs. Franzheim, individually, a judgment was rendered on July 21, 1958, sending the legatees (including the trustees) under the will into possession of the Louisiana estate.
On December 15, 1959, Mrs. Bessie Simms Franzheim, who also was domiciled in Texas, died, she being survived by the three above named children, including this plaintiff. She left a will in which she bequeathed to her son (Kenneth Franzheim, II) and to one of the two daughters (Mrs.. Lillie Franzheim McCullar) certain specified property located in Louisiana; and, after a number of particular bequests, she designated those two children as her residuary-legatees. Her said son, and W. P. Hamblem and Alden K. Boddeker were named executors. The plaintiff was not mentioned in: Mrs. Franzheim’s will.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a suit in Texas: attacking the validity of her mother’s wilL Later, with respect to that testament, ancillary probate proceedings were commenced in Louisiana on the petition of Mrs. McCullar, a resident of this state; and therein' she was appointed provisional administratrix of her mother’s estate inasmuch as the-testamentary executors could not act until their right to do so under the will had been established in the Texas litigation. (In this-connection plaintiff, in her brief to this-court, notes “ * * * Mrs. Franzheim left a will, the validity of which was litigated in Texas, and during the pendency of these proceedings (the instant litigation) its validity was upheld in Texas. Thereafter, it was probated in ancillary proceedings in Plaquemines Parish, as will appear from the substitution of the Testamentary Executors named therein for the Provisional Administratrix in the Succession of Franzheim by order in the Court of Appeal dated December 23, 1964. * * * ”) Also see Reese v. Franzheim, Tex.Civ.App., 381 S.W.2d 329.
[185]*185Pending the attack on her mother’s will in the Texas courts, the plaintiff, on November 27, 1961, filed the instant action in her grandmother’s ancillary succession proceeding, she seeking (as we have said) to set aside the trust bequests in the will of Mrs. Simms, the will’s probate and the judgment sending the several legatees (including the trustees) into possession. In this action plaintiff contends that the assailed trust provisions constituted prohibited substitutions under the laws of Louisiana, and, consequently, they and the judgment purporting to perpetuate them were null and void and of no effect with respect to the Louisiana properties, the result being that her grandmother died intestate as to those bequests so that such properties were inherited by the testatrix’s sole forced heir (plaintiff’s mother) and should now properly form a part of her mother’s succession.
Mrs. Simms’ testamentary executors have filed in this court an exception of no right of action in which there is alleged a want of interest in the plaintiff, the ex-ceptors pointing out that she is a stranger to the estate of her grandmother for the reason that she was not an heir of Mrs. Simms and that she acquired no seizin in the succession of her mother, Mrs. Franzheim. (We note that this exception was not filed on behalf of all of the defendant litigants. But we consider this of no. importance inasmuch as the failure of right or interest in a plaintiff to institute suit may be noticed by this court of its own motion. Code of Civil Procedure Article 927.)
In the pertinent portions of the brief of plaintiff, where she asserts the basis of her right to proceed in the instant litigation, she contends: “ * * * It is not contended by Mrs. Reese that she is the heir of her grandmother. She is the heir of her mother and as such, asserts the same right which her mother had to establish the absolute nullity of the disputed dispositions of Mrs. Simms’ will. This is manifest from Articles 944 and 945 of the Civil Code. The heir being considered as having succeeded to the deceased from the instant of his death, the * * * effect of this right is to authorize the heir to institute all the actions, even possessory ones, which the deceased had a right to institute and to prosecute those already commenced, for the heir in everything repre-, sents the deceased and has a full right in his place as well for his rights as his obligations. * * * ” In support of this, contention plaintiff relies primarily on Hoggatt v. Gibbs, 12 La.Ann. 770 and Gahn v. Brown et al., 160 La. 790, 107 So. 576, and on Articles 940-945 and 1607 of the Louisiana Revised Civil Code.
At the outset we hold that the cited decisions are not authority for such contention. In the IToggatt case the right or interest of the plaintiff does not appear to. have been questioned and is not mentioned in the opinion; nor did the court in any [187]*187manner consider an issue respecting liis seizin. Likewise, in the Gahn case, the right of the plaintiff to proceed was not mentioned. Moreover, he was the forced .heir of his deceased grandfather, the latter having died after the plaintiff’s mother. Consequently, plaintiff had every right, as a forced heir of his grandfather, to sue to reduce a donation which impinged on his legitime.
Under Article 941 of the Louisiana Revised Civil Code the right of seizin given to ■the heir by Article 940 is by operation of law alone. Under Article 942 he is “con.sidered” seized of the possession of the ■succession. Article 945 authorizes such heir with seizin to institute all the actions which the decedent had a right to institute. And Article 1607 provides that forced heirs are •seized of right at the death of the testator. However, Article 1659 authorizes the testator to “give his testamentary executor the seizin of the whole of his succession * Therefore, in cases where the testator 'leaves forced heirs and has given seizin to his testamentary executor there obviously is (under the codal articles) a conflict between such heirs and the executor insofar as the 'benefits arising out of the right of seizin are concerned.
But in our opinion this obvious ■conflict can be resolved if we interpret Articles 941 and 1607 to mean that the heir .acquires seizin by operation of law on the •death of the testator only when the latter in his will has made no other legally authorized disposition of the seizin. (It is our duty to resolve such a conflict if a reasonable construction can achieve that end. See Article 17 Revised Civil Code; City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for the Parish of Orleans, 216 La. 116, 43 So.2d 237; Hall v. Rosteet, 247 La. 45, 169 So.2d 903; and Crawford v. Alatex Construction Service, Inc., 120 So. 2d 845, Court of Appeal, cert, denied.)
The suggested interpretation was given such codal articles in Succession of Serres, 135 La. 1005, 66 So. 342, and it appears to be the last expression of this court on the subject. In that case, which involved a dispute between the forced heir and the testamentary executor with seizin, the court reviewed extensively and in detail the prior jurisprudence, noted that there had been misleading, and perhaps, conflicting statements in the dicta of certain opinions, and concluded that “ * * * the law is correctly interpreted in the opinion in Bird v. Succession of Jones, [5 La.Ann. 643, 645] in the statement that: ‘The actual seisin of an executor is something distinct from and paramount to the fictitious seisin, which, it is said, is vested in the heir immediately upon the death of the ancestor.’ ” Therein, prior statements or holdings of the court to the contrary were specifically overruled.
Consequently, if Mrs. Franzheim, in her will, granted seizin to her executors it cannot be said correctly that on her death seizin [189]*189devolved on plaintiff, as a forced heir, by operation of law.
Article 1660 of the Revised Civil Code provides: “The testator may express his intention to grant the seizin of his estate to the testamentary executor, either in express terms, by authorising him to take possession of the whole, or a part of the estate of his succession after his death, or by merely appointing him testamentary executor and detainer of his estate; * * The clause in Mrs. Franzheim’s will that appoints the executors reads: “I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint my son, Kenneth Franzheim, II, and W. P. Hamblen and Alden X. Boddeker as Independent Executors of my will, and I direct that no bond shall be required of them and that no other action shall be had in the Court having jurisdiction of my estate relating to the settlement of the same than the probating and recording of this, my will, and the return of statutory inventory, appraisement and list of claims of said estate and of all claims due or owing by me at the time of my death.” (Italics ours.)
The statutory law and jurisprudence of Texas relating to the making of wills (of which we are permitted to take judicial notice by Article 1391 of the Code of Civil Procedure and which are pertinent here in determining the intention of the testatrix since she was domiciled in such state) permit the appointment of Independent Executors who are authorised by such designation to take control and custody of the estate for the purpose of completely managing and administering it, independently of and without orders from the probate cotirt, and to have the right to do zvhaiever the testator could have done in his lifetime. See Vernon’s Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, Probate Code Sections 145 et seq.; Hutcherson v. Hutcherson et al., 135 S.W.2d 757 (Tex.) and Schramm v. Hoch, 241 S.W. 1087 (Tex.). Clearly a grant of that kind to an Independent Executor evidences an intent to authorize “him to take possession of the whole” of the estate — such as would effect the giving of seizin under our law (Revised Civil Code Article 1660). It follows, therefore, that since the testamentary executors were granted seizin by Mrs. Franzheim, the seizin did not, on her death, devolve upon her heirs.
Incidentally, the authority given to her executors by Mrs. Franzheim is far broader and greater, it appears to us, than that encompassed in the language used by the-testator in Succession of Hale, 26 La.Ann.. 195, as follows: “I do hereby appoint my wife Josephine Jones the natural tutrix and executrix under this will, relying on her good judgment and discretion in the administration for the benefit of herself and children * * * ” On an opposition by-the heirs to the executrix’s receiving a. commission, they alleging that she was not given seizin of the property by the will, this, court approved the ruling of the district. [191]*191■court which was: “ * * * It appears * * * that it is sufficiently clear, from the tenor of the will, that the testator had the desire to give the seizin to the executrix. Any disposition or recommendation from the testator to his executor in regard to the mode in which his property is administered, is a sufficient indication of his desire to grant the seizin. That it is not necessary that the word seizin be inserted in the will to confer the power. * * * ” (Italics ours.)
Moreover, wc note that the instant action was not instituted until November 27, 1961, or after the effective date of the new Code of Civil Procedure; and in her brief to this court plaintiff recognizes that, even though the litigation was filed in the original succession proceedings, it is controlled by the provisions of that Code. As a consequence, Article 3211 thereof seems to eliminate the provisions of Article 945 of the Revised Civil Code which authorize the heir with seizin to institute all actions that the deceased had a right to bring. It provides: “A succession representative shall be deemed to have possession of all property of the succession and shall enforce ■all obligations in its favor.” And in the “Official Revision Comments” found thereunder it is said: “(a) This article is a departure from the law relating to seizin. The utility of the concept of seizin in Louisiana law is doubtful, since as a practical matter the succession representative has full seizin of all the property of the deceased. McMahon 1688, n. 211.” (Italics ours.)
Inasmuch as plaintiff was not an heir of her grandmother (her mother, Mrs. Franzheim, was living at the time of the testatrix’s death), she is a stranger to Mrs. Simms’ succession. Also, since she did not acquire seizin of her mother’s estate she was without right or interest to attack her grandmother’s testament or the probate proceedings connected with it.
Of course, as a forced heir of her mother plaintiff has a right to demand a reduction of the bequests left by Mrs. Franzheim. But a demand of that kind is not made in this action.
In a supplemental brief filed here, following the submission of this case, the plaintiff confidently asserts that Cox et al. v. Von Ahlefeldt et al., 50 La.Ann. 1266, 23 So. 959 completely sustains her position that she can maintain this action as one which her mother could have instituted. But even a cursory reading of that opinion reveals that such decision is riot at all controlling.
In the Cox case the deceased grandfather had disposed by will of all of his property in Louisiana without providing for a grandchild, Susan Robinson, who was living at his death and (as pointed out in the opinion) was a forced heir inasmuch as her mother (the testator’s daughter) had predeceased the testator. Without having [193]*193taken any part in her grandfather’s succession in this state, or in the distribution of the effects thereof, Susan died. Within the time permitted by law collateral heirs of Susan brought suit to have the latter recognized as a forced heir of her grandfather, entitled to her legitime, and to have her grandfather’s bequests reduced accordingly. The legatees urged that the collateral heirs of Susan had no right to bring the action because such right would devolve only on forced heirs of the forced heir. However, the court held that under the explicit language of Article 1504 any heir (as well as an assignee) of a forced heir could bring an action for the reduction of excessive donations.
That case is not applicable here because (among other reasons) this plaintiff is not suing to redxice the bequests of Mrs. Simms as exceeding the disposable portion and to recover the legitime owing to the now deceased daughter, Mrs. Franzheim. And even if she were she could not succeed for the obvious reason that Mrs. Simms’ bequests did not exceed the disposable portion. Rather, the testatrix specifically bequeathed to the only forced heir (plaintiff’s mother) the portion legally due her.
For the reasons assigned the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and set aside, the peremptory exception of no right of action is maintained, and plaintiff’s suit is dismissed. All costs are to be borne by plaintiff.