Succession of Melba Mitchell Griggs

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: December 21, 2011
• Docket: CA-0011-0172
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-0172

SUCCESSION OF MELBA MITCHELL GRIGGS

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APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 43991 HONORABLE LEO BOOTHE, DISTRICT JUDGE

JIMMIE C. PETERS JUDGE

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Oswald A. Decuir, Jimmie C. Peters, J. David Painter, and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

Cooks, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Brandy McClure Smith, Taliaferro & Purvis P. O. Box 298 Jonesville, LA 71343 (318) 339-8526 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Francis Clyde Griggs

Brent Stafford Gore Attorney at Law 111 Serio Boulevard Ferriday, LA 71334 (318) 757-4545 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Katheryne Belinda Hoover Tyson Glennell Hoover Byrd Rita Bolyer PETERS, J.

Francis Clyde Griggs appeals a trial court judgment rendered against him in

these succession proceedings finding him liable to the purported heirs of his

deceased wife in the amount of $23,000.00. For the following reasons, we find

that the purported heirs have no right or interest in instituting this suit and reverse

the judgment.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

This litigation began as a September 25, 2008 petition by Katheryne Belinda

Hoover Tyson, Glennell Hoover Byrd, and Rita Bolyer (hereinafter sometimes

referred to as “the Hoover heirs”) to be placed in possession of the property

belonging to their deceased mother, Melba Lee Mitchell Griggs. Their original

petition asserts that their mother died intestate on June 9, 2000; that she had been

married twice, first to Charles Ray Hoover, from whom she was divorced in

February of 1971, and then to the defendant in these proceedings, Francis Clyde

Griggs; that they were born of the marriage to Charles Ray Hoover; and that at the

time of her death their mother was still married to Mr. Griggs. Of critical

importance to the posture of the matter now before us, the Hoover heirs asserted in

their petition to be placed in possession that “[n]o administration of this estate

be[sic] required or is necessary.” A notation at the end of the petition requested

personal service on Mr. Griggs.

The Hoover heirs attached a three-page detailed descriptive list to their

petition to be placed in possession. The attachment lists property both movable

and immovable that they assert comprises the community property belonging to the

deceased and Mr. Griggs, as well as two items of movable property that they claim

were the separate property of their mother. The item at issue in this litigation is

one of the two items of purported separate property and is described in the detailed descriptive list as a “Guitar in possession of Harley Humphrey. Claim to be filed

for return of guitar.” The guitar’s value is listed at $23,000.00.

The succession proceeding lay dormant for almost a year before the next

filing occurred. On August 20, 2009, the Hoover heirs filed an amended detailed

descriptive list wherein they again referred to the guitar along with other assets.

The amended list described the guitar as follows:

Guitar in or formerly in possession of Harley Humphrey. The Guitar was improperly and wrongfully in possession of Harley Humphrey by Francis Clyde Griggs. Francis Clyde Griggs or Harley Humphrey owes the Succession for return of guitar or its fair market value.

(Emphasis added.)

The listed value of the guitar remained at $23,000.00.

On that same day they amended the detailed descriptive list, the Hoover

heirs filed a pleading entitled “PETITION TO RETURN FUNDS TO THE

SUCCESSION.” In this pleading, the Hoover heirs sought to name Harley

Humphrey as a defendant in the proceedings. They asserted that Mr. Humphrey

was Mr. Griggs’ brother-in-law and that after their mother died Mr. Griggs had

given Mr. Humphrey the guitar. The pleading sought a judgment against Mr.

Humphrey ordering him “to return the guitar or funds equal to the amount of the

guitar, to be administered and distributed pursuant to the orders of this Court.”

(Emphasis added.) Attached to the petition was an interrogatory addressed to Mr.

Humphrey requesting that he produce an appraisal of the guitar that he purportedly

had in his possession.

Mr. Griggs finally became a party to the litigation on October 7, 2009, when

he filed a motion to traverse the Hoover heirs’ detailed descriptive lists. In his

pleading, Mr. Griggs asserted that various items not at issue in this appeal were not

properly described and/or valued. In reference to the guitar, Mr. Griggs stated:

2 “Guitar was given to Harley Humphrey. The guitar did not work at the time of

Mrs. Griggs’ death. The value is incorrectly listed; the correct value is $0.”

After a number of attempts to settle the disputes raised by Mr. Griggs’

October 7, 2009 motion, those issues finally came before the trial court for hearing

on March 8, 2010. However, before the beginning of the hearing on Mr. Griggs’

traversal, the trial court allowed the Hoover heirs to confirm a default judgment

against Mr. Humphrey based on the August 20, 2009 filing seeking recovery of the

guitar or its value.

In the confirmation proceedings, Rita Bolyer testified on behalf of the

Hoover heirs. After hearing Ms. Bolyer’s testimony and after considering internet

information with regard to the value of a vintage Martin guitar, which she

suggested was the same brand as the guitar at issue in the litigation, the trial court

rendered judgment against Mr. Humphrey in the amount of $67,500.00. The

written judgment signed on March 26, 2010, awards the amount to the three

Hoover heirs as “heirs to the estate of Melba Lee Mitchell Griggs.”1

The hearing concerning the disputes between the Hoover heirs and Mr.

Griggs began immediately after confirmation of the default judgment against Mr.

Humphrey. Ms. Bolyer was again the only witness for the Hoover heirs. With

regard to the guitar, she attempted to use the same internet information to establish

the value of a vintage Martin guitar, but the trial court sustained Mr. Griggs’

hearsay objection. She then testified that Mr. Griggs had informed her that Mr.

Humphrey had told him that he (Mr. Humphrey) had a written appraisal reflecting

the guitar’s value at $23,000.00. The trial court rejected Mr. Griggs’ hearsay

objection to this testimony. When questioned concerning how she knew that the

1 Counsel for Mr. Griggs objected to Ms. Bolyer’s use of the internet information in establishing the value of the guitar, and the trial court made it clear that anything presented to confirm the default was not to be considered a part of the Hoover heirs’ proof in the disputes between them and Mr. Griggs. 3 guitar at issue was a Martin guitar, Ms. Boelyn stated that “[w]e were raised with

the guitar and my brother-in-law is an expert on musical instruments and he said it

was a Martin guitar and Mr. Humphrey’s attorney stated it was a Martin guitar in

one of his letters corresponding to Mr. Gore [the Humphrey heirs’ attorney].”2

Mr. Griggs acknowledged that the guitar at issue was the separate property

of his deceased wife, but also testified that the guitar was never in very good

condition despite his wife’s attempts to fix it. He denied knowing the brand of the

guitar or its value, and claimed that his wife had given the guitar to Mr. Humphries

before her death. Mr. Griggs asserted that he had never heard his wife’s son-in law

play the guitar and had no idea of its value.

Upon completion of the evidence, the trial court took the matter under

advisement. On June 17, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment addressing all the

issues raised at the March 8, 2010 hearing. With regard to the guitar, the judgment

stated the following:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there be Judgment herein in favor of the Succession of MELBA LEE MITCHELL GRIGGS and against Defendant, FRANCIS CLYDE GRIGGS, in the amount of $23,000.00, together with legal interest thereon from date of judicial demand until paid, for the wrongful conversion of one Martin guitar owned by the Succession of MELBA LEE MITCHELL GRIGGS and given by Defendant, FRANCIS CLYDE GRIGGS, to Defendant’s brother-in- law, one Harley Humphrey, without the knowledge of or consent of KATHERYN BELINDA HOOVER TYSON, GLENNELL HOOVER BYRD, and RITA BOLYER.

By a judgment signed on October 19, 2010, the trial court rejected Mr.

Griggs’ motion for new trial on the guitar issue and this appeal followed. Mr.

Griggs asserts in his one assignment of error that “[t]he trial court erred in its

2 While Ms. Boelyn never identified her brother-in-law by name, it is apparent from the record that this is Freddie Joe Tyson. 4 conclusion that the value of the guitar in the Succession of Melba Lee Mitchell

Griggs is $23,000.00.”

OPINION

The initial pleading filed by the Hoover heirs appears on the surface as

nothing more than an attempt to take advantage of the provisions of La.Code

Civ.P. arts. 3001-3008, which address a succession proceeding where the parties

seek to be placed into possession of the assets of an intestate succession involving

no underlying issues requiring an administrated succession. While nothing within

that process contemplates its use to litigate disputed issues, the Hoover heirs make

it clear in their initial detailed descriptive list that conflicts exist between their

mother’s estate and Mr. Griggs. That being the case, the proper approach to

address the conflicting claims is by placing the succession under administration

pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3091, et seq., using the duly qualified succession

representative appointed by the court as the proper plaintiff to enforce any right the

succession may have against Mr. Griggs. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 685 and the

comments that follow that Article.

That being the case, the Hoover heirs have no standing to pursue this claim

through the succession proceeding as it now stands. Acting on the authority of

La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B), we grant an exception of no right of action as provided

for by La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(A)(6) to reverse the trial court judgment and

remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.3

DISPOSITION

3 While the default judgment rendered against Harley Humphrey suffers from the same defect, that issue is not before us. 5 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that part of the trial court judgment

rendered against Francis Clyde Griggs and remand the matter to the trial court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We assess all costs of this appeal

to Katheryne Belinda Hoover Tyson, Glennell Hoover Byrd, and Rita Bolyer.

6 STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

Cooks, J., Dissenting

The three children and only heirs of the intestate decedent filed a petition for

possession without administration. A Detailed Descriptive List showing the assets

and debts of the succession was also filed. The decedent’s separate and

community property assets are listed, totaling an estimated $249,356.50 plus an

undetermined amount of interest earned during the marriage on stock dividends,

security funds and investments owned by Francis Clyde Griggs (Mr. Griggs). The

total debts of the Succession are listed as $76,583.00 which includes a mortgage in

the amount of $11,780.00; funeral expenses totaling $10,803.00; attorney fees and

court costs $4,000.00; and $50,000.00 medical bills. The succession is not under

administration. No creditor petitioned for an administration, and neither did Mr.

Griggs or any of the three children. The heirs were willing to accept the

succession and be placed in possession without the benefit of an inventory or

appraisal of assets. Counsel for plaintiffs and defendants both admitted in oral

argument that an administration is not needed.

Article 3001 of Code of Civil Procedure provides that heirs may be put in

possession without an administration when all of the heirs are competent and all

accept the succession and when “the succession is relatively free of debt”. The

code defines a succession as “relatively free of debt” when “its only debts are

administration expenses, mortgages not in arrears, and debts of the decedent that

are small in comparison with the assets of the succession”. La.Code Civ. P. art.

3001(A). Based on the representations in the detailed descriptive list, and the

amended list, the heirs of this succession could be sent into possession without an

1 administration. Leaving out the mortgage which is not in arrears, and

administration costs, the debts of the decedent are small in comparison with the

assets. See for example Succession of Pyle, 434 So.2d 523 (La. App. 2 Cir., 1983)

wherein the court found that a succession was “relatively free from debt” where it

had assets of $45,706.97 and debts of $28,845.51. The ratio of assets to debts in

the succession before us is much greater.

The Louisiana Civil Code provides in Article 934 “Succession occurs at the

death of a person” and in Article 935 provides “Immediately at the death of the

decedent, universal successors acquire ownership of the estate and particular

successors acquire ownership of the things bequeathed to them.” La.Civ. Code

Art. 935 further provides “Prior to qualification of a succession representative only

a universal successor may represent the decedent with respect to the heritable

rights and obligations of the decedent.” La.Civ. Code Art. 936 provides “The

succession of the decedent is transferred to his successors, whether testate or

intestate, whether particular, general, or universal legatees. A universal successor

continues the possession with all its advantages and defects, and with no alteration

in the nature of the possession.” Particularly relevant to the issue before us are the

further provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code in Article 938 which provides: “ (A)

Prior to the qualification of a succession representative, a successor may exercise

rights of ownership with respect to his interests in a thing of the estate as well as

his interest in the estate as a whole. (B) If a successor exercises his rights of

ownership after the qualification of a succession representative, the effect of that

exercise is subordinate to the administration of the estate.”

The three heirs in this case acted prior to the qualification of a succession

representative and under the express provisions of La.Civ. Code Art. 938(A), they

have standing and they enjoy the right to exercise their rights as owners in any

“thing” belonging to the estate, such as a guitar, or as to their interest in the whole

2 estate. It is true, as the majority points out, that La.Code Civ. P. art. 685

(emphasis added) provides in part: “Except as provided by law, the succession

representative appointed by a court of this state is the proper plaintiff to sue to

enforce a right of the deceased or of his succession, while the latter is under

administration.” However, when read with the aforementioned Code articles it is

clear that Article 685 applies only after a succession representative has been

appointed. It is not necessary in this case to appoint a succession representative as

acknowledged by all parties concerned. The administration of this relatively small

succession will needlessly deplete the assets. For these reasons I do not agree with

the majority’s granting an exception of no right of action on our own motion. I

believe the heirs have a legal right to proceed, and we must review their appeal.

For these reasons I must respectfully dissent.