Succession of Loewer

149 So. 504, 177 La. 869, 1933 La. LEXIS 1766
Supreme Court of Louisiana·Decided July 7, 1933·No. No. 31857.·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

The only question in this case is whether a document purporting to be the holographic will of Miss Magdalena Loewer was really written by her. Her three cousins, Ernest, Gustav, and Alvin Buchholz, are named in the document as her universal legatees. They produced it and had it probated two months after the succession was opened. Miss Louise Loewer, who is the sister and only heir of the deceased, had the succession opened and was sent into possession as owner of the estate. She contended that the document purporting to be the will of her sister was a forgery. After hearing the evidence, the court decided that the document was a forgery. The three cousins of the deceased have appealed.

Two handwriting experts testified at the trial — one as a witness for the plaintiff and the other for the defendants. The expert testifying for the plaintiff gave the opinion that the contested document was a forgery, *871 and pointed out several discrepancies between the handwriting in contest and the specimens that were admitted to be the genuine handwriting of the deceased. The expert testifying for the defendants was of the opinion that the handwriting in contest was that of the deceased, and he pointed out several characteristics in her handwriting that appeared also in the handwriting in contest, which is very similar to that! which is admitted to be genuine. But that is true in almost every case where forgery is charged, and particularly where the hand-whiting experts disagree. The similarity of handwriting in such cases does not prove absolutely that the contested handwriting is genuine, where, as in this case, a forger might have been aided by a specimen of the genuine handwriting.

Expert testimony is of no aid td the court where, there being two expert witnesses, they contradict each other, and one appears to be as competent and as worthy of belief as the other.

Three nonexpert witnesses for the defendants testified, as a matter of opinion said to be founded upon familiarity with the handwriting of the deceased, that the instrument in question was in her handwriting; but the fact is that these witnesses were judging merely from a comparison of the questioned handwriting with the admitted handwriting of the deceased, and not from an independent knowledge or recollection of her handwriting. One of these witnesses, who was one of the two witnesses on whose testimony the will was probated, admitted that the last instance where he had seen the handwriting of the deceased was in a very brief inscription on a post card, seven years before the time of his testifying; that the last time previous to that was in another brief inscription on a post card; and that the last time previous to that time, when he saw the handwriting of the deceased, was when he received a short letter of congratulation upon his marriage, about seventeen years before the time of £is testifying. He admitted that the only other writings of the deceased that he had ever seen were brief statements on about half a dozen post cards that he had received from time to time, more than seventeen years before the time of his testifying; and he admitted that every such writing that he had received was destroyed soon afterwards. Another of the four nonexpert witnesses for the defendants, who was the other of the two witnesses on whose testimony the instrument in question was probated, admitted, frankly, on the trial of the case, that he could not identify the disputed handwriting as that of the deceased by an independent recollection of her handwriting, or without comparing the disputed handwriting- with a known signature which he held in his hand; and all that he would say, as .to whether the disputed handwriting was that of the deceased, was: “I would think so; I am not a handwriting expert, but there seems to be some similarity between that and this.” Another of the four nonexpert, witnesses for the defendants admitted that he did not know how the deceased spelled her name.

Two nonexpert witnesses for the plaintiff testified that the disputed handwriting was not that of the deceased. These witnesses were women who had worked, beside the de *873 ceased, one for twenty-five years and the other for twenty-eight years, making costumes for carnival organizations; and they claimed to know well her handwriting. The plaintiff, who very likely knew her sister’s handwriting better than any one else knew it, testified that the instrument in contest was not her sister’s handwriting.

If the case depended entirely upon the testimony of the witnesses who undertook tot identify the handwriting in dispute, against the testimony of those who denied the genuineness of the handwriting, the result would be a matter of much doubt. But there is some circumstantial evidence which, in a case already as doubtful as this is, justifies the conclusion that the handwriting in contest is not that of the deceased. In the first place, her name in the instrument, which contains only thirty-two words besides the date and signature, is written thus: “I Magdelena (Lena) Loewer,” etc.; and the record is full of signatures showing — and proof of the fact — that the deceased never on any other occasion spelled her name “Magdelena” (with an e in the middle of it) but spelled it always “Magdalena” (with an a in the middle), or, familiarly, Lena. The instrument in contest is signed Lena Loewer — the name by which Miss Loewer was familiarly known, and with which she signed'her personal letters, but with which she never signed a document of much importance.

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Succession of Loewer, 149 So. 504, 177 La. 869, 1933 La. LEXIS 1766 (La. 1933).

149 So. 504 (Succession of Loewer) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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