Succession of Harris

29 La. Ann. 743
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJuly 15, 1877
DocketNo. 716
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 29 La. Ann. 743 (Succession of Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Succession of Harris, 29 La. Ann. 743 (La. 1877).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Egan, J.

James S. Bay, public administrator of Ouachita, was appointed, by virtue of his office, dative testamenty executor of the will •of the decedent in January, 1874, J. E. Pargoud, the executor named in the will, having refused to accept.

The dative executor provoked the sale of both real and personal prop•erty and filed the account, the items of which are opposed generally and ¡specially by Pargoud as a creditor of the succession. The accountant excepted that he was not a creditor and not entitled to oppose. A tableau of debts in the record shows a large accepted claim in his favor, which had been transferred to Meyer as collateral security for a debt of ¡smaller amount due him by Pargoud, which was subsequently paid. 'Three thousand dollars of the Pargoud debt was used by Meyer in paying for real estate of the Harris succession purchased by him, and the remainder is still due and belongs to Pargaud as shown by the evidence.

It is the fact and not the amount of indebtedness to him which gives him the right to oppose. It is therefore immaterial to inquire further ■or to prove specific amount. The exception was properly overruled.

We shall consider the opposition in the same order as the parish .-judge.

Eirst — That the accountant has credited himself with the difference tbetween the proceeds of sale of property and the amount of inventory [744]*744improperly for several reasons: First — That he has not accounted for a mule, Julie, appraised at $175. ' This is admitted, but it is claimed that this mule was bid off at the sale, and the purchaser not complying-with the terms of sale, the mule was subsequently sold privately by the executor for $110 cash, instead of on a credit of twelve months as ordered by the court. The accountant has failed to show at what price ■ the mule was bid off, or that its real value was less than the appraisement, and, if so, how much less. He was therefore properly charged with the appraised price, $175.

The next item charged to be improperly credited and not accounted, for is nineteen hundred pounds of meat. The quantity inventoried was • twenty-ñve hundred pounds and that sold only six hundred pounds. The parish j udge allowed the executor a credit of 280 pounds of meat consumed by the colored family of deceased, according to the best estimate of the witnesses. This allowance is not complained of by the opponent, and we think was proper. The executor was, however, charged with the difference between 880 pounds, the quantity sold and thus used,. and that inventoried, making 1620 pounds, at ten cents, equal to $162. Of this the executor complains on the ground that he has shown by witnesses that something over five hundred pounds was stolen from the • smoke-house at night in the1 absence of Hanna, a keeper appointed and paid by him to care for the property; and for the further reason that the meat was not weighed, but only estimated at the time of the inventory. With regard to the latter reason, it may be remarked that the mode of estimation adopted is a not uncommon one where, as in this instance, the meat was hanging on sticks; that is, the quantity on one-stick was weighed, and then the number of sticks and of pieces upon each counted and the total quantity thus calculated. This may not have been exactly accurate, but was, no doubt, approximately so. At all events, at this distance of time, we have no better guide, and if there is any uncertainty it is attributable to the executor, who provoked the • inventory and permitted it to be taken in this manner. It was his duty to have had an accurate inventory, and if he did not do so he can claim no advantage of that fact now. There may, however, have been some shrinkage or loss in weight in the short time between inventory and sale, and we -will reduce this item of charge against accountant to five hundred pounds, at ten cents, equal to one hundred and fifty dollars on that account. We do not think that the executor is entitled to the credit for the meat shown to have been stolen. His keeper boarded and slept two ■ or three miles from the place, and, as properly remarked by the parish judge, his presence and care were more needed at night than at any other time. No prudent man would have left his own property exposed to such risk, and the executor must be held responsible for the fault or ■ [745]*745neglect of his servant, the keeper, appointed by him, and whose keepership appears to have been of little if any service to the succession.

The next item was corn inventoried and not accounted £or. The evidence in regard to this is not very satisfactory, but taken in connection with the inventory might have justified some charge against the executor on this account; as it renders it probable that some part of the corn was stolen, and it certainly was left as liable to be stolen as the meat. It is shown, however, to have been in great part inferior to that which was on the top when inventoried, and was not so accurately measured or estimated. We think the parish judge was liberal in not charging any thing to the executor on this account, but as the evidence does not enable us to ascertain with how much he should be charged we shall not disturb the judgment in this respect.

The next item of $25 3£> money embraced in the inventory, not charged in the account, is admitted to be correctly charged in the judgment of the parish court.

The matter of two or-three barrels of spoiled meat was properly not charged against the executor.

The item of twenty dollars for a rifle gun stolen was properly charged for the same reason as the meat; i. e., the fault of the keeper.

The next item opposed is the attorney’s fees in the succession, charged at $581 62, or ten per cent on the amount of the inventory. It is objected that this is not only excessive, but that the public administrator is a public officer with a compensation fixed by law at double that allowed ordinary administrators, and that he is presumed to have been appointed by reason of his qualification to discharge the duties in person without the aid of an attorney, and if he requires one that he must himself pay for it as was no doubt contemplated by the Legislature in allowing so large fees of office. In view of the history of this and other recent legislation in Louisiana, and of the class of persons usually chosen to act as public administrators, and of the fact that no special qualifications were required by the law, it would be a violent presumption that any such economic or prudent considerations entered into the legislative mind. This was properly characterized in argument as only one of the many more than useless officers with which our people have been burdened in the recent past, but for the future happily no longer under the new order of things. Nevertheless, the office was created by statute of the body acting as a Legislature. No man could properly or safely perform its duties without the aid of an attorney, and the law itself permitted the judge of probates to allow, besides the regular commissions, other reasonable and proper expenses. We think attorney’s fees was one, and that the parish judge properly allowed the amount of five per cent on the inventory, or one half of that charged [746]*746in the account, which, considering the size of the estate and the value of the services required for its proper management, we consider a usual and proper allowance.

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Bluebook (online)
29 La. Ann. 743, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/succession-of-harris-la-1877.