Succession of Amie Sayer Saucier

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 19, 2022
• Docket: CA-0022-0088
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 22-88

SUCCESSION OF AMIE SAYER SAUCIER

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APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 45,704 HONORABLE MONIQUE FREEMAN RAULS, DISTRICT JUDGE

BILLY HOWARD EZELL JUDGE

Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, Jonathan W. Perry, and Gary J. Ortego, Judges.

AFFIRMED. Thomas Rockwell Willson 1330 Jackson St. Alexandria, LA 71301 (318) 442-8658 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Pamela Katherine Saucier Burlew

Valerie M Thompson 3600 Jackson St., Ste. 115 B Alexandria, LA 71303 (318) 473-0052 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Joseph M. Saucier EZELL, Judge.

Pamela Saucier Burlew appeals the decision of the trial court below

appointing her brother, Joseph Saucier, administrator of the estate of their mother,

Amie Sayer Saucier. For the following reasons, we hereby affirm the decision of

the trial court.

Mrs. Saucier died on April 13, 2021. She died intestate and was survived by

ten children. Her son, Joseph (hereinafter Mr. Saucier), petitioned to be appointed

provisional administrator to assist with the inventory of the estate and distribution

of the assets. After his appointment as such, Mr. Saucier filed a detailed

descriptive list and requested to be appointed full administrator. His sister, Mrs.

Burlew, opposed his appointment, alleging that he failed to act as required while he

was provisional administrator. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court

determined that Mr. Saucier was qualified to be appointed administrator of the

estate. From that decision, Mr. Burlew appeals.

On appeal, Mrs. Burlew asserts one assignment of error, that the trial court

erred in denying her opposition to Mr. Saucier’s appointment as administrator of

the estate. We disagree.

An appeal challenging a trial court’s decision to appoint an individual to the

position of administrator of a succession is subject to the manifest error standard.

Succession of Brown, 20-518 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/21/21), 318 So.3d 348. “The trial

court is vested with great discretion in determining whether removal is appropriate

under the facts of the particular case.” In re Succession of Keyes, 13-1145, p. 4

(La.App. 4 Cir. 1/22/14), 133 So.3d 163, 165 (citing Succession of Krushevski, 528

So.2d 743 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1988)). In order to reverse a finder of fact’s determination under the manifest error

standard of review, this Court “must find from the record that a reasonable factual

basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court.” Stobart v. State through

Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). When the trial court’s

factual findings are based on the credibility of witnesses, the court’s decision to

credit the testimony of one witness over another must be afforded great deference

by the reviewing court, “for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in

demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding and

belief in what is said.” Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). “It is not

the function of the appellate court to assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh

the evidence.” McKinnis v. Reine, 10-753, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/26/11), 65 So.3d

688, 693.

The trial court stated in its ruling that it believed Mr. Saucier to be “very

credible.” The trial court found that there was no mismanagement or intentional

delays by Mr. Saucier in establishing a succession bank account, as alleged by Mrs.

Burlew, but that the delays complained of were caused by roadblocks set before

Mr. Saucier by the bank holding the accounts. That finding was supported by the

testimony before the court. Mr. Saucier testified that he had compiled the detailed

descriptive list within the time allowed and that he had obtained insurance on his

mother’s home for up to a year, to allow the asset to be protected prior to its sale.

His brother, Larry, testified that he believed Mr. Saucier would be fair as

administrator of the estate.

Further, the testimony at trial established that the three children most

involved in the daily life and care of Mrs. Saucier and her home were Joseph,

Larry, and Lewis, with Joseph being the most involved on a daily basis, due to the

2 proximity of his home to hers. Larry and another brother, Chris, objected to Mrs.

Burlew being named administrator of the succession, with Larry specifically

stating she had not been communication with Mrs. Saucier for years. One of Mrs.

Burlew’s complaints on appeal is that Mr. Saucier paid estate debts with estate

funds, allegedly without authorization, while he was acting provisional

administrator. However, she testified at trial that she did the exact same thing

with regards to a CLECO bill after her mother’s passing, that she then switched the

CLECO account over to her own name, and even opened a post office box in her

deceased mother’s name, after her death, all while she did even not have the

authority of a provisional administrator to do so.

It is clear from the record before this court that the trial court had a

reasonable factual basis for its decision. Moreover, it is apparent that the trial

judge gave greater credence to the testimony of the witnesses for Mr. Saucier than

to those for Mrs. Burlew. This is a matter which is particularly within the purview

of the trier of fact. After reviewing the record, and affording the great deference

owed to the trial court’s credibility determination, we can find no manifest error in

the trial court’s decision.

For the above reasons, the decision of the trial court below appointing

Joseph Saucier administrator of the estate of Amie Sayer Saucier is hereby

affirmed. Costs of this appeal are hereby assessed against Mrs. Burlew.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.