RENDERED: JULY 10, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0760-MR
SUBHASH DHAND; S. DHAND M.D., INC.; SADHNA DHAND; AND SUBHASH DHAND AND SADHNA DHAND AS TRUSTEES OF THE DHAND FAMILY TRUST DATE 05/05/89 APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE RICHARD A. BRUEGGEMANN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-01972
BANK OF AMERICA N.A.; CAPITAL ONE N.A.; CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY; FIFTH THIRD BANK, N.A.; HERITAGE BANK, INC.; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC.; AND WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. APPELLEES
AND NO. 2025-CA-1305-MR
SUBHASH DHAND; S. DHAND M.D.; SADHNA DHAND; AND SUBHASH DHAND AND SADHNA DHAND AS TRUSTEES OF THE DHAND FAMILY TRUST DATE 05-05-89 APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE RICHARD A. BRUEGGEMANN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-01972
CAPITAL ONE N.A. AND WELLS APPELLEES FARGO BANK, N.A.
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: This is a financial fraud case. The scheme targeted a
practicing physician, Dr. Dhand, and his wife, Sadhna Dhand, individually and as
trustees of the Dhand Family Trust date 05-05-89 (collectively, “Appellants”).
Individuals impersonating government officials persuaded Dr. Dhand to wire
transfer approximately $5.8 million from several bank accounts in California to
accounts in Kentucky. After discovering the loss, Appellants filed a lawsuit in
Boone County, Kentucky. Therein, they asserted claims against the alleged
-2- defrauder and various financial institutions involved in the transfer of funds (the
“Banks”).1
The Banks filed individual motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under CR2 12.02(f), which were granted. Appellants appealed to this Court
as a matter of right. Two dismissal orders lacked the requisite finality language.
CR 54.02(1). Appellants were ordered to show why those orders should not be
excluded. The matter was ultimately resolved by an agreed order entered by the
trial court adding the finality language, from which Appellants appealed, resulting
in two separate cases before this Court. Appellants filed a motion to consolidate,
which was granted. For the following reasons, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no
deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the
issue de novo.” Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, “the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true.” Id.
1 They include the above captioned Appellees Wells Fargo, Bank of America, N.A., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A, Fifth Third Bank, N.A., Central Bank & Trust Co., and Heritage Bank, Inc. 2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-3- ANALYSIS
Appellants raise seven issues on appeal. They include various
common law negligence and statutory violations resulting in alleged damages,
including punitive damages. However, we begin with Appellants’ argument that
their complaint was timely filed within the one-year statute of limitations period.
KRS3 413.140.
We need not address that issue beyond concluding that it does not bar
the present case. Expiration of the statute of limitations was not the basis for the
trial court’s dismissal order. Moreover, it is undisputed that Appellants discovered
that they were defrauded on December 3, 2023. The present case was filed on
December 2, 2024, which is within the one-year statute of limitations. What
matters here is “knowledge that one has been wronged[,]” not “knowledge that the
wrong is actionable[.]” Wolfe v. Kimmel, 681 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Ky. 2023) (internal
quotation omitted). Thus, the present case was timely filed. The remaining issues
were addressed by the circuit court in one of its dismissal orders as follows:
[Appellants’] negligence claims fail as a matter of law because [Banks] owed no duty to the Plaintiffs, who were not its customers, and such negligence claims are displaced by Kentucky’s implementation of the Uniform Commercial Code;
[Appellants’] claim under KRS 209.030 [is] barred, because the Plaintiffs, as (1) non-residents of the
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4- Commonwealth and (2) having failed to allege that they are dysfunctioning adults unable to cope with the daily activities of life, are not a protected class for purpose of the statute;
[Appellants’] claims under KRS 365.245 fail because the reporting obligations of the statute are permissive, not mandatory, and even if they were not, [Appellants] have alleged no facts that would allow [Banks] to reasonably conclude there was any financial exploitation; and
[Appellants’] remaining claims, including their claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees, fail as a matter of law.[4]
Common Law Claims
The primary basis for the circuit court’s disposition is that Kentucky’s
Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A, KRS 355.4A–101 et seq., (“UCC”),
typically preempts common law negligence claims such as those raised herein.
Kentucky has “a strong policy in favor of treating the UCC as occupying the field
and displacing common-law causes of action.” Mark D. Dean, P.S.C. v.
Commonwealth Bank & Tr. Co., 434 S.W.3d 489, 505 (Ky. 2014). Indeed, “the
Code is plenary and exclusive except where the legislature has clearly indicated
otherwise.” Id. (quoting Lincoln Bank & Tr. Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 385
(Ky. 1961)). Accordingly, a common law claim is foreclosed when the UCC
4 Only the circuit court’s order granting Bank of America’s motion to dismiss contains findings. However, because the Banks’ arguments for dismissal were similar—if not identical—we will impute the court’s findings as broadly applicable.
-5- provides a comprehensive remedy for the transaction at issue. Id. at 506-07. We
agree with the Banks that the UCC displaces Appellants’ common law claims
because it provides a comprehensive remedy for the transfer of funds. Yet, no
UCC violation is alleged here. See KRS 355.4A-202(1) (“A payment order
received by the receiving bank is the authorized order of the person identified as
sender if that person authorized the order . . . .”); KRS 355.4A-204(1)(a)
(describing circumstances for refunds of payment orders that are “not authorized
. . . under KRS 355.4A-202”).
To be clear, Appellants’ central argument on appeal is that the Banks
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RENDERED: JULY 10, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0760-MR
SUBHASH DHAND; S. DHAND M.D., INC.; SADHNA DHAND; AND SUBHASH DHAND AND SADHNA DHAND AS TRUSTEES OF THE DHAND FAMILY TRUST DATE 05/05/89 APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE RICHARD A. BRUEGGEMANN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-01972
BANK OF AMERICA N.A.; CAPITAL ONE N.A.; CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY; FIFTH THIRD BANK, N.A.; HERITAGE BANK, INC.; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC.; AND WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. APPELLEES
AND NO. 2025-CA-1305-MR
SUBHASH DHAND; S. DHAND M.D.; SADHNA DHAND; AND SUBHASH DHAND AND SADHNA DHAND AS TRUSTEES OF THE DHAND FAMILY TRUST DATE 05-05-89 APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE RICHARD A. BRUEGGEMANN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-01972
CAPITAL ONE N.A. AND WELLS APPELLEES FARGO BANK, N.A.
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: This is a financial fraud case. The scheme targeted a
practicing physician, Dr. Dhand, and his wife, Sadhna Dhand, individually and as
trustees of the Dhand Family Trust date 05-05-89 (collectively, “Appellants”).
Individuals impersonating government officials persuaded Dr. Dhand to wire
transfer approximately $5.8 million from several bank accounts in California to
accounts in Kentucky. After discovering the loss, Appellants filed a lawsuit in
Boone County, Kentucky. Therein, they asserted claims against the alleged
-2- defrauder and various financial institutions involved in the transfer of funds (the
“Banks”).1
The Banks filed individual motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under CR2 12.02(f), which were granted. Appellants appealed to this Court
as a matter of right. Two dismissal orders lacked the requisite finality language.
CR 54.02(1). Appellants were ordered to show why those orders should not be
excluded. The matter was ultimately resolved by an agreed order entered by the
trial court adding the finality language, from which Appellants appealed, resulting
in two separate cases before this Court. Appellants filed a motion to consolidate,
which was granted. For the following reasons, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no
deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the
issue de novo.” Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, “the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true.” Id.
1 They include the above captioned Appellees Wells Fargo, Bank of America, N.A., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A, Fifth Third Bank, N.A., Central Bank & Trust Co., and Heritage Bank, Inc. 2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-3- ANALYSIS
Appellants raise seven issues on appeal. They include various
common law negligence and statutory violations resulting in alleged damages,
including punitive damages. However, we begin with Appellants’ argument that
their complaint was timely filed within the one-year statute of limitations period.
KRS3 413.140.
We need not address that issue beyond concluding that it does not bar
the present case. Expiration of the statute of limitations was not the basis for the
trial court’s dismissal order. Moreover, it is undisputed that Appellants discovered
that they were defrauded on December 3, 2023. The present case was filed on
December 2, 2024, which is within the one-year statute of limitations. What
matters here is “knowledge that one has been wronged[,]” not “knowledge that the
wrong is actionable[.]” Wolfe v. Kimmel, 681 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Ky. 2023) (internal
quotation omitted). Thus, the present case was timely filed. The remaining issues
were addressed by the circuit court in one of its dismissal orders as follows:
[Appellants’] negligence claims fail as a matter of law because [Banks] owed no duty to the Plaintiffs, who were not its customers, and such negligence claims are displaced by Kentucky’s implementation of the Uniform Commercial Code;
[Appellants’] claim under KRS 209.030 [is] barred, because the Plaintiffs, as (1) non-residents of the
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4- Commonwealth and (2) having failed to allege that they are dysfunctioning adults unable to cope with the daily activities of life, are not a protected class for purpose of the statute;
[Appellants’] claims under KRS 365.245 fail because the reporting obligations of the statute are permissive, not mandatory, and even if they were not, [Appellants] have alleged no facts that would allow [Banks] to reasonably conclude there was any financial exploitation; and
[Appellants’] remaining claims, including their claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees, fail as a matter of law.[4]
Common Law Claims
The primary basis for the circuit court’s disposition is that Kentucky’s
Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A, KRS 355.4A–101 et seq., (“UCC”),
typically preempts common law negligence claims such as those raised herein.
Kentucky has “a strong policy in favor of treating the UCC as occupying the field
and displacing common-law causes of action.” Mark D. Dean, P.S.C. v.
Commonwealth Bank & Tr. Co., 434 S.W.3d 489, 505 (Ky. 2014). Indeed, “the
Code is plenary and exclusive except where the legislature has clearly indicated
otherwise.” Id. (quoting Lincoln Bank & Tr. Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 385
(Ky. 1961)). Accordingly, a common law claim is foreclosed when the UCC
4 Only the circuit court’s order granting Bank of America’s motion to dismiss contains findings. However, because the Banks’ arguments for dismissal were similar—if not identical—we will impute the court’s findings as broadly applicable.
-5- provides a comprehensive remedy for the transaction at issue. Id. at 506-07. We
agree with the Banks that the UCC displaces Appellants’ common law claims
because it provides a comprehensive remedy for the transfer of funds. Yet, no
UCC violation is alleged here. See KRS 355.4A-202(1) (“A payment order
received by the receiving bank is the authorized order of the person identified as
sender if that person authorized the order . . . .”); KRS 355.4A-204(1)(a)
(describing circumstances for refunds of payment orders that are “not authorized
. . . under KRS 355.4A-202”).
To be clear, Appellants’ central argument on appeal is that the Banks
violated Kentucky’s “universal duty” of care under which “every person owes a
duty to every other person to exercise ordinary care in his activities to prevent
foreseeable injury.” Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles, Aerie No. 3738, Inc. v.
Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328, 332 (Ky. 1987). We do not believe that this general
duty of care is enough, based on the allegations presented here, to maintain a
common law action against the Banks. The complaint, amended complaint, and
arguments raised herein, indicate that the Banks—whether payor or payee—were
mere facilitators of a series of transactions executed and authorized by Appellants.
Statutory Claims
As previously stated, Appellants do not raise any UCC violations.
Instead, they present negligence per se claims for alleged violation of 1) Kentucky
-6- Adult Protection Act (“KAPA”), KRS 209.005 et seq., and 2) Kentucky’s
Protection from Financial Exploitation Act (“KPFEA”), KRS 365.245. Each will
be addressed in turn.
“Under the Kentucky Adult Protection Act, KRS 209.080–.990,
adults of the Commonwealth who are unable to manage their own affairs, or who
are unable to protect themselves from abuse, neglect, or exploitation, are able to
access a system of protective services to provide assistance in these areas.”
Council on Developmental Disabilities, Inc. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs.,
473 S.W.3d 597, 601 (Ky. 2015), as modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 17, 2015)
“Adult” means a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who, because of mental or physical dysfunctioning, is unable to manage his or her own resources, carry out the activity of daily living, or protect himself or herself from neglect, exploitation, or a hazardous or abusive situation without assistance from others, and who may be in need of protective services[.]
KRS 209.020(4). KAPA requires any person “having reasonable cause to suspect
that an adult has suffered abuse, neglect, or exploitation” to report the suspected
abuse to the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. KRS 209.030(2).
First, there is no indication that KAPA provides a private right of enforcement.
See KRS 209.040 (“Any court may upon proper application by the cabinet issue a
restraining order or other injunctive relief to prohibit any violation of this chapter,
-7- regardless of the existence of any other remedy at law.’). Furthermore, Appellants
are not within the statutorily protected class. KRS 209.020.
Similarly, KPFEA protects “specified adults,” who are adults 65 years
or older; or are reasonably believed to have “mental or physical impairment that
renders that natural person unable to protect his or her own interests.” KRS
365.245(1)(e). KPFEA provides a mechanism for reporting financial exploitation.
KRS 365.245(2)(a). However, KPFEA’s reporting provisions are permissive
rather than mandatory and, in any event, Appellants do not allege financial
exploitation by the Banks. Any remaining issues are moot or otherwise
unpersuasive.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Boone Circuit Court’s dismissal orders
are hereby AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
-8- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR BANK OF AMERICA AND MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, Andre F. Regard FENNER & SMITH, INC.: Lexington, Kentucky Matthew A. Fitzgerald Brian E. Pumphrey Richmond, Virginia
Micaylee A. Noreen Pro Hac Vice
Bethany A. Breetz Neal Bailen Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.:
Benjamin B. Coulter Birmingham, Alabama
BRIEF FOR FIFTH THIRD BANK, N.A.:
Victor A. Walton, Jr. J.B. Lind Cincinnati, Ohio
Jacob D. Mahle Pro Hac Vice
BRIEF FOR HERITAGE BANK, INC. AND CENTRAL BANK & TRUST CO.:
Griffin Terry Sumner William T. Repasky Matthew Marino Louisville, Kentucky
-9- BRIEF FOR JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.:
Dustin E. Meek Daniel R. Graham Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR CAPITAL ONE, N.A.:
Jonathan M. Kenney Virginia Beach, Virginia
-10-