Suarez v. The Long Island Railroad Company

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 13, 2025
Docket1:22-cv-09013
StatusUnknown

This text of Suarez v. The Long Island Railroad Company (Suarez v. The Long Island Railroad Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Suarez v. The Long Island Railroad Company, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

PHILIP J. DINHOFER, LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW CENTRE AVE. - SUITE 314 ROCKVILLE CENTRE, NY 11570 TEL: 516-678-3500 FAX: 516-678-4235 E-MAIL: PJDLLC2806@Y AHOO.COM june 12, 2025 MEMO ENDORSE The Court directs Defendant D&C U: VIA ECF to respond to the letter (ECF No. 47) June 16, 2025. Hon. Edgardo Ramos United States District Judge United States Courthouse SO ORDERED. 40 Foley Square □□ New York, NY 10007 = — Edgardo Ramos,‘U.S.D.J. Re: Suarez v. LIRR, et al. Dated: June 13, 2025 22 Civ. 9013 (ER) New York, New York Dear Judge Ramos: Plaintiff Gregory Suarez does herewith move to preclude defendant D&C United from offering any Rule 26(a)(2)(B) expert testimony at the trial to be had in this action. In this regard we consider the extensive discussions had at the May 30, 2025 conference, where the defendant D&C United was directed by you to provide its Rule 26(a)(2)(B) expert witness disclosure by no later than June 6, 2025, as the equivalent of a pre-motion conference on this discovery issue. Your Honor may recall that the Court’s direction to defendant D&C came after we had pointed out that the plaintiff had been examined by the defendant’s doctor some 8 months beforehand in September 2024 and still we had not received the defendant’s Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosure and/or expert’s report. Defendant asserted it was waiting to make such tender following the completion of plaintiff's deposition. The frivolity of that argument was readily apparent when we pointed out that plaintiff's deposition had been completed on March 25, 2025, some three months before counsel’s argument made at the May 30, 2025 conference, yet still no such Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosure was had in the time since. Your Honor directed defendant’s prompt tender of its expert witness exchage by no later than July 6, 2025. After normal work hours on Friday, June 6, 2025 we received several e-mail transmissions with defendant D&C’s attempt at compliance with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Defendant proffered two experts; the physician who examined plaintiff, James Kipnis, MD, and an accident reconstructionist, Stephen N. Emolo. Defendant’s Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosure for Dr. Kipnis (copy attached) says at page 2, paragraph 1, as follows: A copy of Dr. Kipnis’ fee schedule will be supplemented under separate cover. A list of testimonies for Dr. Kipnis will be supplemented under separate cover. Defendant’s Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosure for Mr. Emolo (Copy attached) says at page 1, paragraph 1, as follows: A copy of Mr. Emolo’s applicable court appearances and testimony will follow under separate cover. Mr. Emolo’s fee schedule will follow under separate cover.

The following day, on June 7, 2025, plaintiff promptly wrote counsel for defendant D&C, to advise that because of the foregoing deficiencies, which were not in compliance with Rule 26(a)(2)(B), we were rejecting both expert witness tenders, however, we were providing them with the courtesy of an opportunity to come into compliance with the Rule by providing the missing materials by no later than the close of business on June 11, 2025 (copy of letter attached). To date, we have had neither any response from defense counsel for D&C, nor have we received the missing information required of a proper Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosure. Accordingly, this motion to preclude follows. The power of a Court to exercise its discretion and to impose the sanction of preclusion for failing to provide required disclosure is “near automatic.” Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 297 (2nd Cir. 2006). It does not require a showing of bad faith. Id, at 296. The Court need only find that there is no substantial justification and that the failure to disclose is not harmless. Id. at 297. FRCP Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provides that a proper expert witness disclosure must include amongst other things, the following two items: (v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case. These two elements of disclosure that are specifically required by the Rule are presumptively substantial discovery rights afforded to the recipient of such discovery and an adverse party’s failure to make such required disclosure cannot be found to be harmless when it is specifically compelled by the FRCP. Moreover, having addressed the very specific issue of the defendant’s missing expert witness disclosures only the week before in open Court, the defendant D&C had the opportunity to inform the Court of any problems it had making the requisite rull and complete disclosure mandated by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and to request that the Court adjust the deadlines for the making of such disclosure, or seek some other alternative remedy as the circumstances may have then warranted. Nonetheless, for reasons known only to themselves, defendant D&C chose to remain silent as to these deficiencies in what can only be perceived as a conscious plan designed to frustrate plaintiff’s legitimate discovery rights. That such silence continues and that no excuse (no less a “substantial justification”) has been proffered by defendant D&C even after the issue was specifically raised by plaintiff’s letter of June 7, 2025, only further reinforces the foregoing conclusion. As noted by the dates thereon defendant had Dr. Kipness report as of September 2024, and Mr. Emolo’s in November of 2024. It seems highly unlikely that either expert failed to bill for providing such report or that defendant was unaware of the cost of each study well before engaging the expert no less within a reasonable time after receipt of each report. Nor does it seem like any great effort beyond a simple phone call for defendant to ascertain their experts costs for trial and/or deposition. Nonetheless, defendant D&C still have not provided this mandated discovery information nor any excuse as to why they have not done so. In a similar regard, a Westlaw search of caselaw for the name James Kipnis has revealed that in January 2023 he was proffered by this very same defense counsel’s law offices as an expert witness before the Eastern District of New York in the matter of Chang Qeu Oh, 21-CV-01042 (RPK)(PK) and as such defense counsel’s law firm is presumed to have made an appropriate Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosure that included a list of cases where he had testified. So too we point out that having elected to participate as an expert for hire in an action before a Federal Court, its is the expert’s professional responsibility to be aware of its discovery obligations to the Court and parties, and to be fully prepared to meet them. This includes their obligation to provide the requisite list of cases. Lastly, we note that “Case law establishes that the list of cases in which the witness has testified should at a minimum include the name of the court or administrative agency where the testimony occurred, the names of the parties, the case number, and whether the testimony was given at a deposition or trial. Whalen v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2016 WL 5660381, at *4 (S.D.N.Y., 2016)(Citations Omitted). In view of the foregoing, it is clear that defendant D&C’s failure to provide an appropriate Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosure has prejudiced plaintiff’s ability to properly prepare this action for consideration of both deposition and/or trial, no less for plaintiff to make appropriate deliberation of the foregoing within the strict time parameters previously set by the Court. Defendant D&C has been given more than ample time to come forward with all the requisite information constrained by Rule 26(a)(2)(B), they have been in possession of their experts reports in excess of some 7 months and yet they are still incapable of an appropriate disclosure.

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Suarez v. The Long Island Railroad Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/suarez-v-the-long-island-railroad-company-nysd-2025.