Su v. Sarene Services, Inc. et.al.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJuly 19, 2024
Docket2:20-cv-03273
StatusUnknown

This text of Su v. Sarene Services, Inc. et.al. (Su v. Sarene Services, Inc. et.al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Su v. Sarene Services, Inc. et.al., (E.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Julie A. Su, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor,

Plaintiff,

-v- 2:20-cv-03273 (NJC) (ST) Sarene Services, Inc. d/b/a Serene Home Nursing Agency; Irene Manolias, Individually,

Defendants.

ORDER

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, District Judge: This case concerns claims prosecuted by the Acting Secretary of Labor, Julie A. Su (“Acting Secretary”), on behalf of the United States Department of Labor (the “Department”) against Sarene Services Inc., d/b/a Serene Home Nursing Agency (“Serene”), and Irene Manolias (“Manolias” and collectively, “Defendants”) under provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the “FLSA”). (Am. Compl., ECF No. 139.) On July 15, 2024, the Court issued an Opinion and Order granting the Acting Secretary’s Motion to Amend the Complaint to add an FLSA retaliation claim under 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). (See Op. & Order, ECF No. 138 (granting ECF Nos. 106, 132).) The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to keep accurate time records, failed to pay certain former employees—home health aides who provide services to people requiring home care twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week (“live-in aides”)—minimum and overtime wages, and engaged in retaliation against former employees in the course of litigating this action, all in violation of various FLSA provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 211(c), 215(a)(2), 215(a)(3), and 215(a)(5). (Am. Compl. at 1.) The Amended Complaint also identifies the names of current and former Serene employees who, the Acting Secretary argues, would receive back wages should the Acting Secretary prevail on the FLSA claims in this action. (Id. at 3, 21–33.)

In this Order, I incorporate by reference the findings and conclusions of the Opinion and Order in full. (See Op. & Order.) This includes my conclusion that the record, at this stage of the proceedings: gives rise to material questions of fact as to whether Serene representatives properly informed any of the former live-in aides whom they solicited to sign declarations about this litigation, their rights, and the implications of signing declarations addressing issues central to the claims brought in this action.

(Id. at 68.) It also includes my finding that “[t]he record is more than sufficient to show the existence of numerous triable questions of material fact concerning Defendants’ alleged retaliation against live-in aides, including whether Defendants used false pretenses and coercive means to chill these former employees from participating in this lawsuit.” (Id. at 70; see also id. at 15–22.) As described in the Opinion and Order, the Acting Secretary filed a renewed Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (“PI Motion”) (Pl.’s Renewed PI Mot., ECF No. 114) arguing that Defendants were engaged in retaliation against former live-in aides. (See Op. & Order at 8.) In its briefing on the renewed PI Motion, the Acting Secretary argues, in the alternative, for the issuance of a protective order to “curb the likelihood of serious abuse” in Defendants’ communications with their former live-in aides, all of whom have an interest in this action, even without a finding of retaliation. (Pl.’s Reply Br. ISO Renewed Mot. for PI at 5, 5 n.5 (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 116; see also Pl.’s Supp. Br. ISO PI Mot. at 1 n.1 (“Pl.’s Supp. Br.”), ECF No. 132.) The Acting Secretary argues that there is good cause, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”), for the Court to issue a protective order to ensure that Defendants’ communications with their former live-in aide employees in preparation for trial do not chill them from testifying or otherwise participating in this action, and instead take place in a context in which these former employees are accurately informed about this action and their

rights. (Pl.’s Reply at 5 n.5.) Defendants have been on notice of the Acting Secretary’s alternative request for a protective order at least since the parties’ briefing filed on January 26, 2024. (See id.; Pl.’s Supp. Br. at 1 n.1.) During the July 19, 2024 status conference with the Court following issuance of the Opinion and Order, the Acting Secretary asked me to construe the renewed PI Motion as a Motion for a Protective Order. Both parties confirmed that their arguments concerning the Acting Secretary’s requested preliminary injunction and Motion to Amend the Complaint were also in response to the Acting Secretary’s request for a protective order. I now consider whether to grant a protective order under Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P. In

making this decision, I take into account all of the arguments made by the Acting Secretary and Defendants in previous filings on the renewed PI Motion and Motion to Amend. (ECF Nos. 106, 114–116, 131–133,1 136–137.) Under Rule 26, “the trial court has broad discretion to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Uto v. Job Site Servs. Inc., 269 F.R.D. 209, 211–12 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). A showing of good

1 On June 11, 2024, Defendants filed a supplemental brief in opposition to the renewed PI Motion and Motion to Amend without any attachments. (ECF No. 131.) That same day, Defendants filed the same supplemental brief again, but included seven exhibits. (ECF Nos. 133, 133-1–7.) cause is necessary, and this standard is met upon a showing of “a particular need for protection.” Id. at 211–212 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, a court may issue a protective order sua sponte or upon a party’s motion “to prohibit retaliation from occurring in the workplace.” Copper v. Cavalry Staffing, LLC, No. 14-cv-3676, at 32 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2015) (unpublished) (citing Benitez v. Demco of Riverdale, LLC, No. 14-cv-7074, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015) (sua sponte

issuing a protective order prohibiting employer from speaking to employees about the lawsuit asserting FLSA and New York Labor Law claims and threatening or retaliating against any employees for reasons related to the lawsuit)); Su v. Versa Cret Contracting Co., No. 21CV05697JMAJMW, 2024 WL 1704695, at *3, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2024) (granting in part motion for protective order preventing disclosure of the names of employee-informant witnesses prior to trial in part because of retaliation concerns). Here, the record demonstrates a particular need for protection of former Serene live-in aides. The case is scheduled for trial to begin on November 12, 2024. In the coming weeks and months, Defendants will be preparing their defense and seeking to speak to potential witnesses

who are former employees, including live-in aides contacted in the 2023 outreach challenged as retaliatory. Defendants will also be seeking to speak to other former Serene live-in aides whom the Acting Secretary identified in the Amended Complaint as eligible for back pay and damages if the Acting Secretary prevails in the FLSA claims brought here.

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Related

Uto v. Job Site Services Inc.
269 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. New York, 2010)

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