North, J.
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit judge dismissing contempt proceedings instituted by plaintiff against defendant. The alleged contempt was defendant’s failure to make certain payments of money to plaintiff as provided in an amended decree of divorce. It is agreed that such defaulted payments total $9,810. The circuit judge refused to find defendant guilty of contempt on the ground that the provisions of the decree were in the nature of a property settlement enforceable as an ordinary money decree, but not by contempt proceedings. His holding was: “that the decree in this case contains no provision which is clearly and unequivocally for the support and maintenance of the minor children, nor does it contain any provision for payment of alimony as such to the plaintiff.” Plaintiff has appealed.
Prior to November 12,1929, these parties had separated and were then living apart from each other. On the date noted they entered into a “separation agreement.” The material portions of this agreement are printed in the margin, hereof.
For refer
enee purposes we have italicized certain provisions. Two children were born of this marriage. At the date of the property settlement the son, Donald, was 10 years of age, and the daughter, Alice, 8. On January 7, 1930, plaintiff filed a bill for divorce. Personal service was obtained on defendant, his default for nonappearance entered, testimony taken, and a decree of divorce granted plaintiff April 18, 1930. Plaintiff has not remarried. The decree gave plaintiff “the care, custody and maintenance of said minor children;” and contained the following:
“And it is also further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the said Marian Sturgis pay to the said Gladys G. Sturgis the sum of One Dollar.
“And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the provision made for the said Gladys G. Sturgis herein shall be in lieu of her dower in the property of her husband, the said Marian Sturgis, and in full satisfaction of all claims that she may have in any property which the said Marian Sturgis owns or may hereafter own, or in which he has or may hereafter have any interest and that he shall hereafter hold his remaining real estate free, clear and discharged from any such dower right or claims.”
This original decree made no reference to the property settlement contained in tbe “separation agreement,” nor did tbe decree contain any specific provision for alimony or payments by defendant for tbe support and maintenance of tbe minor children. On May 12,1932, having previously beard tbe respective parties, tbe court entered an amended decree in which were embodied tbe terms of tbe separation agreement of November 12,1929; and after having so provided tbe amended decree concluded as follows:
“Tbe provisions herein contained for tbe said Gladys G. Sturgis shall be in lieu of dower in the property of tbe said Marian Sturgis, and in full satisfaction of all claims that she may have in any property which tbe said Marian Sturgis owned or may hereafter own.”
On this appeal the two questions with, which we are confronted are: (1) Does the amended decree, separate and apart from the provisions of the property settlement, award alimony to plaintiff; and (2) Does the amended decree contain a provision for the support and maintenance of the minor children which can he separated from the property settlement?
“Divorce decree may join award for alimony with award in lieu of dower, but if so awarded in lump sum, contempt for nonpayment thereof may not be adjudged.”
Harner
v.
Harner
(syllabus), 255 Mich. 515.
“Where a decree is entered in approval of and pursuant to a property settlement, its entire provision in that respect must be considered, and for the plaintiff to resort to contempt proceedings it must
clearly appear that a stated allowance is made therein to her for alimony alone.”
Shafer
v.
Shafer, 257
Mich. 372.
Tested in the light of the foregoing decisions and others of like character which might be cited, we think it is clear that the property settlement embodied in the amended decree is of such a character that it is not possible to find in it a provision which is for alimony alone, as contradistinguished from the provisions for the property settlement between plaintiff and her husband. It follows that the circuit judge was clearly right in holding contempt proceedings were not available to plaintiff incident to her complaint that defendant had defaulted in payment to her of a specified sum as alimony.
“A
divorce decree, which plainly states the award to be in lieu of dower and in satisfaction of property claims, is not enforceable by contempt proceedings.”
Belting
v.
Wayne Circuit Judge
(syllabus), 245 Mich. 111
But the record is different as to the payments ordered to be made to plaintiff for the support and maintenance of the minor children. In this particular we think within certain limitations it clearly and distinctly appears that a definite portion of each of the $150 monthly payments was considered and designated as the decreed contribution of defendant to be paid to plaintiff monthly towards the support and maintenance of the two minor children. The italicized portion of the property settlement embodied in the amended decree in part reads:
“It is mutually agreed, however, that at any time both of said children shall become self-supporting and no longer dependent on first party, that then and in that event the said monthly payments [of $150 each] shall be reduced to the sum of $100. * * *
“Second party further agrees to pay all doctor, dental and medical bills for the said first party and said children incurred in each year in excess of the total sum of $100. ’ ’
From the foregoing we think it clearly appears that the decree as drafted contemplated and embodied a separate and distinct provision for payment by defendant to plaintiff of $150 per month and that of this amount $50 per month was for the support and maintenance of the two minor children. And further, that there was the specific provision that in event the expense of medical or dental care for “first party and said children” in any one year exceeded $100, such excess should be paid by defendant to plaintiff. It may be noted that a claim of this latter character is made in plaintiff’s present petition. Notwithstanding these provisions for the care and maintenance of the two minor children are interspersed with other provisions of the property settlement between plaintiff and defendant, we think they are by the terms of the agreement sufficiently ascertainable as distinct and separate provisions having to do alone with the support and maintenance of the minor children, and as such their nonpayment amounts to contempt of court.
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North, J.
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit judge dismissing contempt proceedings instituted by plaintiff against defendant. The alleged contempt was defendant’s failure to make certain payments of money to plaintiff as provided in an amended decree of divorce. It is agreed that such defaulted payments total $9,810. The circuit judge refused to find defendant guilty of contempt on the ground that the provisions of the decree were in the nature of a property settlement enforceable as an ordinary money decree, but not by contempt proceedings. His holding was: “that the decree in this case contains no provision which is clearly and unequivocally for the support and maintenance of the minor children, nor does it contain any provision for payment of alimony as such to the plaintiff.” Plaintiff has appealed.
Prior to November 12,1929, these parties had separated and were then living apart from each other. On the date noted they entered into a “separation agreement.” The material portions of this agreement are printed in the margin, hereof.
For refer
enee purposes we have italicized certain provisions. Two children were born of this marriage. At the date of the property settlement the son, Donald, was 10 years of age, and the daughter, Alice, 8. On January 7, 1930, plaintiff filed a bill for divorce. Personal service was obtained on defendant, his default for nonappearance entered, testimony taken, and a decree of divorce granted plaintiff April 18, 1930. Plaintiff has not remarried. The decree gave plaintiff “the care, custody and maintenance of said minor children;” and contained the following:
“And it is also further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the said Marian Sturgis pay to the said Gladys G. Sturgis the sum of One Dollar.
“And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the provision made for the said Gladys G. Sturgis herein shall be in lieu of her dower in the property of her husband, the said Marian Sturgis, and in full satisfaction of all claims that she may have in any property which the said Marian Sturgis owns or may hereafter own, or in which he has or may hereafter have any interest and that he shall hereafter hold his remaining real estate free, clear and discharged from any such dower right or claims.”
This original decree made no reference to the property settlement contained in tbe “separation agreement,” nor did tbe decree contain any specific provision for alimony or payments by defendant for tbe support and maintenance of tbe minor children. On May 12,1932, having previously beard tbe respective parties, tbe court entered an amended decree in which were embodied tbe terms of tbe separation agreement of November 12,1929; and after having so provided tbe amended decree concluded as follows:
“Tbe provisions herein contained for tbe said Gladys G. Sturgis shall be in lieu of dower in the property of tbe said Marian Sturgis, and in full satisfaction of all claims that she may have in any property which tbe said Marian Sturgis owned or may hereafter own.”
On this appeal the two questions with, which we are confronted are: (1) Does the amended decree, separate and apart from the provisions of the property settlement, award alimony to plaintiff; and (2) Does the amended decree contain a provision for the support and maintenance of the minor children which can he separated from the property settlement?
“Divorce decree may join award for alimony with award in lieu of dower, but if so awarded in lump sum, contempt for nonpayment thereof may not be adjudged.”
Harner
v.
Harner
(syllabus), 255 Mich. 515.
“Where a decree is entered in approval of and pursuant to a property settlement, its entire provision in that respect must be considered, and for the plaintiff to resort to contempt proceedings it must
clearly appear that a stated allowance is made therein to her for alimony alone.”
Shafer
v.
Shafer, 257
Mich. 372.
Tested in the light of the foregoing decisions and others of like character which might be cited, we think it is clear that the property settlement embodied in the amended decree is of such a character that it is not possible to find in it a provision which is for alimony alone, as contradistinguished from the provisions for the property settlement between plaintiff and her husband. It follows that the circuit judge was clearly right in holding contempt proceedings were not available to plaintiff incident to her complaint that defendant had defaulted in payment to her of a specified sum as alimony.
“A
divorce decree, which plainly states the award to be in lieu of dower and in satisfaction of property claims, is not enforceable by contempt proceedings.”
Belting
v.
Wayne Circuit Judge
(syllabus), 245 Mich. 111
But the record is different as to the payments ordered to be made to plaintiff for the support and maintenance of the minor children. In this particular we think within certain limitations it clearly and distinctly appears that a definite portion of each of the $150 monthly payments was considered and designated as the decreed contribution of defendant to be paid to plaintiff monthly towards the support and maintenance of the two minor children. The italicized portion of the property settlement embodied in the amended decree in part reads:
“It is mutually agreed, however, that at any time both of said children shall become self-supporting and no longer dependent on first party, that then and in that event the said monthly payments [of $150 each] shall be reduced to the sum of $100. * * *
“Second party further agrees to pay all doctor, dental and medical bills for the said first party and said children incurred in each year in excess of the total sum of $100. ’ ’
From the foregoing we think it clearly appears that the decree as drafted contemplated and embodied a separate and distinct provision for payment by defendant to plaintiff of $150 per month and that of this amount $50 per month was for the support and maintenance of the two minor children. And further, that there was the specific provision that in event the expense of medical or dental care for “first party and said children” in any one year exceeded $100, such excess should be paid by defendant to plaintiff. It may be noted that a claim of this latter character is made in plaintiff’s present petition. Notwithstanding these provisions for the care and maintenance of the two minor children are interspersed with other provisions of the property settlement between plaintiff and defendant, we think they are by the terms of the agreement sufficiently ascertainable as distinct and separate provisions having to do alone with the support and maintenance of the minor children, and as such their nonpayment amounts to contempt of court.
“A monthly allowance decreed to a wife for the support and maintenance of a child in a suit for a divorce is ‘alimony’ within the meaning of Act No. 230, Pub. Acts 1899 (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13910 [Stat. Ann. § 27.511]), authorizing the enforcement of a decree for alimony through imprisonment for
contempt.”
Brown
v.
Brown
(syllabus), 135 Mich. 141.
It is much stressed in plaintiff’s brief that in the present proceedings the parties entered into a so-called stipulation of facts in the circuit court in which it was recited that the payments which defendant has failed to make were “for the support, education, and maintenance of the said minor children from the date of said decree to and including May, 1940; ’ ’ and from this it is strenuously urged that plaintiff is entitled to prosecute contempt proceedings for the whole amount unpaid by defendant. With this we cannot agree. The legal effect of a decree entered cannot be altered by a stipulation of facts subsequently agreed upon by the respective parties. Instead, the decree of the court stands for an adjudication in accord with the provisions therein contained.
“Where a decree is complete and unambiguous in itself, extraneous matters cannot be resorted to for the purpose of giving it a meaning which its language, without such help, would not carry.”
Belting
v.
Wayne Circuit Judge, supra.
Nor are we in accord with the contention of defendant that the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify the terms of the original decree by subsequently entering an amended decree. As applied to a property settlement this contention would be sound, in the absence of some condition such as fraud which would justify the modification of a decree entered in consequence thereof.
Stoutenburg
v.
Stoutenburg,
285 Mich. 505. But provisions in a decree of divorce for the care, custody and maintenance of minor children are subject to modification by an amended decree as may be required by a change of circumstances or the welfare of such minor children. See
McFarlane
v.
McFarlane,
298 Mich. 595;
Winter
v.
Winter,
270 Mich. 707; and
West
v.
West,
241 Mich. 679. We quote two of the headnotes from the latter case:
“In Michigan, husband and wife, during the pend-ency of a suit for divorce, may agree upon a property settlement, and, in the absence óf fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, be bound thereby.
“Parents of a minor child requiring maintenance may not, by any agreement, take from the court the power, in case of divorce, to decree maintenance of the child. ’ ’
The parties have stipulated that the older one of the two children continued to live with plaintiff and continued in school or college until April 15, 1940; and the younger one continued to live with plaintiff and attended school or college until May 18, 1940. Under the terms of the decree the $50 a month for the support of the children continued until the latter one of these two dates. While the stipulation discloses that from and after November, 1931, defendant paid to apply on the $150 monthly instalments $5,710, the exact dates or amounts of the respective payments do not appear. For that reason it is impossible to determine for how many .of the months since November, 1931, defendant has failed to pay $50 or more under the decree. As to such defaults in making monthly payments of $50 plaintiff is entitled to prosecute the contempt proceedings. If at any time the monthly payments have been in excess of $50 per month such excess payments should be construed as applying on the $100 monthly instalments, decreed for plaintiff’s use, and not applied as payments of accrued monthly instalments of $50 for the support and maintenance of the minor children. Because of the inadequacy of the record before us, the case must be remanded for further consideration by the trial court and determination in accordance herewith.
It is so ordered; but since neither of these parties has fully prevailed on this appeal, no costs will be awarded.
Chandler, C. J., .and Starr, Wiest, Butzel, Bushnell, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred with North, J.