EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Aug 13, 2025 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK ROBIN S.,1 No. 1:24-CV-3107-MKD
Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER v. ECF Nos. 6, 8 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,2 Defendant.
1 To protect the privacy of plaintiffs in social security cases, the Court identifies them by only their first names and the initial of their last names. See LCivR 5.2(c). 2 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano is substituted for Martin O’Malley as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Before the Court are the parties’ briefs. ECF Nos. 6, 8. Victoria Chhagan and Amy Gilbrough represent Plaintiff; Special Assistant United States Attorneys
L. Jamala Edwards and Shata Stucky represent Defendant. The Court, having reviewed the administrative record and the parties’ briefing, is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
Plaintiff filed applications for benefits on November 23, 2020, alleging disability beginning January 26, 2020. Tr. 303-14. The applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 78-79, 126-27. An Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on April 14, 2023, Tr. 48-77, and issued an unfavorable decision on July 26, 2023. Tr. 14-34. The Appeals Council denied review on May 15, 2024. Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff appealed this final decision of the
Commissioner on July 18, 2024. ECF No. 1. The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153,
1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence” means “relevant evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Stated
differently, substantial evidence equates to “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the entire
record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. Id. In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on reh’g (Aug. 9, 2001). If the evidence in the
record “is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012),
superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (citation omitted). Further, a district court “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” Id. (citation omitted). An error is harmless “where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115
(quotation marks and citations omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).
A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within
the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to
determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s work activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the
Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis
proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of impairments which
significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant’s impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold,
however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to severe impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant’s “residual functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), defined generally as the claimant’s ability to perform physical and mental work
activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis.
At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in
the past (past relevant work). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).
If the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five. At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, the analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is
therefore entitled to benefits. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to
step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 416.960(c)(2);
Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity
only during the third quarter of 2022, but found there was a continuous 12-month period in which Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity. Tr. 19. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: shoulder arthroplasty, substance addiction disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), personality disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety, and depression. Tr. 20. At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of a listed impairment. Tr. 20-21. The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work subject to the following limitations: [Plaintiff] can occasionally reach overhead as well as frequently reach in the front or to the side bilaterally, and she can frequently handle, finger, and feel bilaterally. She can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds and occasionally crawl. [Plaintiff] is limited to work that involves simple repetitive tasks with no more than superficial contact with the public and occasional interaction with coworkers with no tandem tasks. Tr. 21. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff incapable of performing her past relevant work. Tr. 25. At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s
age, education, work experience, RFC, and testimony from the vocational expert, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including routing clerk, housekeeper, and production
assembler. Tr. 26-27. Therefore, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from the alleged onset date of January 26, 2020, through the date of the decision. Tr. 27.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her benefits. Plaintiff raises the following issues for review: 1. Whether ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion evidence; and
2. Whether ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony. ECF No. 6 at 1-2.3
3 To the extent Plaintiff’s Brief appears to allege errors at step five, the argument is foreclosed because, as discussed below, the ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence and reasonably discounted Plaintiff’s testimony. Any restatement of Plaintiff’s argument fails to establish error at step five. Stubbs-Danielson v.
Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008). A. Medical Opinion Evidence
For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, new regulations apply that change the framework for how an ALJ must evaluate medical opinion evidence. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL
168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c. The new regulations provide that the ALJ will no longer “give any specific evidentiary weight . . . to any medical opinion(s) . . . .” Revisions to Rules, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867-68; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a),
416.920c(a). Instead, an ALJ must consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings from medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(b), 416.920c(a)-(b).
The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings include supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant (including length of the treatment, frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment, extent of the treatment, and the existence of an
examination), specialization, and “other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding” (including, but not limited to, “evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other
evidence in the claim or an understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and therefore the ALJ is required to explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). Supportability and consistency are explained in
the regulations: Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be. Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), 416.920c(c)(1)-(2) (emphases added). The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how the other factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). However, when two or more medical opinions or prior administrative findings “about the same issue are both equally well-supported . . . and consistent with the record . . . but are not exactly the same,” the ALJ is required to explain how “the other most persuasive factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)” were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the changes to the regulations displace the longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide specific and legitimate reasons to reject an examining provider’s opinion. Woods v.
Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). The Court held that the new regulations eliminate any hierarchy of medical opinions, and the specific and legitimate standard no longer applies. Id. The Court reasoned the “relationship factors” remain relevant under the new regulations, and thus the “ALJ can still
consider the length and purpose of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, the kinds and extent of examinations that the medical source has performed or ordered from specialists, and whether the medical source has
examined the claimant or merely reviewed the claimant's records.” Id. at 792. However, the ALJ is not required to make specific findings regarding the relationship factors. Id. Even under the new regulations, an ALJ must provide an explanation supported by substantial evidence when rejecting an examining or
treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent. Id. Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinion of Dr. Billinghurst. ECF No. 6 at 4-11. The ALJ found Dr. Billinghurst opined Plaintiff
“can perform light work that requires no more than occasional reaching.” Tr. 24. The ALJ found this opinion “not entirely persuasive”: “Dr. Billinghurst supports his opinion by noting the claimant’s history of bilateral rotator cuff injuries/repairs;
however, the absence of any other limitations, such as limitations in climbing ladders and ropes or crawling, is inconsistent with this.” Tr. 24. Plaintiff cursorily argues “Dr. Billinghurst’s opinion is neither well
supported nor consistent with the medical evidence of record.” ECF No. 6 at 11. Plaintiff fails to sufficiently grapple with the ALJ’s reasoning and instead posits a competing interpretation of the record. See id. at 5-10; Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. Plaintiff thus has failed to show that the ALJ committed harmful error. See Ludwig
v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the party challenging an administrative decision bears the burden of proving harmful error) (citing Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407-09 (2009)). The Court concludes the ALJ
did not err in evaluating the medical opinion evidence. B. Plaintiff’s Testimony Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to rely on reasons that were clear and convincing in discrediting her symptom claims. ECF No. 6 at 11-14. An ALJ
engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2 (Mar. 16, 2016). “First, the ALJ must determine whether there is objective
medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The claimant is not required to
show that [the claimant’s] impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom [the claimant] has alleged; [the claimant] need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Vasquez v.
Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if [the ALJ] gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the
rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and footnote omitted). General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what symptom claims are being discounted and what evidence undermines these
claims. Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) , as amended (Apr. 9, 1996)); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring the ALJ to sufficiently explain why it discounted claimant’s symptom claims)). “The clear and convincing [evidence] standard is the most demanding
required in Social Security cases.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)) (quotation marks omitted).
Factors to be considered in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms include: (1) daily activities; (2) the location,
duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or
other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7) any other factors concerning an individual’s functional limitations and restrictions
due to pain or other symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7; 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3). The ALJ is instructed to “consider all of the evidence in an individual’s record,” to “determine how symptoms limit ability to perform work-
related activities.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her
symptoms were not entirely consistent with the evidence. Tr. 22. The ALJ offered numerous reasons to discount Plaintiff’s testimony, at least two of which the Court finds well supported. First, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s
testimony as inconsistent with her improvement with treatment. Tr. 22-23. “[E]vidence of medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability.” Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(1), 416.920a(c)(1)). Substantial evidence supports this ground. See, e.g., Tr. 932 (June 7, 2021, treatment note indicating, among other things, Plaintiff “is doing well,” “has very good range of motion,” and
may “start looking for work”); Tr. 1085-86 (March 8, 2022, treatment note indicating Plaintiff “was quite active over the weekend trying to work on her truck … [and] has been extremely sore since,” but is “progressing as expected”); Tr. 1142 (June 23, 2022, treatment note indicating Plaintiff “has not been seen
since February and apparently has not been in therapy either,” “note[s] that she has gotten a lot better over the last couple of months,” shows “[d]efinite improvement in the last couple of months with range of motion, strength and function,” and “is
actually working now”). The ALJ thus reasonably relied on this ground to discount Plaintiff’s testimony. Second, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony as inconsistent with the nature of her mental health treatment. Tr. 23. “[A] claimant’s failure to assert a
good reason for not seeking treatment . . . can cast doubt on the sincerity” of the testimony and an ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony when the “level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints.” Molina, 674
F.3d at 1113-14 (quotations and citations omitted). The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “treatment has generally been limited to routine outpatient care with therapy and psychotropic medication management, and mental status examinations evidence
good overall functioning.” Tr. 23. Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s finding and thus fails to show the ALJ harmfully erred by discounting Plaintiff’s testimony on this ground. See Ludwig, 681 F.3d at 1054 (citing Shineski, 556 U.S. at 407-
09). Because the ALJ gave at least two valid reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony, the Court need not address the balance of the ALJ’s stated reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. Any inclusion of erroneous reasons was
inconsequential and therefore harmless. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court concludes the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of harmful legal error. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. The District Court Executive is directed to substitute Frank Bisignano as
Defendant and update the docket sheet. 2. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 6, is DENIED. 3. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 8, is GRANTED.
4. The Clerk’s Office shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant. The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to the parties, and CLOSE THE FILE.
DATED August 13, 2025. s/Mary K. Dimke MARY K. DIMKE