Stullken v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co.

169 Ill. App. 164, 1912 Ill. App. LEXIS 977
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedMarch 21, 1912
StatusPublished

This text of 169 Ill. App. 164 (Stullken v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stullken v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 169 Ill. App. 164, 1912 Ill. App. LEXIS 977 (Ill. Ct. App. 1912).

Opinion

Mr. Justice McBride

delivered the opinion of the court.

This cause was tried in the Circuit Court of Madison County and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,999.99, to reverse which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

On the 27th day of January, 1910, Herman Retzloff was engaged in driving a mule in appellant’s mine and during his first trip into room No. 2 was thrown from the car and killed. The deceased had been engaged in the business of driving a mule in other mines in Madison county for some time but had been at work driving a mule in appellant’s mine for about five days, and had been driving in different parts of the mine. On the morning in question he had been sent in to room No. 2 for the first time and during his first trip in such room he was killed. The room had been driven in to a depth of 175 feet and was about thirty feet wide. The track was laid in the center of the room and was constructed of iron rails laid on ties which were placed at intervals of three to five feet apart. The track was about forty-two inches wide. The cars used in appellant’s mine were about seven feet long, five feet wide and three feet deep, equipped with flange wheels about twelve or sixteen inches in diameter, and provided with wooden bumpers projecting from the bottom of the box, about three or four inches wide in the center and rounded off at the corner of the boxes, which bumpers were protected with iron bands or rims. Beneath the center of the bumpers are fastened the links used in coupling the cars. A tail chain is used for hitching the mule to the car and the driver while pulling a load rides with one foot on the bumper of the car and the other on the tail chain, with one. hand on the mule’s rump and one hand upon the car. Just before the deceased met his death he had hitched his mule to a car of coal in room No. 2 and was hauling it out from the room and when he had reached a point claimed by appellee’s witnesses to have been wet and muddy, the deceased, from some cause, fell from the car and was killed. There is a wide difference in the testimony of the witnesses as to the condition of the track and surroundings at the place at which the deceased was killed. It is contended by counsel for appellant that the verdict of the jury was so manifestly against the weight of the evidence that for that reason the judgment should be reversed.

The declaration in this case consists of two counts. The negligence charged in the first count is that the defendant failed and neglected to use reasonable care to provide plaintiff’s intestate with a reasonably safe place to perform his work, and a reasonably safe track over, upon and along which to drive said mule and convey said cars at, to wit, a point in room No. 2 in the first stub entry, but on the contrary caused and permitted the ties and rails of said track at said point to be and remain then and there raised and elevated above the ground at a height of, to wit, eighteen inches, thereby rendering said place and the track at said place extra hazardous and dangerous for plaintiff’s intestate to drive said mule over, upon and along as aforesaid; that deceased was then and there ignorant of the dangerous condition of said track, and while exercising due care and caution for his own safety, and while in the performance of his duties as a driver said mule stepped between the ties of said track which were then and there so raised and elevated above the ground as aforesaid, thereby causing the tail chain upon which deceased was riding to strike against and upon said ties so raised and elevated as aforesaid and thereby plaintiff’s intestate was thrown from off said tail chain and from off said car to and upon the track and said car ran upon him and he was killed.

The second count is the same as the first except that it avers that defendant permitted and allowed said track and the ties and rails thereof to be and remain then and there without sufficient packing or ballasting and insecurely and insufficiently loaded and fastened to the ground thereby rendering said track at said place unsafe, loose and springy and the place and track extra hazardous and dangerous for plaintiff’s intestate to drive said mule along and to ride over as aforesaid, and that while the deceased was hauling the car along said track it was caused to move up and down and the said car was caused to rock, spring, bounce and bound upon said track and said tail chain was caused to jerk suddenly and violently and plaintiff’s intestate was thrown and caused to slip from off said car and tail chain and was run upon by said car and killed.

Counsel for appellant assign as error, that the trial court erred in its ruling on evidence, that it erred in the giving of instructions, that the deceased was killed by a danger incident to his employment and the risk assumed by him, and that the verdict of the jury is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

We think the verdict of the jury in this case is manifestly against the weight of the evidence and that this is the only error that need be considered. We agree with the contention of counsel for appellee that where there is a mere conflict in the evidence that the verdict will not be disturbed unless it is clearly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence and that the judgment will not be reversed on account of the mere preponderance of the number of witnesses and that the “evidence should be measured by weight and not (alone) by count,” and in determining the facts in this case we have kept these rules clearly before our minds. The Supreme Court has said that where it appears that the verdict of the jury is manifestly against the weight of the evidence it then becomes the duty of the appellate court, regardless of the integrity of the jurors, or as to whether they may or may not have been influenced from prejudice or passion or some improper motive or condition in the making up of their verdict, to reverse the judgment and grant a new trial. Donelson v. E. St. L. & Sub. R. R. Co., 235 Ill. 625.

There were three witnesses for the appellee who testified that the track in question was unsafe and muddy, and there are eleven witnesses for appellant who testified that the track in question was safe, well ballasted and not muddy. The only witness who appears to have any financial interest in the result of this law suit is G-us. Retzloff, a brother of the deceased. One of the witnesses for appellant was the boss driver, one a mine manager, one a civil engineer and the others were miners, persons then engaged at work in the mine. So far as we are able to gather from this record the witnesses for the appellant had equally as good opportunities to observe the condition of the track as did the witnesses for the appellee. The witness Albert Seiberleich says, “The track at that place had been raised from about 16 to 18 inches;” and the ties and rails had both been raised. They had cap pieces under the ties, blocked it up and was raised for about fifteen feet in length. It was right at this place where Eetzloif was killed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Donelson v. East St. Louis & Suburban Railway Co.
85 N.E. 914 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1908)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
169 Ill. App. 164, 1912 Ill. App. LEXIS 977, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stullken-v-donk-bros-coal-coke-co-illappct-1912.