Strybuc Replacement Hardware, LLC v. Window Parts Warehouse, Inc.

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: February 21, 2024
• Docket: 2022-2076
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed February 21, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D22-2076 Lower Tribunal No. 20-13023 ________________

Strybuc Replacement Hardware, LLC, Appellant,

vs.

Window Parts Warehouse, Inc., Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William Thomas, Judge.

The Kobak Law Firm, P.A., and Paul L. Kobak, for appellant.

Rosenberg & Cummings, PLLC, and Marc Edward Rosenthal, and Casey Ryan Cummings (Ft. Lauderdale); Cowen Edwards, PLLC, and Paul David Edwards (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and FERNANDEZ, and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Appellant, Strybuc Replacement Hardware, LLC, appeals a Final

Judgment in favor of Appellee, Window Parts Warehouse, Inc., and an order

denying Strybuc’s Motion for New Trial. Strybuc argues that the trial court’s

sua sponte interference with the impeachment of a witness constitutes

reversible error. See Ruchimora v. Grullon, 307 So. 3d 95, 97 (Fla. 3d DCA

2020) (“We review the denial of a motion for new trial and a trial court’s

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”). We disagree.

Generally, it is not the role of a trial judge in a civil case to make

objections for the opposition; rather, a trial judge should remain a neutral

umpire. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Velez, 365 So. 3d 1194, 1198 (Fla.

3d DCA 2023) (“A trial judge crosses the line when he becomes an active

participant in the adversarial process . . . .” (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v.

2000 Island Blvd. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 153 So. 3d 384, 388 (Fla. 3d DCA

2014))). Here, however, we do not find reversible error based on the record

before us. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Farnes, 697 So. 2d 825, 826

(Fla. 1997) (“[The] ‘abuse of discretion’ standard is highly deferential . . . .”);

In re Doe, 325 So. 3d 99, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (holding that, because

“[t]he abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential . . . the order must be

affirmed unless ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the

court’” (quoting Treloar v. Smith, 791 So. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA

2001))).

2 Affirmed.