2020 IL App (1st) 191216-U No. 1-19-1216 Order filed May 11, 2020 First Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ JAMES T. STRUCK, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 19 L 36362 ) COOK COUNTY GUARDIAN, ) Honorable ) Moira S. Johnson, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Griffin and Justice Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Appeal dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
¶2 Plaintiff-appellant James T. Struck appeals pro se from two orders of the circuit court
concerning the dismissal of his lawsuit against the “Cook County Guardian.” 1 For the following
reasons, we lack appellate jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
1 It appears that plaintiff intended to sue the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, although no party besides plaintiff appeared in this action. No. 1-19-1216
¶3 Although plaintiff’s brief is largely incoherent, and no appellee brief has been filed, we
glean the following facts from the record. It appears that an earlier proceeding in the probate
division of the circuit court of Cook County involved plaintiff’s mother, Estate of Janie Struck, a
Disabled Person, No. 86 P 4029. The record in this appeal includes two copies of orders entered
in that probate matter: (1) a copy of an April 2007 order in which the trial court authorized the
Cook County Public Guardian “to place Janie B. Struck in an appropriate nursing care facility,”
and (2) a May 8, 2009, order that prohibited plaintiff from entering his mother’s nursing home or
from “having ANY contact with Janie Struck.” According to plaintiff’s submissions here, his
mother died in July 2017.
¶4 Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed this case on April 4, 2019. Plaintiff filed a civil action cover
sheet in the law division of the circuit court of Cook County, reflecting that he desired to initiate a
“personal injury/wrongful death action” against the “Cook County Guardian.”
¶5 On the same date, plaintiff also filed a pleading entitled “Motion [for] Compensation as
Cook County Did Aggravated Battery, Manslaughter, Theft, Financial Exploitation of my mom
and me contributing to her death 7/15/2017” (the motion). In the motion, plaintiff alleged
numerous wrongful acts against himself and his mother, including that “Cook County did
aggravated battery of my mom * * * by battering her with toxic medications.” Plaintiff specified
that “Cook County’s Nathan Goldenson 2 wrote an order signed by Judge Maureen E. Connors for
my mom to ‘Submit to all shots’ when shots are battery.” Plaintiff claimed that the circuit court
had engaged in “elder abuse” of his mother, and that Cook County committed “financial
2 The record reflects that Goldenson appeared as counsel on behalf of the Cook County Public Guardian in case No. 86 P 4029.
-2- No. 1-19-1216
exploitation of an adult child caregiver” by declining to reimburse him for costs of his mother’s
care. Plaintiff also alleged that $150,000 was stolen from him and his mother.
¶6 In the motion, plaintiff also claimed that the Cook County Public Guardian engaged in
“sex, age, disability discrimination” against his mother and violated several federal statutes,
including the Americans with Disabilities Act. He further asserted a violation of the thirteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution because his mother had been “enslave[d]” as well as
a violation of the eighth amendment, in that “[d]enying phone, visits, home, church to an elderly
person and son is a form of cruelty.” Plaintiff also alleged “Wrongful Death” resulting from “Cook
County’s confinement [of plaintiff’s mother] in [a] nursing home.”
¶7 Also on April 4, 2019, plaintiff filed an application for waiver of court fees based on his
inability to afford them. The next day, April 5, 2019, the trial court entered an order that denied
his fee application and, at the same time, dismissed the lawsuit. That order stated:
“The application is denied for the following reason(s): Applicant cannot bring a
suit [on] behalf of another. This case is hereby dismissed and any and all further
dates are hereby stricken.”
The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of any corresponding proceedings on April 5,
2019.
¶8 Notwithstanding the April 5, 2019, dismissal order, the record reflects that plaintiff
received a notice stating that there would be a “case management call of [his] case” on May 29,
2019. It is not apparent from the record when this notice was transmitted or received.
¶9 On May 13, 2019, the trial court entered an order stating:
-3- No. 1-19-1216
“This cause coming before the court for administrative status, the court being fully
advised in the premises and having jurisdiction of the parties and/or the subject
matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: * * * Case previously disposed of on
4/5/19 by Judge Flannery[.] Court date of 5/29 is stricken * * * and [plaintiff] is
excused from attending.” 3
The record does not contain a transcript of any court proceedings on May 13, 2019. Nothing in the
record indicates whether plaintiff was in court on that date, or when he received notice of the May
13, 2019, order.
¶ 10 According to plaintiff’s brief, he came to court on May 29, 2019, the date of the previously-
scheduled case management conference, but was told by the court to leave. The record on appeal
does not contain any record of proceedings from that date.
¶ 11 On May 29, 2019, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Motion Compensation as I can Bring
Suit on My Own Behalf * * * *.” In that submission, plaintiff stated that “I can plead on my own
behalf that I miss my mother and this is a type of personal injury cause of action” and that “[t]he
power of attorney act gives me the right to sue on my mom’s behalf.” The record does not reflect
whether the trial court ever made any ruling on that submission.
¶ 12 On June 4, 2019, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Motion Compensation Violations of
Law by Cook County and Cook County Guardian” that repeated many of the allegations in his
3 The April 5, 2019, order was entered by Judge James P. Flannery. The May 13, 2019, order was entered by Judge Moira S. Johnson.
-4- No. 1-19-1216
prior submissions, as well as adding new claims for relief related to the alleged mistreatment of
his mother. The record on appeal does not reflect that the trial court ruled upon that submission.
¶ 13 On June 13, 2019, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal indicating that he sought review of both
the April 5, 2019, order and the May 13, 2019, order. On August 7, 2019, plaintiff filed an amended
notice of appeal, which added a number of handwritten factual allegations and claimed violations
of statutory and constitutional rights.
¶ 14 On appeal, the bulk of plaintiff’s pro se brief consists of allegations of purported facts.
Relevant to this appeal, he contends that in the April 5, 2019, order, “Judge Flannery wrongly
ruled that I did not have standing to plead on my behalf” and that in the May 13, 2019, order, the
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2020 IL App (1st) 191216-U No. 1-19-1216 Order filed May 11, 2020 First Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ JAMES T. STRUCK, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 19 L 36362 ) COOK COUNTY GUARDIAN, ) Honorable ) Moira S. Johnson, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Griffin and Justice Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Appeal dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
¶2 Plaintiff-appellant James T. Struck appeals pro se from two orders of the circuit court
concerning the dismissal of his lawsuit against the “Cook County Guardian.” 1 For the following
reasons, we lack appellate jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
1 It appears that plaintiff intended to sue the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, although no party besides plaintiff appeared in this action. No. 1-19-1216
¶3 Although plaintiff’s brief is largely incoherent, and no appellee brief has been filed, we
glean the following facts from the record. It appears that an earlier proceeding in the probate
division of the circuit court of Cook County involved plaintiff’s mother, Estate of Janie Struck, a
Disabled Person, No. 86 P 4029. The record in this appeal includes two copies of orders entered
in that probate matter: (1) a copy of an April 2007 order in which the trial court authorized the
Cook County Public Guardian “to place Janie B. Struck in an appropriate nursing care facility,”
and (2) a May 8, 2009, order that prohibited plaintiff from entering his mother’s nursing home or
from “having ANY contact with Janie Struck.” According to plaintiff’s submissions here, his
mother died in July 2017.
¶4 Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed this case on April 4, 2019. Plaintiff filed a civil action cover
sheet in the law division of the circuit court of Cook County, reflecting that he desired to initiate a
“personal injury/wrongful death action” against the “Cook County Guardian.”
¶5 On the same date, plaintiff also filed a pleading entitled “Motion [for] Compensation as
Cook County Did Aggravated Battery, Manslaughter, Theft, Financial Exploitation of my mom
and me contributing to her death 7/15/2017” (the motion). In the motion, plaintiff alleged
numerous wrongful acts against himself and his mother, including that “Cook County did
aggravated battery of my mom * * * by battering her with toxic medications.” Plaintiff specified
that “Cook County’s Nathan Goldenson 2 wrote an order signed by Judge Maureen E. Connors for
my mom to ‘Submit to all shots’ when shots are battery.” Plaintiff claimed that the circuit court
had engaged in “elder abuse” of his mother, and that Cook County committed “financial
2 The record reflects that Goldenson appeared as counsel on behalf of the Cook County Public Guardian in case No. 86 P 4029.
-2- No. 1-19-1216
exploitation of an adult child caregiver” by declining to reimburse him for costs of his mother’s
care. Plaintiff also alleged that $150,000 was stolen from him and his mother.
¶6 In the motion, plaintiff also claimed that the Cook County Public Guardian engaged in
“sex, age, disability discrimination” against his mother and violated several federal statutes,
including the Americans with Disabilities Act. He further asserted a violation of the thirteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution because his mother had been “enslave[d]” as well as
a violation of the eighth amendment, in that “[d]enying phone, visits, home, church to an elderly
person and son is a form of cruelty.” Plaintiff also alleged “Wrongful Death” resulting from “Cook
County’s confinement [of plaintiff’s mother] in [a] nursing home.”
¶7 Also on April 4, 2019, plaintiff filed an application for waiver of court fees based on his
inability to afford them. The next day, April 5, 2019, the trial court entered an order that denied
his fee application and, at the same time, dismissed the lawsuit. That order stated:
“The application is denied for the following reason(s): Applicant cannot bring a
suit [on] behalf of another. This case is hereby dismissed and any and all further
dates are hereby stricken.”
The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of any corresponding proceedings on April 5,
2019.
¶8 Notwithstanding the April 5, 2019, dismissal order, the record reflects that plaintiff
received a notice stating that there would be a “case management call of [his] case” on May 29,
2019. It is not apparent from the record when this notice was transmitted or received.
¶9 On May 13, 2019, the trial court entered an order stating:
-3- No. 1-19-1216
“This cause coming before the court for administrative status, the court being fully
advised in the premises and having jurisdiction of the parties and/or the subject
matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: * * * Case previously disposed of on
4/5/19 by Judge Flannery[.] Court date of 5/29 is stricken * * * and [plaintiff] is
excused from attending.” 3
The record does not contain a transcript of any court proceedings on May 13, 2019. Nothing in the
record indicates whether plaintiff was in court on that date, or when he received notice of the May
13, 2019, order.
¶ 10 According to plaintiff’s brief, he came to court on May 29, 2019, the date of the previously-
scheduled case management conference, but was told by the court to leave. The record on appeal
does not contain any record of proceedings from that date.
¶ 11 On May 29, 2019, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Motion Compensation as I can Bring
Suit on My Own Behalf * * * *.” In that submission, plaintiff stated that “I can plead on my own
behalf that I miss my mother and this is a type of personal injury cause of action” and that “[t]he
power of attorney act gives me the right to sue on my mom’s behalf.” The record does not reflect
whether the trial court ever made any ruling on that submission.
¶ 12 On June 4, 2019, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Motion Compensation Violations of
Law by Cook County and Cook County Guardian” that repeated many of the allegations in his
3 The April 5, 2019, order was entered by Judge James P. Flannery. The May 13, 2019, order was entered by Judge Moira S. Johnson.
-4- No. 1-19-1216
prior submissions, as well as adding new claims for relief related to the alleged mistreatment of
his mother. The record on appeal does not reflect that the trial court ruled upon that submission.
¶ 13 On June 13, 2019, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal indicating that he sought review of both
the April 5, 2019, order and the May 13, 2019, order. On August 7, 2019, plaintiff filed an amended
notice of appeal, which added a number of handwritten factual allegations and claimed violations
of statutory and constitutional rights.
¶ 14 On appeal, the bulk of plaintiff’s pro se brief consists of allegations of purported facts.
Relevant to this appeal, he contends that in the April 5, 2019, order, “Judge Flannery wrongly
ruled that I did not have standing to plead on my behalf” and that in the May 13, 2019, order, the
trial court “incorrectly supported [Judge] Flannery’s violation of the ADA, 1st amendment right
to redress grievances, express concern with nursing home care act violations, ADA and violations
of power of attorney act.” He claims that “the trial court ruled incorrectly that adult children do
not have a wrongful death act right, power of attorney act, nursing home care act, ADA, right to
plead on behalf of themselves and their parents.” No appellee brief was filed.
¶ 15 Before this court can address the merits of the appeal, we have an independent duty to
assess our own jurisdiction, regardless of whether that issue has been raised by any party. A.M.
Realty Western L.L.C. v. MSMC Realty, L.L.C., 2016 IL App (1st) 151087, ¶ 67; see also Secura
Ins. Co. v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009) (“A reviewing court must ascertain
its jurisdiction before proceeding in a cause of action, regardless of whether either party has raised
the issue. [Citations.]”). As explained below, we lack jurisdiction to review either the April 5,
2019, order or the May 19, 2019, order and, consequently, dismiss this appeal.
-5- No. 1-19-1216
¶ 16 “The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. [Citation.]” Won
v. Grant Park 2, L.L.C., 2013 IL App (1st) 122523, ¶ 20. “Strict compliance with the supreme
court rules governing the time limits for filing a notice of appeal is required, and neither a trial
court nor an appellate court has the authority to excuse compliance with the filing requirements
mandated by the supreme court rules. [Citation.] When an appeal is untimely, this court has no
discretion to take action other than to dismiss the appeal. [Citation.]” Id.
¶ 17 Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) requires that, “a notice of appeal must be filed within 30
days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely posttrial motion directed
against judgment is filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending
postjudgment motion directed against that judgment or order.” Won, 2013 IL App (1st) 122523, ¶
20; Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 18 In this case, plaintiff seeks to appeal both the April 5, 2019, order and the May 13, 2019,
order. His notice of appeal was filed on June 13, 2019. We first consider whether the April 5, 2019,
order was “final” within the meaning of Rule 303(a). “An order or judgment is final for purposes
of Rule 303(a) if it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the cause or
disposes of the rights of the parties either upon the entire controversy or upon some definite part
thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kroot v. Chan, 2017 IL App (1st) 162315, ¶ 12. “A
final order or judgment requires a determination by the trial court * * * which ascertains and fixes
absolutely and finally the rights of the parties to the litigation. [Citation.]” Phoenix Capital, LLC
v. Tabiti, 2016 IL App (1st) 162686, ¶ 6. In other words, “[a] final order is one that ‘resolve[s]
every right, liability or matter raised.’ ” Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App (1st) 133236, ¶ 22 (quoting
Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990)).
-6- No. 1-19-1216
¶ 19 Here, the record shows that the April 5, 2019, order was a “final” order. In that order, the
court determined that plaintiff could not bring his lawsuit “on behalf of another,” indicating its
conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing to proceed. The trial court’s order does not suggest that
any of his claims remained pending, or that any further proceedings were necessary. To the
contrary, the April 5, 2019, order explicitly indicated that it terminated the litigation in its entirety,
stating: “This case is hereby dismissed and any and all further dates are hereby stricken.” Thus,
the April 5, 2019, dismissal order “ascertain[ed] and fixe[d] absolutely and finally the rights of the
parties to the litigation. [Citation.]” Phoenix Capital, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 162686, ¶ 6.
¶ 20 Under Rule 303(a)(1), plaintiff had to either file a notice of appeal within 30 days, or file
a timely motion directed against the April 5, 2019, order to preserve his appeal of this order.
Plaintiff failed to do either. The notice of appeal was not filed until June 13, 2019, more than 30
days after the April 5, 2019, order. And plaintiff did not file a timely motion directed against the
April 5, 2019, final order. “Section 2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that a
postjudgment motion be filed within 30 days of the judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2012).
If a party files a postjudgment motion more than 30 days after the entry of final judgment, the
motion will not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. [Citation.]” Goral, 2014 IL App (1st)
133236, ¶ 20. In this case, any timely motion to reconsider the April 5, 2019, dismissal order was
due within 30 days, or by May 5, 2019. 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2018). The record does not
reflect any filing by defendant until his May 29, 2019, “Motion Compensation as I can Bring Suit
on My Own behalf.” Clearly, that motion was filed more than 30 days after the April 5, 2019,
dismissal order and it was not a timely postjudgment motion that could extend the time to appeal
the April 5 final order. We thus conclude that defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely with
-7- No. 1-19-1216
respect to the April 5, 2019, dismissal order, and therefore we lack jurisdiction to review that final
order.
¶ 21 Defendant’s notice of appeal also seeks review of the trial court’s May 13, 2019, order,
that states the case was “previously dismissed” on April 5, 2019. While there is no question that
defendant’s notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the May 13, 2019, order, in light of our
conclusion that the April 5, 2019, order was a final order (and that there was no timely motion to
reconsider that order), the trial court had lost jurisdiction in this case by the time it entered the May
13, 2019, order. As a result, we have no appellate jurisdiction to review that order.
¶ 22 We observe that the language of the May 13 order makes an administrative statement that
the case was “previously dismissed.” Thus, the order itself does not purport to affirm, modify or
vacate any previous order: it simply struck the case for that call and stated the reason for the case
being stricken. But, even if it could be plausibly argued that this order was directed at the April 5
order, it was entered more than 30 days after the case was dismissed on April 5 and is of no import.
¶ 23 “It is well established that a trial court loses jurisdiction over a case and the authority to
vacate or modify its judgment 30 days after the entry of judgment, unless a timely postjudgment
motion is filed. [Citations].” Longo v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1033
(2001). “A trial court loses jurisdiction over a matter when (1) 30 days have passed following the
entry of a final and appealable order concerning that matter and (2) during that time, neither party
has taken any legally proper action to extend the 30-day period. [Citation.]” Leavell v. Department
of Natural Resources, 397 Ill. App. 3d 937, 950 (2010); see also Won, 2013 IL App (1st) 122523,
¶ 20 (“the trial court loses jurisdiction after 30 days from the time the final judgment is entered
when either (1) a posttrial motion directed against the judgment is not filed, (2) 30 days pass from
-8- No. 1-19-1216
the time the trial court disposes of a timely filed posttrial motion, or (3) a notice of appeal is timely
filed. [Citation.]”).
¶ 24 The record in this case is clear that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter
when it entered the May 13, 2019, order. As of that date, more than 30 days had elapsed since the
April 5, 2019, final order, and plaintiff had not filed a timely motion to reconsider that dismissal
order. 4 As of May 13, 2019, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to reconsider the April 5,
2019, dismissal order. See Wilk v. Wilmorite, Inc., 349 Ill. App. 3d 880, 883 (2004) (“Under section
2-1203 of the Code, a posttrial motion must be filed within 30 days of a final judgment. [Citation.]
Otherwise, the trial court will lose jurisdiction to modify or vacate the final order that it entered
after a lapse of 30 days. [Citation.]”). As a result, even if the May 13, 2019, order was directed at
the April 5 order, it was void. See Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 531 (2001)
(recognizing that “[i]f jurisdiction is lacking, any subsequent judgment of the court is rendered
void.”). In turn, we lack jurisdiction to review the May 13, 2009, order, as “an appellate court has
no authority to address the substantive merits of a judgment entered by a trial court without
jurisdiction.” People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 28; see also Manning v. City of Chicago, 407
Ill. App. 3d 849, 852 (2011) (“[O]nce the trial court loses jurisdiction, any subsequent orders
entered, including a notice of appeal which would vest jurisdiction with our [appellate] court, are
not viable. [Citations.]”).
¶ 25 In sum, we have no jurisdiction to review either of the trial court orders cited in the notice
of appeal, because: (1) defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the April 5, 2019,
4 Tellingly, the May 13, 2019, order does not reference any pending motion, but reflects that the case merely came before the court on that date “for administrative status.”
-9- No. 1-19-1216
dismissal order; and (2) the trial court had lost jurisdiction of in this case by the time it entered the
May 13, 2019, order. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.
¶ 26 Appeal dismissed.
- 10 -