Strout v. Oxford County Sheriff's Office

Maine Superior

Strout v. Oxford County Sheriff's Office

DecidedMay 10, 2004

DocketOXFcv-03-016

StatusUnpublished

This text of Strout v. Oxford County Sheriff's Office (Strout v. Oxford County Sheriff's Office) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Strout v. Oxford County Sheriff's Office, (Me. Super. Ct. 2004).

Pincite

Opinion

STATE OF M AINE» aeons Fe ess | .. SUPERIOR COURT

OXFORD, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. CV-03-016 Er Vo — 0% F- - Be ‘ne > oO yO] [ NOREEN E. STROUT, Plaintiff ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Vv.

OXFORD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

LLOYD “SKIP” HERRICK, SHERRIFF,

JAMES A. DAVIS, CHIEF DEPUTY, Defendants

MAY ee 2004 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 13, 2003, Noreen Strout filed a single-count complaint against the Oxford County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Lloyd Herrick, and Chief Deputy James Davis. In her complaint, Ms. Strout alleged that the defendants had failed to release public information as required by Maine’s Freedom of Access Law, 1 M.R.S.A. § 408. Ms. Strout mailed copies of the complaint to Davis and Herrick. A person whose name appears to be Hazel Paakkonon signed for those copies on June 17, 2003. Ms. Strout stapled the two green certified mail cards signed by Ms. Paakkonon to asummons form on which she wrote that she had served all three of the defendants, and filed that document with the Oxford County Superior Court on June 18, 2003.

On July 18, 2003, Ms. Strout filed an affidavit and request for default against all three defendants, asserting that service had been completed on June 17, 2003, and that none of the defendants had filed an answer. Although there was no indication of

service on the county, the clerk entered default against all three defendants on July 18, 2003. On July 21, 2003, Ms. Strout filed a request that a one-hour hearing on her complaint be scheduled.

On August 6, 2003, defendants filed a motion to set aside default and /or dismiss for improper service. In their motion, defendants Herrick and Davis stated that each of them had received unsigned and undated copies of the plaintiff's complaint. Neither had received a summons, and neither received a notice and acknowledgment form. They also asserted that the complaint Ms. Strout had filed with the court was unsigned. The court file includes a complaint filed by Ms. Strout on June 13, which contains a signature in red ink, purportedly made on June 13, 2003. The file also contains a nearly identical complaint, with a hand-written notation of “corrected complaint,” which was filed June 18, 2003, but was not signed until September 11, 2003.

The court (Gorman, J.) denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss but, over the plaintiff's objection, granted their motion to lift default. The court allowed Ms. Strout thirty (30) days to complete service on the defendants. On September 11, 2003, Attorney Michael Schmidt accepted service on behalf of the defendants. The defendants filed an answer denying the plaintiff's claim on September 22, 2003.

The court (Delahanty, J.) issued a scheduling order on September 22, 2003. On October 17, 2003, Ms. Strout filed a motion to waive the required alternative dispute resolution conference, asserting that there was no chance of resolving the dispute. On October 31, 2003, the defendants filed a concurrence with Ms. Strout’s motion, although not for the reasons she cited. The motion was granted on November 10, 2003. (Gorman, J.)

On December 1, 2003, Ms. Strout filed an unsigned motion to amend complaint

and a document entitled “Amended Complaint.” That document included claims that the defendants had breached a fiduciary duty, had wrongfully imprisoned her, had trespassed on her land, had tortiously interfered with an insurance claim, had inflicted emotional distress, and had conspired to kidnap someone. All of the events giving rise to these assertions, except the conspiracy to kidnap, appear to have occurred between January 2002 and July 2002. Accompanying the amended complaint are what appear to be a typed letter from Ms. Strout to the South Paris Police Department dated November 30, 2003, a copy of a typed statement by Charles Hurd, and a copy of a typed statement by Grace Hurd. Those three documents refer to a contact between the plaintiff, Oxford County Deputy Sheriffs, and the South Paris District Court on November 25, 2003.

On December 16, 2003, defendants filed an objection to Ms. Strout’s motion to amend. On December 22, 2003, Ms. Strout filed her response to that objection. After review, the court denied her motion to amend.

On January 27, 2004, Ms. Strout filed a motion for recusal and a motion for reconsideration. Those motions were denied in an order dated February 17, 2004.

On February 13, 2004, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment that included a Statement of Material Facts. Although Ms. Strout responded to the motion, she failed to admit, deny, or qualify any of the statements of fact asserted by the defendants. Because motion practice can be a trap for the unwary, and in an effort to provide Ms. Strout an opportunity to present testimonial evidence’, the court scheduled a hearing on April 30, 2004. Although the parties appeared, Ms. Strout stated that she

was not willing to participate in the hearing. Counsel for the defendants reiterated that

* As was mentioned above, on July 21, 2003, Ms. Strout had requested a one-hour hearing on her complaint. Ms. Strout had failed to properly respond to their motion, and the court took the motion under advisement. DISCUSSION

The standards for deciding motions for summary judgment have been addressed in many cases, including Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, 7 5, 711 A.2d 842, 844. There, the Law Court stated:

In reviewing a summary judgment, we examine the evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonprevailing party to determine whether the

record supports the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material

fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law. See Petillo v. City of Portland, 657 A.2d 325, 326 (Me. 1995). In testing

the propriety of a summary judgment, we accept as true the

uncontroverted facts properly appearing in the record. See Gerber v. Peters,

584 A.2d 605, 607 (Me. 1990) (citing Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil

Practice § 56.4 at 357 (2d ed. Supp. 1981). A contested fact is “material” if it could change the outcome of the case. See

Steinke v. Sungard Fin. Sys., Inc., 121 F.3d 763, 768 (1st Cir. 1997); Burdzel v. Sobus,

2000 ME 84, J 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575.

The defendants are entitled to judgment on the claims against them, because Ms. Strout has failed to properly controvert their Statement of Material Facts. Opposing statements of fact must “admit, deny or qualify” facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the other party’s statement. In addition, a denial or qualification must be supported by a record citation. Unsupported denials do not satisfy the admissibility standard of Rule 56(e).

Once the defendants presented materials in their statement of material facts indicating that no genuine issue of material fact existed, the burden shifted to Ms. Strout to point to specific facts demonstrating that a disputed fact for trial does exist.

See Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995); Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, J 9, 711 A.2d 842, 845. As the party with the burden of proof, her obligation to come forward with appropriate evidence of a disputed fact through a proper statement of material facts was particularly important. See, Int'l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v.

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