Strougo v. Hoyt

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Strougo v. Hoyt

245 A.D.2d 210, 665 N.Y.S.2d 902, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13329

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 23, 1997

StatusPublished

This text of 245 A.D.2d 210 (Strougo v. Hoyt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Strougo v. Hoyt, 245 A.D.2d 210, 665 N.Y.S.2d 902, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13329 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

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Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter Schackman, J.), entered August 30, 1996, which, in a shareholder derivative action, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff failed to plead any particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that defendants were disinterested and independent, or that the challenged transaction was other than the product of a valid exercise of business judgment, and therefore did not demonstrate that a prelitigation demand upon the directors would have been futile, as required by Rules of the Delaware Chancery Court, rule 23.1, applicable to this Delaware corporation on behalf of which plaintiff sues (see, Aronson v Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 814-815 [Del]). Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Williams, Andrias and Colabella, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter Schackman, J.), entered August 30, 1996, which, in a shareholder derivative action, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff failed to plead any particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that defendants were disinterested and independent, or that the challenged transaction was other than the product of a valid exercise of business judgment, and therefore did not demonstrate that a prelitigation demand upon the directors would have been futile, as required by Rules of the Delaware Chancery Court, rule 23.1, applicable to this Delaware corporation on behalf of which plaintiff sues (see, Aronson v Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 814-815 [Del]). Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Williams, Andrias and Colabella, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

245 A.D.2d 210, 665 N.Y.S.2d 902, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13329, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strougo-v-hoyt-nyappdiv-1997.

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