Stroud v. Adams

417 F. App'x 632

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Jabbar Latino Stroud appeals denial by the district court of a writ of habeas cor pus. We granted a Certificate of Appealability that asks whether appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the trial court’s admission of a letter sent by appellant during his incarceration. Given deference owed the district court decision under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, we hold that Stroud’s rights were not violated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, that governs here includes Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply this law. See People v. Stroud, No. D040833, 2003 WL 22853769 (Cal.Ct.App. Dec.3, 2003) (unpublished).

The California regulation addressing confidential, outgoing inmate correspondence is, on its face, permissible. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3142. As applied, the state court was not unreasonable in finding that Stroud, who admitted to being given a copy of the Title 15 regulations, failed to follow the required procedure and in holding that the prison’s actions did not violate Stroud’s constitutional rights. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Stroud’s writ of habeas corpus.

AFFIRMED.

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.