Strother v. Ohio Casualty Insurance

28 Ohio Law. Abs. 550, 14 Ohio Op. 139, 1939 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1184
CourtCourt of Common Pleas of Ohio, Hamilton County
DecidedJanuary 3, 1939
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 28 Ohio Law. Abs. 550 (Strother v. Ohio Casualty Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Hamilton County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strother v. Ohio Casualty Insurance, 28 Ohio Law. Abs. 550, 14 Ohio Op. 139, 1939 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1184 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1939).

Opinion

OPINION

By BELL, J.

This is an action brought by the plaintiffs, in which they seek an injunction. The cause was submitted to the court upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. There is no dispute about the facts, the question is entirely one of law.

In the petition it is set forth that John P. Strother and Saul M. Greenberg were duly admitted by the Supreme Court of Ohio, to practice law in all the courts of the state of Ohio, and that they have been engaged in the active practice of the law since their admission, and are members of the Bar of Hamilton County and the state of Ohio. It is set forth that the defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of this state, and engaged in the insurance business within this state; that the defendant has entered into written contracts with a large number of persons, firms or corporations in this county and throughout the state, these contracts being automobile, elevator, owner, landlord and tenant, liability insurance policies and that among the provisions in each of the contracts are contained the following two provisions:

“1. To insure within specified limits the assureds named in said policies against all direct loss or expense by reason of liability imposed upon said assureds by law for damages by reason of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobiles, elevators, and/or premises described in said policies on account of accidents covered by said policies.
“2. To defend in the name and on behalf of said persons, firms and/or other corporations, named as assureds, any and all law suits, even if groundless, false or fraudulent, brought against said persons, firms and/or other corporations named as assureds to recover damages on account of any accidents covered by said policies.”

By virtue of these two provisions in the contracts it is claimed that the defendant, by and through its duly authorized agents and attorneys, appears in court, prepares and files motions and demurrers, pleadings, takes depositions, interviews and prepares statements of the cases, subpoenas witnesses, and does all and singular all acts necessary for the full management and conduct of the trial of law suits, prepares and files motions for new trial, prepares bills of exception and proceedings m error, and that the defendant cmipletely and exclusively defends and controls the conduct of lawsuits brought against the assured when the cause of action is covered by the policy, and does these acts even if such suits are groundless, false or fraudulent, as well as when brought in good faith.

Plaintiffs further allege that the defendant through its duly authorized agents and attorneys, settles, adjusts and compromises claims made on account of accidents covered by such policies, and in connection therewith drafts legal documents and releases, and gives legal advice with reference to said matters.

Plaintiffs claim that the defendant has no legal right or authority to practice law either directly or indirectly, by employing regularly licensed attorneys to practice law for it, and allege that the defendant is engaged in the unauthorized and unlawful practice of law, and that it will continue so to do unless restrained and enjoined by the court.

It is further claimed that this is a transgression of the rights of plaintiffs, who are members of the Bar, and that the action is brought by them on behalf of themselves and all other members of the legal profession wthin this state, and that they have no adequate remedy at law.

The relief sought, is a perpetual injunction against the defendant from writing contracts containing provision number two as above set forth.

An answer was filed by the defendant, which admits every claim of the plaintiffs with the exception that it employes laymen for the purpose of .iegotiating settlements or doing any act which might be considered the practice of law; the answer sets forth that by making this contract of indemnity the defendant company thereafter has a direct pecuniary and financial interest in any accident covered by its policies, and by reason of such pecuniary and financial interest that it has the right to do the things of which the plaintiffs complain.

The defendant asks that the plaintiff’s petition be dismissed.

A reply was filed by the plaintiffs, in which the affirmative allegations of the answer are denied.

In the agreed statement of facts it is admitted that the deiendant has entered into a large number of these contracts and specimens marked Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 covering Automobile Liability, Special Elevator Liability, Owner’s, Landlords and Ten[552]*552ants Public Liability Policies are attached thereto; that each and every one of those classes of policies written by the defendant contains the provisions herein numbered 1 and 2.

It is further agreed that the defendant employs no laymen as claim adjusters and employs no one except regularly licensed attorneys at law to adjust claims or conduct the defense of suits brought against the insured.

The question presented for consideration is whether or not. under these pleadings and the agreed statement of facts, the defendant is engaged m the unauthorized and unlawful practice of the law.

This is a subject which has become quite controversial in the last few years. Many cases have been decided in this state wherein the cause of action was based upon the claim of unauthorized and unlawful practice of the law. It has been held, and rightfully so, that a corporation has no right to enter into a contract to defend actions which are instituted and threatened actions on behalf of persons, firms or corporations where the insurer has no financial interest in the outcome of the litigation. Those cases have for their foundation the proposition that a contract simply to defend against actual or threatened litigation for a fee paid by the insured to the insurer is a contract by the insurer to engage in the practice of the law, which is unauthorized and unlawful. Those decisions can not be applied here for the reason that it is agreed that the defendant company itself will pay, within the terms of the policy, such sums as the insured would otherwise be required to pay.

The question for decision may be stated thus: Is it an unauthorized and unlawful practice of the law for an insurance company, which contracts to pay within the limits of the policy such sum as the insured, except for the policy, would be required to pay, entitled to employ its own attorneys •to take charge of, direct and control litigation within the terms of the policy, instituted against the insured, and to adjust any claim against the insured within the terms of the policy?

It is claimed by the defendant that this is no longer an open question in this state, that the Supreme Court, as well as other inferior courts, have recognized the legality of these contracts and have entered judgments against the insurance companies in cases where they failed and refused to defend under contracts such as here in question, where the insured, after such failure and refusal, defended at rts own expense. On behalf of plaintiffs it is claimed that those cases proceeded without any question being raised as to the legality of the provision here under consideration.

It is my opinion that there is no case in. this state in which the question here presented has been directly decided.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
28 Ohio Law. Abs. 550, 14 Ohio Op. 139, 1939 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1184, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strother-v-ohio-casualty-insurance-ohctcomplhamilt-1939.