Strongsville v. Smith

2026 Ohio 469

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 115551, 115552
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Strongsville v. Smith, 2026-Ohio-469.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF STRONGSVILLE, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Nos. 115551 and 115552 v. :

MICHAEL THOMAS SMITH, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 12, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Berea Municipal Court Case Nos. 25TRD00993 and 25TRD00996

Appearances:

Kenneth A. Kraus, City of Strongsville Law Director, and John T. Castele, Assistant Law Director/Prosecutor, for appellee.

Michael Smith, pro se.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

This consolidated appeal is before the court on the accelerated docket

pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. The purpose of an accelerated appeal

is to allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision. State v. Trone, 2020-Ohio-384, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Priest, 2014-Ohio-1735, ¶ 1

(8th Dist.).

These appeals involve two separate traffic citations appellant Michael

Thomas Smith received in Strongsville, Ohio. The following procedural history can

be gleaned from the court record; no transcript has been provided to this court for

any of the hearings.

On January 30, 2025, Smith was cited for failing to signal before

changing course, in violation of Strongsville Cod.Ord. 432.13, a fourth-degree

misdemeanor (“signal case”). He appeared before the Strongsville Mayor’s Court on

February 12, 2025, pleaded not guilty, and waived his right to a speedy trial. He

appeared again in Mayor’s Court on February 27, 2025, and requested that his case

be transferred to Berea Municipal Court.

On February 13, 2025, Smith received another traffic citation for

speeding, in violation of Strongsville Cod.Ord. 434.03, a fourth-degree

misdemeanor (“speeding case”). He appeared before the Strongsville Mayor’s Court

on February 27, 2025, pleaded not guilty, and the case was transferred to Berea

Municipal Court.

On March 21, 2025, Smith appeared, pro se, before the Berea

Municipal Court on both cases. On this day, he pleaded not guilty, did not waive

speedy trial on either case, and the cases were scheduled for a bench trial on April 2,

2025, which later was converted to a pretrial. Thereafter, the cases were continued

for multiple reasons, all caused by Smith. At a pretrial on April 30, 2025, the City amended both offenses to minor misdemeanors — the signal case to a violation of

R.C. 4511.39, and the speeding case to a violation of R.C. 4511.21.

At some point, the court appointed Smith counsel.1 According to the

record, Smith appeared with counsel at a final pretrial on June 25, 2025, at which

the court scheduled the case for a bench trial on August 27, 2025.

On August 18, 2025, Smith moved to dismiss both the cases,

contending that the City violated his right to a speedy trial. He further requested

pursuant to Crim.R. 12(F) that the court issue findings of fact when it rendered its

decision on his motion. The City did not file any opposition.

On the day of trial, the trial court denied Smith’s motion to dismiss.

The court did not issue any written findings; no transcript was filed with this court.

Smith pleaded no contest in both cases and was found guilty. The trial court ordered

Smith to pay a fine and court costs in both cases. This consolidated appeal followed.

I. The Appeal

In these appeals, Smith challenges the trial court’s decision denying

his motion to dismiss for speedy trial in both cases.

Whether a trial court’s ruling on a speedy-trial question was correct

presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Borrero, 2004-Ohio-4488, ¶ 10

(8th Dist.), citing State v. Barnett, 2003-Ohio-2014 (12th Dist.). Appellate courts

1 Smith later moved to withdraw the appointed counsel, explaining that he was not

entitled to appointed counsel because both offenses were reduced to minor misdemeanors. He further explained that counsel was assigned in error to those cases — counsel was appointed in two other cases that were not minor misdemeanors. apply a de novo standard of review to the legal issues but afford great deference to

any findings of fact made by the trial court, if supported by competent and credible

evidence. State v. Barnes, 2008-Ohio-5472, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). This court must

construe the statutes strictly against the prosecution when reviewing the legal issues

in a speedy-trial claim. Brecksville v. Cook, 1996-Ohio-171, ¶ 15. Moreover, in

analyzing the procedural time-line record of the case, this court is required to strictly

construe any ambiguity in the record in favor of the accused. State v. Michailides,

2018-Ohio-2399, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing Cook.

R.C. 2945.71(B)(1) requires the City to bring a person charged with a

fourth-degree misdemeanor to trial within 45 days of citation. If a defendant is not

brought to trial within the speedy-trial limits, the court, upon motion, must

discharge the defendant. R.C. 2945.73(B). A defendant establishes a prima facie

case for discharge based on a speedy-trial violation when he demonstrates the

specified statutory time elapsed before trial. See, e.g., State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio

St.3d 28 (1986). The burden then shifts to the City to show that provisions in R.C.

2945.72 extended the time limit.

In these cases, over 180 days elapsed between the date when Smith

received the traffic citations and when Smith filed his motion to dismiss on August

18, 2025. He, therefore, established a prima face case of a speedy-trial violation.

The burden then shifted to the City.

Under R.C. 2945.72, the time within which an accused must be

brought to trial is extended for various reasons, including removal of the case from mayor’s court to municipal court, motions filed and continuances requested by the

accused, and reasonable continuances granted other than upon the accused’s

motion. See, e.g., Cook, 1996-Ohio-171, at ¶ 12, 24; State v. Byrd, 2009-Ohio-3283

(8th Dist.); State v. Sanchez, 2006-Ohio-4478.

For purposes of this accelerated appeal, this court will presume,

without deciding, that from the date of each traffic citation in each respective case

until the final pretrial on June 25, 2025, the time was tolled and not counted against

the City. Accordingly, this court will only focus on the 54 days between the final

pretrial date and the time when Smith filed his motion to dismiss on August 18, 2025

— which alone would violate the 45-day speedy trial time.

On June 25, 2025, the trial court conducted a final pretrial, at which

the trial court scheduled both cases for trial on August 27, 2025. The court’s journal

entries each provide: “This matter came on for Pretrial on June 25, 2025.

Defendant and Counsel present. Defense requests set for Trial. Trial set for August

27, 2025 at 1:30 p.m.” Unlike the trial court’s other orders that specifically noted

that “time is tolled,” these journal entries did not contain such language.

The City concedes that the time between the final pretrial and trial

exceeded the statutory time period but contends that (1) Smith did not object to the

trial date, and (2) the continuance was reasonable considering that Smith requested

a trial in two cases, both set for August 27, 2025. This court rejects the City’s contention that Smith’s failure to object

waived any speedy-trial argument. This court addressed this same argument under

similar circumstances in Michailides, 2018-Ohio-2399 (8th Dist.).

In Michailides, the court scheduled a trial date beyond the speedy-

trial time. In the court’s journal, it noted that the trial date was scheduled “at the

defendant’s request” without any further information explaining why the court

chose that specific date. Id. at ¶ 33. This court found that when the trial court did

not indicate why the specific beyond-speedy-trial date was set, including that the

defendant requested that specific date, and the prosecution objected to that date or

requested a different day, then the court will strictly construe the ambiguity against

the prosecution and find the date was arbitrarily set. Id.

This court stated that “a defendant has no duty to object to the setting

of a trial date beyond the speedy trial deadline.” Id. at ¶ 34, citing State v. Penwell,

1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 834, *11 (4th Dist. Feb. 14, 1994). It is the prosecution and

the trial court’s duty to ensure that a defendant is brought to trial within the

timeframe under R.C. 2945.71. Id., citing State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 105-

106 (1977) (the mandatory duty of complying with R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 is

upon the prosecution and the trial court); State v. Ramey, 2012-Ohio-2904, ¶ 14,

citing Singer (“The prosecution and the trial courts have a mandatory duty to try an

accused within the time frame provided by the statute.”).

Accordingly, Smith did not need to object to preserve his speedy-trial

claim. The City also contends that the trial date was a reasonable

continuance and thus pursuant to the second clause of R.C. 2945.72(H), it was a

“continuance other than upon the accused’s own motion,” which would extend the

speedy trial time limits. In support, it relies on State v. McRae, 55 Ohio St.3d 149

(1978).

In McRae, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior decision in

Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, and held that when a trial date is set beyond the time

limits of R.C. 2945.71 and the defendant does not acquiesce to that date, but merely

fails to object, and the trial court’s action of setting that date beyond the speedy-trial

time does not constitute a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H). Id. at 152. The Court

noted that the trial court has the discretion, however, to extend the time when

defense counsel voluntarily agrees to the trial date beyond the statutory time limits.

Id. However, that continuance must be “reasonable” and “does not deny the accused

the right to a speedy trial.” Id. at 153, citing State v. Davis, 46 Ohio St.2d 444, 448-

449 (1976), and State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 209 (1976). “Whether such a

continuance is reasonable must be affirmatively demonstrated in some manner in

the trial court.” (Emphasis added.) Id., citing Lee at 209.

In Ramey, the Ohio Supreme Court revisited Davis’s requirement

that “[w]hen a trial court exercises its discretion to continue the period for trial

beyond the statutory limit, the continuance is entered under the second clause of

subsection (H) and, therefore, the period of continuance must be reasonable.”

Ramey, 2012-Ohio-2904, ¶ 28, citing Davis at syllabus. The Ramey Court stated that it was once again “address[ing] trial courts’ imperfect handling of continuances

under R.C. 2945.72(H).” Ramey at ¶ 33. The Court admonished the trial court’s

failure to comply with State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 (1982), that requires “[w]hen

sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court must enter

the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the

expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to

trial.” Id. at ¶ 32, quoting Mincy at syllabus.

Nevertheless, the Court “recognized that an appellate court may

affirm a conviction challenged on speedy-trial grounds even if the trial court did not

expressly enumerate any reasons justifying the delay when the reasonableness of the

continuance is otherwise affirmatively demonstrated by the record.” Id., citing

McRae, 55 Ohio St.3d at 152. The Ramey Court stated that the appellate court,

however, did not undertake the “requisite inquiry . . . to determine whether the

setting of the trial date beyond the statutory time was reasonable.” Id. at ¶ 34. In

remanding the case to the appellate court for this review, the Court “reaffirm[ed] the

principle of law that the determination of reasonableness must be made on the

existing record.” Id., citing McRae at 153.

In this case, much like in Ramey, the trial court also did not comply

with Mincy’s requirement of setting forth any reasons why the trial was scheduled

beyond the speedy-trial time frame. Accordingly, applying the principles of Davis

and McRae, we find that the existing record does not demonstrate that scheduling

the bench trial 54 days from the date of the final pretrial was reasonable considering the nature of the cases. Both of these cases involved simple traffic infractions that

did not require any witnesses beyond the officer who issued the traffic citation.

Moreover, the City did not file any written opposition to Smith’s motion in the trial

court explaining the necessity for the lengthy delay nor does the City’s appellate brief

offer further explanation, other than both trials were scheduled for the same day.

Moreover, although timely requested by Smith, the trial court did not

issue any written findings when it denied Smith’s motion to dismiss. Granted that

may have occurred in open court and Smith has failed to provide this court with a

transcript of the proceedings, but the City has not given this court any indication

that any findings were made, which would support their position that setting the

trial beyond the statutory time frame was reasonable pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H).

Based on the foregoing and construing any ambiguity against the City,

we find that the trial court erred in denying Smith’s motion to dismiss filed in both

cases because the City violated his right to a speedy trial. The assignment of error

raised in both appeals is sustained.

Finding merit to this first assignment of error, his second assignment

of error raised in Appeal No. 115552, challenging the trial court’s issuance of a nunc

pro tunc journal entry, is rendered moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

Judgment reversed, and case remanded for the trial court to vacate

Smith’s convictions in both cases.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Berea

Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial

court to vacate defendant’s convictions.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)