Strong v. Zucker

District Court, W.D. New York·Decided March 28, 2022·No. 6:21-cv-06532·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ___________________________________________ MICHAEL CORRIN STRONG, DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff, 21-CV-6532L v. HOWARD ZUCKER, MD, in his Official Capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Defendant. ___________________________________________ Plaintiff Michael Corrin Strong, appearing pro se, brought this action against the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health (“DOH”), challenging certain actions taken by New York State (“State”) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.1 The State has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. #27.) Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to the motion. (Dkt. #30.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In his original complaint filed on August 10, 2021, plaintiff challenged a regulation issued by DOH in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 66-3. That regulation generally concerned the mandatory wearing of face masks in public. Plaintiff also challenged

1 Since the DOH Commissioner is sued in his official capacity, and DOH is an arm of the State, defendant will be referred to in this Decision and Order simply as “the State.” the State’s creation and promotion of the “Excelsior Pass,” a means for individuals to maintain an electronic record and show proof of their vaccination histories. Plaintiff asserted that those measures violated the equal protection rights of unvaccinated individuals, particularly those who (like plaintiff) claim to have so-called “natural immunity” as a result of their having previously

contracted and recovered from COVID. See Dkt. #1 at 4-6. On August 27, 2021, DOH repealed the challenged face-mask regulation. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint on October 14, 2021. (Dkt. #7.) Plaintiff stated that he “agrees to drop his objection” to the repealed “mask mandate,” id. ¶ 10, but he “reassert[ed] his complaint” concerning “the continued operation of the Excelsior Pass and other programs that continue to discriminate against the Unvaccinated,” id. The amended complaint requests declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the State to end the Excelsior Pass program, and to recognize “natural immunity” as being at least as efficacious as vaccination in preventing the spread of COVID-19. Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin

the State from enacting or enforcing any regulations or programs that draw a distinction, or that permit the Health Commissioner to draw a distinction, between vaccinated and unvaccinated persons.2 Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction (Dkt. #11) (“injunction motion”) on December 15, 2021. In that motion, plaintiff challenged a determination letter issued by the Health Commissioner on December 10, 2021,which generally required persons in New York to wear face masks in indoor public places,

2 For the sake of convenience, the amended complaint will referred to simply as “the complaint.” -2- with some exceptions. On January 27, 2022, the Court issued a Decision and Order denying the injunction motion. Strong v. Zucker, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2022 WL 245351 (“injunction decision”). The Court concluded that plaintiff had shown neither irreparable harm nor a likelihood of success on the merits, but added that a “full examination and assessment of plaintiff’s claims can

wait” until defendant responded to or moved against the complaint. 2022 WL 245351, at *6. Pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order (Dkt. #22), the State filed its motion to dismiss the complaint on February 14, 2022.3

DISCUSSION In its motion to dismiss, the State frames the complaint as asserting only a claim concerning the Excelsior Pass. In the State’s view, that claim is meritless, because the Excelsior Pass does not violate plaintiff’s rights.

In his response, plaintiff discusses the Excelsior Pass, but his arguments go well beyond that. He sees the complaint as opposing not just the Excelsior Pass, but what he believes to be the State’s “discrimination ... [and] persecut[ion] by reason of public bias and hostility in part created by prejudicial statements made by high State public officials,” against a “group [i.e., unvaccinated persons, which] is a political minority with no effective power to protect itself from the unjust and unconstitutional tyranny of the majority ... .” (Dkt. #30 ¶ 74.) Plaintiff has taken a similarly broad approach to the legal bases for his claims, relying on New York, federal

3 At this point, many COVID-related restrictions, directives and the like in New York have expired, been lifted, or are otherwise no longer in effect. The Excelsior Pass program remains in place, however, as does the grant of authority to the DOH Commissioner to issue future directives distinguishing between vaccinated and unvaccinated persons. -3- and international law, including the federal constitutional rights to equal protection, due process, and religious freedom. Regardless of the two sides’ very different characterizations of the complaint, it is for the Court to decide whether plaintiff has stated a facially valid claim, giving due regard for

plaintiff’s pro se status. See Sacerdote v. N.Y.U., 9 F.4th 95, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2021); Felton v. Monroe Comm. Coll., __ F.Supp.3d __, 2022 WL 71694, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2022). The Court’s task is to examine the complaint, interpreting it liberally to determine if it states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Crenshaw v. Dondrea, 278 F.Supp.3d 667, 670 (W.D.N.Y. 2017). In my view, plaintiff has failed to state a claim and, therefore, the complaint is dismissed. Although the complaint does mention the Excelsior Pass, it mostly comprises a diatribe against government COVID-19 policies in general. Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss is in the same vein, asserting that New York is headed toward a “medical tyranny” that could easily “turn into a totalitarian state.” (Dkt. #30 at 23.) As plaintiff sees it, the adoption of the

Excelsior Pass is merely a first step onto a slippery slope that will lead to more and more individual rights and freedoms being stripped away. See Dkt. #7 ¶ 97. A plaintiff’s antipathy toward government policies will not in itself give rise to a viable claim, however, no matter how fervent his beliefs in that regard. Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies.” As a consequence of that limitation, a party seeking to bring suit in federal court must allege facts showing that he has suffered an “injury in fact” caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct, that can be redressed by a decision favorable to the plaintiff. See E.M. v. New York City Dep’t of

Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 449-50 (2d Cir. 2014). -4- As stated, plaintiff’s most if not only specific claim is that relating to the Excelsior Pass. According to the State’s website, the “Excelsior Pass is a free, voluntary platform that provides secure, digital proof of COVID-19 vaccination or negative test results.” The Pass “can be accessed and stored through the NYS Excelsior Pass Wallet app, or through the Excelsior Pass

Web Portal and printed.”4 In the complaint, plaintiff does not allege that he was required to enroll in the Excelsior Pass program, or that he was prevented from enrolling in the program other than by virtue of the fact that he has never been vaccinated for COVID-19.

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