Strong v. Wright

1 Conn. 459
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJune 15, 1816
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 1 Conn. 459 (Strong v. Wright) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strong v. Wright, 1 Conn. 459 (Colo. 1816).

Opinions

Swift, Ch. J.

This is an action by the plaintiff, as treasurer of the town of Hebron, against the defendant, a collector of state taxes.

The civil authority and select-men gave the defendant a certificate to the state treasurer of the abatement of one eighth part of the tax of the town, taking his note for the whole sum under an agreement that he should pay such part as should not be abated to individuals ;—and this suit is brought to recover the sum not abated.

The defendant contends, that the whole eighth part ought to be applied to the abatement of the taxes of the indigent ;— that the town have no right to it ;—that the consideration of the contract is illegal, and the note void. The statute on this subject is, That on all warrants issued by the treasurer of the state, there shall be allowed to the several towns an abatement of one eighth part of the true list of said towns respectively, which eighth part the civil authority and select-men are empowered to apply for the relief of the indigent in the abatement of their particular rates, in whole or in part, in such way and manner as they shall judge most proper, just, and reasonable.” Tit. 135. c. 1. s. 18.

Prior to the passing of this statute the civil authority and select-men had a discretionary power to abate taxes due to the state from towns. The exercise of such a discretion by so many different tribunals produced so much inequality among the towns, and opened the door to such abuse, that the legislature found it necessary, by the present law, to limit the towns to a certain sum, and to render them responsible for the residue, whether collected or not. The expressions of the statute make an unconditional allowance of one eighth part to the town, and imply a relinquishment of all [461]*461claim, in any event, to any part of it. The civil authority and select-men are vested with a discretionary power to apply it to the relief of the indigent. If their taxes are sufficient to absorb the whole sum, it is the duty of the civil authority and select-men to make the application. But cases may occur where there are so few indigent persons that the taxes will not amount to an eighth part. The question is, what shall then be done ? The state can make no claim, for the allowance to the town is absolute. The law will not warrant the abatement of the taxes of the rich, or of those who are not indigent, and are able to pay them ; for it can be no relief to the indigent that the taxes of the rich should be abated ; and it would be unequal and unjust that the taxes of a part of those who are able to pay should be abated, and the rest compelled to pay. It never could have been the intention of the legislature to require the abatement of the taxes of those who were able to pay them. The probability is, that they supposed there would always be a sufficient number of indigent to require an application of an eighth part ; and therefore made no provision for a different event. Under these circumstances, there is nobody to claim this money but the town ; and it is perfectly reasonable and equitable that they should make such an arrangement as that in question to secure it to their benefit. It is opposed to no principle of law, justice or policy.

It is objected, that the certificate of abatement was false, and a fraud on the treasurer. But the law does not require such certificate to entitle the town to the allowance ; it does not require an actual abatement of one eighth part before the allowance is to be made by the treasurer. The certificate of abatement is a matter of form, prescribed by the treasury department. Whether correct or not, it operated no actual fraud ; for nothing was obtained but what the town was entitled to without any certificate.

But the most plausible objection is, that on this construction the civil authority and select-men will be enabled to encrease the funds of the town, and lessen their own taxes ; and of course, they will be under a strong temptation to oppress the poor. It will, however, be found in practice, that their individual interest will be too trifling to have any serious influence on their minds ; and that it might very properly be disregarded by the legislature when they made [462]*462the law. In this case, there is no pretence that there has been a refusal to abate the taxes of any indigent person. For aught that appears, the defendant has collected all the money, and is taking this mode to keep it. It is he that is attempting to practice a fraud.

I am of opinion that the consideration of the note is good, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.

In this opinion Trumbull, Smith, Baldwin, Goddard and Hosmer, Js. concurred.

Edmond, J.

The decision of the question in this case depends upon the construction that ought to be given to the 18th section of the act which provides for the collection and payment of taxes. Tit. 135. c. 1.

If the abatement of the one eighth part there mentioned, is a gift of so much money to the towns respectively, to be equally applied for the benefit of the inhabitants generally, and to be collected and distributed at the discretion of the civil authority and select-men, there can be very little, if any, doubt of their power to leave the rate unabated in the hands of the collector, and to take his note for the amount. But in my opinion such a construction is inadmissible. There is a deference due from the court to the legislature. In examining statutes it is proper to conclude the framers of them had some beneficial object in view ; and when the words used, or the location of them, is such as to admit of different constructions, that ought to be adopted, which, in its application, will be remedial, and especially where it will deliver the statute, from what must otherwise appear a palpable absurdity.

If the legislature intended by the provisions of this section a gift to the town, or in other words, to the inhabitants, then every individual in the town liable by law to the payment of taxes, whether rich or poor, has an interest in the gift proportioned to his list compared with the whole list of the town. Let us then examine the nature of this gift in this view of the subject, and what is it ?—The Assembly grant a tax of one eighth more than the public exigence demands, to be levied upon all the inhabitants of the state liable to the payment of taxes in proportion to their lists made out and returned according to law, and then, by a solemn act, give back as a gift this unnecessary eighth to the towns, or what [463]*463is the same thing in substance, to all those from whom it is ordered to be collected, to be disposed of as they may judge expedient. The extent of the gift then, is, the legislature levy a tax on the towns for their benefit, charge them with the amount, and then generously relinquish this claim, and leave the towns to do as they please with the money when collected. To show the absurdity of such a process no comment is necessary.

Let us then examine this section, and see whether it will not fairly admit of a construction widely different, more rational, and more useful in its application. In the laws which provide for and regulate the manner in which the general list shall be made out, a special regard to the poor and unfortunate constitutes a prominent feature.

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Related

In Re Jeremy J. S., (Mar. 10, 1992)
1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 2174 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
1 Conn. 459, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strong-v-wright-conn-1816.