Strong v. Brakeley

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedMay 5, 2015
DocketANDcv-13-144
StatusUnpublished

This text of Strong v. Brakeley (Strong v. Brakeley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strong v. Brakeley, (Me. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss CNILACTION AUBSC-CV-13-144

KEVIN F. STRONG,

Plaintiff ANDROSCOGGIN SUPERIOR COURT v. ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REBECCA M. BRAKELEY

and

JONATHAN M. BAUSMAN,

Defendants

Before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Kevin Strong's complaint alleges that defendants made false and

defamatory statements in response to questionnaires circulated by a company

working on behalf of Strong's potential employer. His complaint includes three

counts: (1) defamation, (2) tortious interference with a business relationship, and

(3) punitive damages. Defendants argue that they are absolutely immune from

suit under the Maine Health Security Act, 24 M.R.S. § 2511. For the following

reasons, defendants' motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Dr. Kevin Strong is a pediatric physician and previously worked at

Central Maine Medical Center ("CMMC") with defendants Drs. Rebecca

Brakeley and Jonathan Bausman, who are also pediatric physicians. (Pl.'s Add.

S.M.F. C)[C)[ 43-44.) In January 2013, CMMC exercised its option to terminate Dr.

Strong's contract for business reasons. (Pl.'s Add. S.M.F. C)[ 47.) During Dr.

Strong's subsequent job search, he used Dr. Brakeley as a reference, and she gave Dr. Strong a positive letter of recommendation. (Pl.'s Add. S.M.F.

May 2013, Dr. Strong accepted a position with a private pediatric practice in

Lewiston. (Pl.'s Add. S.M.F.

process for obtaining privileges at St. Mary's Regional Medical Center and

CMMC. (Pl.'s Add. S.M.F.

Before Dr. Strong started working, he received a letter from an attorney at

CMMC threatening legal action against him if he pursued private practice in

Lewiston because of a non-compete clause in his former employment contract

with CMMC. (Pl.'s Add. S.M.F.

notified by St. Mary's that it had concerns about two references that were

received through an independent contractor that St. Mary's uses to obtain

information required to process applications for staff privileges. (Pl.'s Add.

S.M.F.

organization, which collects, verifies, and dispenses physician credentialing

information" to its customers, which include hospitals. (Def.'s Supp. S.M.F.

St. Mary's contracted with Synernet to collect credentialing information, and

Synernet collected information on Dr. Strong when he applied for staff privileges

at St. Mary's. (Def.'s Supp. S.M.F.

In July 2013, Synernet sent Drs. Brakeley and Bausman "Professional

Reference Questionnaires" as part of its effort to collect credentialing information

about Dr. Strong. 1 (Def.'s Supp. S.M.F.

were sent "to request your assistance in providing information which will assist

1 Plaintiff notes that Drs. Brakeley and Bausman were not aware that the questionnaires would be used in connection with Dr. Strong's application for staffing privileges at St. Mary's. (Pl.'s Opp. S.M.F.9[9.)

2 medical staff leaders involved in making credentialing and privileging

recommendations .... " (Pl.'s Add. S.M.F. '1I 20.) Drs. Brakeley and Bausman

filled out the questionnaires and returned them to Synernet. (Def.'s Supp. S.M.F.

'11:'11: 10-11.) Synernet then forwarded them to St. Mary's. (Def.'s Supp. S.M.F. '1I

12.)

Dr. Strong obtained copies of the two references and was shocked to

discover that they were from Drs. Brakeley and Bausman. (Pl.'s Add. S.M.F. '1I

57.) The references included allegations that Dr. Strong had poor basic medical

and clinical knowledge, had poor availability and thoroughness of patient care,

had poor relationships with physicians and other professional staff, had poor

communication with patients and families, and had been the subject of

disciplinary action. (Pl.'s Add. S.M.F. '11:'11: 58, 60, 62-63.) Dr. Strong was eventually

able to obtain privileges at St. Mary's but only after expending additional time,

effort, and expense to correct the false statements provided in the questionnaires.

(Pl.'s Add. S.M.F. '1I 67.)

Dr. Strong filed his complaint on October 15, 2013, which he amended on

October 31, 2013. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court denied

on December 17, 2013. The court limited discovery to issues related to whether

the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for their responses to the

reference questionnaires under 24 M.R.S. § 2511. On December 22, 2014,

defendants moved for summary judgment. The sole issue before the court is

whether 24 M.R.S. § 2511 provides immunity to Drs. Brakeley and Bausman for

their responses to the Synernet questionnaires.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

3 "Summary judgment is appropriate if the record reflects that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law." Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2014 ME 8,

(quoting F.R. Carroll, Inc. v. TD Bank, N.A., 2010 ME 115,

material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and there is a genuine

issue when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between

competing versions of the fact." Mcilroy v. Gibson's Apple Orchard, 2012 ME 59,

7, 43 A.3d 948 (quoting N. E. Ins. Co. v. Young, 2011 ME 89,

"Even when one party's version of the facts appears more credible and

persuasive to the court, any genuine factual dispute must be resolved through

fact-finding, regardless of the nonmoving party's likelihood of success." Lewis v.

Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 34,

but nevertheless capable of supporting conflicting, plausible inferences, "the

choice between those inferences is not for the court on summary judgment." Id.

2. Immunity Under 24 M.R.S. § 2511

a. Absolute vs. Conditional Privilege

Defendants argue that the basis for Dr. Strong's complaint, defendants'

responses to the reference questionnaires are absolutely privileged, and they are

therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under 24 M.R.S. § 2511:

Any person acting without malice, any physician, podiatrist, health care provider, health care entity or professional society, any member of a professional competence committee or professional review committee, any board or appropriate authority and any entity required to report under this chapter are immune from civil liability ....

The Law Court has applied this section, but found it unnecessary "to express an

opinion whether the immunity provided by section 2511 is absolute or

4 conditioned on the reporter acting without malice .... " McCullough v. Visiting

Nurse Serv. of S. Me., Inc., 1997 ME 55,

of the statute explicitly acknowledges that physicians can receive absolute or

"blanket" immunity under the Act. The following explains the old law and how

it was changed in 1988:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

McCullough v. Visiting Nurse Service of Southern Maine, Inc.
1997 ME 55 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
McIlroy v. Gibson's Apple Orchard
2012 ME 59 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2012)
F.R. Carroll, Inc. v. TD Bank, N.A.
2010 ME 115 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2010)
Estate of Michael Lewis v. Concord General Mutual Insurance Company
2014 ME 34 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2014)
Nicole Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC
2014 ME 8 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2014)
North East Insurance v. Young
2011 ME 89 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2011)

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Strong v. Brakeley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strong-v-brakeley-mesuperct-2015.