Strong v. American States Preferred Insurance Co.
This text of 66 S.W.3d 104 (Strong v. American States Preferred Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
American States Preferred Insurance Company (“Insurer”) appeals the denial of its motion to set aside a default judgment entered against it in favor of Kenneth T. Strong (“Insured”). Insurer asserts in its points on appeal that the trial court erroneously denied its motion to set aside the default judgment because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Insurer for two reasons. First, Insurer claims the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because of Insurer’s proof that it did not receive service of process and therefore had no notice of the claim prior to entry of the default judgment. Second, Insurer asserts the trial court’s entry of the default judgment failed to comply with the requirements of section 375.271 RSMo 2000 1 for default judgments against insurance companies because the Missouri Department of Insurance did not forward the summons and petition to Insurer by registered or certified mail with return receipt [106]*106requested pursuant to section 375.261. We affirm the trial court’s refusal to set aside the default judgment.
Insurer issued an automobile insurance policy to Insured that covered two cars, both of which were reported missing sometime between October 13 and October 20, 1998. Approximately two months later, Insured filed a claim with Insurer on the policy, and Insurer denied coverage. Insured stated that the cars had been stolen, but Insurer believed its investigation proved otherwise and refused to pay the claim.
Insured filed petition for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay an insurance claim on August 5, 1999, and requested that notice of the suit be served on the Director of the Missouri Department of Insurance (“Director”), which occurred August 18. Director then mailed the notice to Insurer on August 19, in accordance with section 375.906. No response was received from Insurer, and Insured subsequently moved for a default judgment, which was entered on December 17.
Insured’s attorney first contacted Insurer on December 20, 2000, after more than a year had passed since entry of the default judgment, inquiring as to when Insurer intended to pay. Insurer shortly thereafter moved to set aside the default judgment on the grounds it had never received notice of the suit. Insurer proffered affidavits from two of its employees that the notice forwarded by Director had never been received.
The trial court denied the motion to set aside the default judgment, and Insurer appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter the default judgment for two reasons. In its first point on appeal, Insurer contends it proved by uncontroverted testimony that it never received service of process or other notice of the claim.
The determination of personal jurisdiction is a question of law. Grooms v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 32 S.W.3d 618, 620-21 (Mo.App.2000). Therefore, in evaluating whether Insurer received valid service of process, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. Id.
Service of process must conform to the manner and form established by law to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Moore v. Christian Fid. Life Ins. Co., 687 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Mo.App.1984). Statutes mandate the requirements for process and service, and when the procedures are not followed, a court lacks power to adjudicate. Id. We must therefore look first to the applicable statutes to determine whether the requisites for effective service of process were met.
Section 375.9062 establishes requirements for service on foreign insurance [107]*107companies doing business within the state. Insurer is such a company. Before these foreign insurance companies can conduct business in Missouri, they must execute in writing an irrevocable power of attorney authorizing Director to acknowledge or receive service of process on their behalf in any action. Id. This power of attorney must include an insurer’s consent “that service upon the director shall be deemed personal service upon the company.” Id. If a company does not execute the requisite power of attorney, it forfeits the right to do business in the state. Section 375.906.4.
Section 375.906.5 requires Director to forward the process immediately “by first class mail prepaid and directed to the secretary of the company.” It also requires Director to keep a permanent record of all process served, including the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ names, the court issuing the summons, and when and by whom the service was accomplished. Id.
Insurer contends it presented un-controverted evidence that it did not receive notice. Director, however, filed an affidavit that the notice was mailed to Insurer “by first class mail prepaid as provided by section 375.906.5.”
When deciding to conduct business in Missouri, Insurer, as a foreign company, consented that service upon Director constituted personal service upon itself. Sections 375.906.1, 375.256. In effect, Insured authorized Director to receive process on its behalf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 766 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Mo.App.1989). “For purposes of service of process, this appointment of the [Director] is the functional equivalent of designating a registered agent.” Id.
There is no dispute that Director received and acknowledged service of process on Insurer’s behalf in this case, and that Director forwarded it to Insurer as required by section 375.906.5. Cf. Grooms, 32 S.W.3d at 621 (reversing trial court’s refusal to set aside default judgment where the director undeniably returned the summons and petition to the insured and failed to forward them to the insurer). Insurer claims that it did not receive the service of process from Director. The statute, however, merely requires that Insurer’s de facto agent, Director, receive process and mail it to Insurer, to which Director attested having done. See section 375.906. As the requirements of section 375.906 have been met, Insurer’s first point is denied.
In its second point, Insurer contends that Director was required to send the service by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, in accordance with section 375.261.3 Other methods of [108]*108service may have adequately conferred personal jurisdiction over Insurer on these facts. See section 375.2764 and Rule 54.18.5 Insured’s service on Director nonetheless was in compliance with section 375.906 and sufficed to confirm personal jurisdiction on Insurer as a foreign company.
Insurer claims that section 375.271,6 which establishes criteria for a plaintiff to receive a default judgment against an insurance company, requires that Insured comply with the service of process procedures outlined in section 375.261 before it can attain a default judgment against Insurer.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
66 S.W.3d 104, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 2058, 2001 WL 1464427, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strong-v-american-states-preferred-insurance-co-moctapp-2001.