Strojnik v. Ogle

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 5, 2021
• Docket: 3:20-cv-08194
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Peter Strojnik, No. CV-20-08194-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Nancy Ogle, et al.,

13 Defendants.

14 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Peter Strojnik’s Motion for Partial Summary 15 Judgment. (Doc. 22). Because the Court concludes that Strojnik lacks standing to proceed 16 in this Court, the Court will sua sponte remand the case to the Navajo County Superior 17 Court for further proceedings. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Strojnik visits hotels and their websites to ensure they meet the dictates of the 20 Americans with Disabilities Act. (Doc. 1-1 at 3; Doc. 22 at 1). When Strojnik believes they 21 fall short, he takes legal action, often filing complaints written in general terms that are 22 routinely dismissed for failing to sufficiently allege Article III standing. See Strojnik v. 23 Driftwood Hosp. Mgmt. LLC, No. CV-20-00343-PHX-DJH, 2021 WL 50456, at *5 (D. 24 Ariz. Jan. 6, 2021) (collecting cases); see also id. at *7 (“The Court will take judicial notice 25 of the fact that Mr. Strojnik has filed thousands [of] ADA lawsuits across the western 26 United States.”). 27 Because of his litigation conduct, a Judge of this Court has ruled that Strojnik is a 28 vexatious litigant who “harasses and coerces parties into agreeing to extortive settlements.” 1 Id. at *10. Judges in the District Courts for the Northern and Central Districts of California 2 have reached similar conclusions. See Strojnik v. IA Lodging Napa First LLC, No. 19-CV- 3 03983-DMR, 2020 WL 2838814, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2020) (granting a motion 4 to declare Strojnik a vexatious litigant and noting that “Strojnik’s pleading practices waste 5 the resources of the court and impose unjustified costs on parties who are forced to defend 6 loosely pleaded complaints that do not allege specific facts about their misconduct.” 7 (internal quotation and alteration omitted)); Strojnik v. SCG Am. Constr. Inc., No. 8 SACV 19-1560 JVS (JDE), 2020 WL 4258814, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2020) (granting 9 a motion to declare Strojnik a vexatious litigant and noting that “Strojnik’s history contains 10 countless filings of frivolous complaints and instances of directly ignoring court orders.”). 11 This particular case involves a visit Strojnik made to Buck Springs Resort in 12 Pinetop, Arizona on or about May 23, 2020. (Doc. 1-1 at 2, 12). On June 18, 2020, Strojnik 13 filed a three-count complaint in the Navajo County Superior Court alleging: (1) violations 14 of the ADA, (2) negligence, and (3) failure to disclose. (Id. at 2). Defendants timely 15 removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction over the ADA claim 16 and supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. (Doc. 1 at 2). 17 Having considered the filings, the Court concludes that this case presents more of 18 the same. Strojnik fails to sufficiently allege Article III standing, and a remand to Superior 19 Court is appropriate. 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 Our Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . 22 [and] Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “[T]o invoke the jurisdiction of the 23 federal courts, a disabled individual claiming discrimination must satisfy the case or 24 controversy requirement of Article III by demonstrating his standing to sue at each stage 25 of the litigation.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). 26 The doctrine of standing requires a party to “prove that he has suffered a concrete 27 and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely to 28 be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 498 (2020) 1 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013)). “A ‘concrete’ injury must be 2 ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 3 (2016). “For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and 4 individual way.’” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)). 5 As relevant here, “an ADA plaintiff can establish standing to sue for injunctive relief 6 . . . by demonstrating deterrence.”1 Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944. Under this “deterrent effect 7 doctrine,” “a disabled individual who is currently deterred from patronizing a public 8 accommodation due to a defendant’s failure to comply with the ADA has suffered ‘actual 9 injury.’” Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002); see 10 also Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Properties Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1098–99 (9th 11 Cir. 2017); Chapman, 631 F.3d at 949–50; Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1040– 12 41 (9th Cir. 2008). But the mere existence of an ADA violation does not give any disabled 13 person standing to sue; a plaintiff “lacks standing . . . if the barriers he seeks to enjoin do 14 not pose a real and immediate threat to him due to his particular disability.” Chapman, 631 15 F.3d at 953 (emphasis added). 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 a. Physical Barriers 18 Strojnik’s complaint alleges that several physical features of the Hotel violate the 19 ADA’s requirements. The complaint also lists Strojnik’s various disabilities and alleges 20 that he is “deterred from visiting the Hotel based on [his] knowledge that the Hotel is not 21 ADA compliant as such compliance relates to [his] disability.” (Doc. 1-1 at 3). But Strojnik 22 does not make any effort to actually relate his conclusory assertion of deterrence to his 23 particular disabilities. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953. 24 As noted in other cases from this Court, Strojnik’s modus operandi is “to use the 25 same boilerplate arguments used in his previous filings [and] insert[] new photos of alleged 26 non-compliance . . . .” See Strojnik v. B&L Motels Inc., No. CV-20-08306-PHX-SPL, 2020

27 1 An ADA plaintiff may also establish standing by “demonstrating injury-in-fact coupled with an intent to return to a noncompliant facility.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944. Strojnik, 28 however, does not allege that he suffered an injury-in-fact, so the Court focuses its analysis on the deterrent effect doctrine. 1 WL 7350897, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2020); Strojnik v. Lonesome Valley Hosp. LLC, No. 2 CV-20-08276-PHX-SPL, 2020 WL 7041347, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2020). In this case, 3 the complaint includes several unclear, dark, and grainy photos of the Hotel that are 4 captioned with vague and conclusory language. (Doc. 1-1 at 10–12). According to the 5 captions, the photos show that there was “[n]o accessible parking anywhere,” an 6 “[i]naccessible route to the office,” and “inaccessible handrails on [an] inaccessible route.” 7 (Id.). 8 Rather than providing any concrete and meaningful statements relating the photos 9 and captions to his disabilities, however, Strojnik alleges that these “conditions constitute 10 a violation of the ADA and deprived [him] of full and equal access and enjoyment of the 11 Hotel.” (Id. at 12). But Strojnik must allege “more than labels and conclusions.” See Bell 12 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It is Strojnik’s responsibility to “connect 13 the metaphorical dots of injury-in-fact,” and he has failed to do so. See Strojnik v. HPTRI 14 Corp., No. CV-20-01868-PHX-SPL, 2020 WL 6827765, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2020). 15 Strojnik’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment contains clearer pictures and 16 captions composed of more words, but it is equally devoid of meaning. (See Doc. 22 at 2– 17 3). For example, the caption under the photo of the Hotel’s front office states: 18 The manner in which the barriers denied Plaintiff full and equal use or access, and which deter Plaintiff from visiting 19 the Hotel: Barrier denied Plaintiff full and equal access by failing to level accessible route and a ramp to the entry. The 20 lack of accessible route prevents Plaintiff from reaching the stairs, and the stairs prevent Plaintiff from reaching the office. 21 22 (Id. at 3). Although this statement includes a conclusory assertion that a barrier prevents 23 Strojnik from accessing the office, the statement does nothing to connect the alleged lack 24 of accommodations to Strojnik’s alleged disability. Presumably, the lack of a ramp would 25 prevent someone who requires a wheelchair to ambulate from reaching the office entrance. 26 Strojnik, however, only alleges that he requires the use of a wheelchair when his 27 impairments are in an “unmitigated, active state.” (Doc. 1-1 at 6). But Strojnik does not 28 indicate whether or how often this occurs or whether he required a wheelchair on the day 1 he visited the Hotel. (Doc. 1-1 at 6). 2 The Court acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit has recently reiterated that the 3 standard for alleging standing under the ADA is not particularly demanding. See Whitaker 4 v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2021). But it demands more than what 5 Strojnik alleged here. 6 Whitaker involved a plaintiff who was “a quadriplegic who use[d] a wheelchair for 7 mobility.” Id. at 1074. The Court noted that “Whitaker’s complaint allege[d] that he use[d] 8 a wheelchair for mobility, that he visited the defendant’s premises, that he personally 9 encountered a barrier related to his disability—inaccessible service counters—and that the 10 barrier deters him from returning.” Id. at 1079. The Court held that “[t]hese allegations are 11 sufficient to establish injury-in-fact for purposes of standing.” Id. 12 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Chapman, where the plaintiff 13 “attached an accessibility survey to his complaint that identified multiple ADA barriers 14 that he claimed ‘denied him access to the [s]tore [at issue], or which he [sought] to remove 15 on behalf of others under related state statutes.’” Id. (quoting Chapman, 631 F.3d at 954). 16 The Whitaker Court noted that the plaintiff in Chapman did not sufficiently allege standing 17 because the “survey did not connect the barriers to Chapman’s disability or indicate which 18 barrier or barriers he had personally encountered.” Id. 19 The Court finds this case more analogous to Chapman than Whitaker. Strojnik’s 20 complaint simply alleges that his various disabilities “affect” certain body systems and 21 “limit” major life activities without describing what those effects or limitations are. (Doc. 22 1-1 at 4). Absent any meaningful relation between the alleged ADA violations and his 23 disabilities, Strojnik’s complaint is no more than a slightly-dressed-up survey of 24 Defendants’ alleged ADA violations. Accordingly, Strojnik has failed to allege Article III 25 standing as it relates to the physical barriers at the Hotel. 26 b. The Website 27 Turning next to Defendants’ website, Strojnik’s complaint states that Defendants’ 28 website does not provide accessibility information. (Doc. 1-1 at 10). Strojnik alleges that 1 the website “fail[s] to identify and describe accessible features and guest rooms offered 2 through its reservations service in sufficient detail to permit [him] to assess independently 3 whether Defendant’s Hotel or guest room meet [his] accessibility needs.” (Id.). But this 4 allegation “merely parrots the cited regulation and does not identify what accessibility 5 features Mr. Strojnik claims are required to accommodate his disability, or state that those 6 specific features were not described on the website[].” See Strojnik v. R.F. Weichert V, Inc., 7 No. 20-CV-00354-VKD, 2021 WL 242912, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) (collecting 8 cases in which “[s]imilarly vague and conclusory allegations have been found insufficient 9 to support Mr. Strojnik’s standing”). Accordingly, Strojnik has failed to allege Article III 10 standing as it relates to the website. 11 c. Remand 12 Having concluded that the Court does not have jurisdiction over Strojnik’s ADA 13 claim, the Court will remand the case to the Navajo County Superior Court. Strojnik lacks 14 standing to proceed in this Court, and this Court consequently has no authority to retain 15 jurisdiction over his state law claims. See Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 16 646, 664 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). Further, the Court finds that granting 17 Strojnik leave to amend the complaint would be futile. See B&L Motels Inc., 2020 WL 18 7350897, at *4 n.2 (“Given Strojnik’s failure to cure almost identical standing defects in 19 prior complaints, despite numerous opportunities to do so, the Court can only conclude that 20 amendment would be futile.”). 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, 23 IT IS ORDERED that Clerk of Court shall remand this case to the Navajo County 24 Superior Court and terminate the case. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon remand, Strojnik’s Motion for Partial || Summary Judgment (Doc. 22) shall remain pending before the Superior Court. 3 Dated this 5th day of April, 2021. 4 S ' ° James A, CO 7 Senior United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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