Strojnik v. Driftwood Hospitality Management LLC

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided December 16, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-01532·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Peter Strojnik, No. CV-20-01532-PHX-DJH

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

Driftwood Hospitality Management LLC, et al., Defendants. Pending before the Court in this consolidated action is Defendants Xenia Hotels and Resorts, Inc.; XHR Phoenix Palms, LLC; and XHR Scottsdale Ranch, LLC’s (collectively “Xenia”) Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 79). The Motion seeks a total of $247,404.00 in attorney fees and $970.78 in costs. Pro se Plaintiff has not filed a response directly to the Motion. Instead, Plaintiff filed a Renewed Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery (Doc. 82) on how Xenia came to this amount.1 For the following reasons, the Court grants Xenia’s Motion in part. I. Background Previously, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Xenia and declared Plaintiff a vexatious litigant for his frivolous and harassing litigation tactics. (Doc. 49 at 17). Because Plaintiff’s original Complaint alleged Xenia violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Xenia sought to impose a mandatory sanction against Plaintiff for frivolous conduct under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1 Plaintiff’s Motion was granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 92). (“PSLRA”) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). (Doc. 56 at 2). Because the standard PSLRA sanction is attorney fees, the Court Ordered Plaintiff “to show cause why the Court should not impose sanctions above an award of attorney fees and costs, which the Court already finds Defendants are entitled to.” (Doc. 77 at 7). In response, Plaintiff represents he “has unsuccessfully searched his memory to determine what actions on his part would merit sanctions.” (Doc. 78 at 2). He also argues this Court and others in the District of Arizona have breached the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. (Id.) Xenia then filed its Motion for Attorney Fees, in response to which Plaintiff filed an original Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery (Doc. 80). This Motion was denied for lacking a certification that Plaintiff had conferred with Xenia as required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(j). In his renewed Motion, Plaintiff represents that Xenia’s counsel “declined to engage.” (Doc. 82 at 1). Noting deficiencies in Xenia’s Motion, the Court ordered Xenia to supplement its Motion for Attorney Fees for failing to comply with the Local Rules. Specifically, Xenia did not provide a copy of a written fee agreement, nor did it explain how its requested fees were reasonable. (Doc. 83 at 2) (citing LRCiv 54.2(c)(3), (d)(2)). Xenia supplemented its Motion as ordered. (See Docs. 84; 90). Subsequently, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery in part and ordered Xenia to supplement its Motion by providing a statement of the amount it has actually paid its attorneys, as required by the Local Rules. (Doc. 92 at 2) (citing LRCiv 54.2(d)(4)(b)). Xenia then filed a supplement representing that as of August 11, 2021, it had paid its attorneys $248,374.78. (Doc. 93 at 2). This figure, Xenia represents, does not include the fees or costs Xenia has incurred litigating Plaintiff’s appeal. (Id.) The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff should be sanctioned under the PSLRA for an amount that is greater than Xenia’s attorney fees. II. Presumed Award of Attorney Fees The PSLRA requires the Court to review the record and find whether any party has violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1). The Court has already done so and found “that Plaintiff has harassed Defendants and needlessly increased the cost of litigation.” (Doc. 77 at 7). For substantial failures to comply with Rule 11(b), the presumed award under the PSLRA is an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred in the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(3)(A). Plaintiff’s defense, that he does not remember any violations of Rule 11(b), fails to rebut this presumption, and fails to show why an award in excess of reasonable attorney fees should not be granted. (Doc. 78 at 2). Rule 11(b) requires that sanctions be limited to only that which deters a party from repeating the sanctionable conduct. The Court, in crafting its Order that declared Plaintiff a vexatious litigant, was also tasked with crafting narrowly tailored order so as to prevent Plaintiff’s vexatious behavior. (Doc. 49 at 18). It may be debated whether its efforts were successful. Xenia notes that after the Court’s previous Order awarding Defendant New Crescent Investments, LLC (“New Crescent”) attorney fees, Plaintiff filed suit in Maricopa County Court arguing that New Crescent “abused process” by removing the action to federal court and obtaining an Order declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. (Doc. 79-3) (containing a copy of the order granting New Crescent’s motion to dismiss in Strojnik v. Leavitt, CV 2020-06297 (May 11, 2021)). That action was dismissed, and the court found that New Crescent was entitled to another award of attorney fees because the complaint “was brought without substantial justification . . . .” (Id. at 5). As will be discussed below, Xenia’s requested award is significantly higher than other awards granted against Mr. Strojnik, and the Court will consider Plaintiff’s history as a vexatious litigant and the surrounding circumstances of Xenia’s Motion to determine what constitutes a reasonable award of attorney fees. However, because the requested fees are so great, the Court sees no reason to impose additional sanctions beyond an award of attorney fees and costs under Rule 11(b). III. Reasonable Attorney Fees Xenia seeks $247,404.00 in attorney fees. This amount, if granted, would be divided between two firms that represented Xenia in this matter, “$110,068.00 to go to Buchalter, a Professional Corporation [‘Buchalter’], and $137,336.00 to go to Latham & Watkins, LLP [‘Latham’].” (Doc. 79 at 4). To receive an award of fees, a party must show that it is eligible and entitled to an award, and that the requested award is reasonable. LRCiv 54.2(c). The Court has already found Xenia is eligible and entitled to an award of fees. (Doc. 77 at 6). Therefore, the question is whether Xenia’s request of $247,404.00 in attorney fees is reasonable. To determine whether an award is reasonable, the Court then uses the lodestar method by multiplying “the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). Reasonableness is assessed with the following factors: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); see also LRCiv 54.2(c)(3). The Court proceeds to evaluate each of the Kerr factors in turn. a. Evaluation of

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Strojnik v. Driftwood Hospitality Management LLC, (D. Ariz. 2021).

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