Strohm v. United States

23 F. Cas. 240

• Court: U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland
• Decided: April 15, 1840
• Status: Published

Opinion

TANEY, Circuit Justice,

said, that upon the two first points above stated, it was very clear that the Anne was built for the slave-trade, and that Strohm & Co. knew it, and he then entered into a particular examination of the testimony, to show that it established the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

In relation to the 3d point, he said, it was true, that the vessel was built, fitted out and equipped by Strohm & Co. as factors, and not by De Sylva himself as owner, nor by the two men, as masters, who superintended the building. The contracts were made with Strohm & Co., and the bills and expenses paid by them, as factors for De Syl-va, and the schooner must therefore be regarded as built, fitted out and equipped by them, as factors, in the sense in which these words are used in the act of congress. But as the court was satisfied, upon the evidence, that Strohm & Co. knew the vessel was intended to the slave-trade, and built her for that purpose, she was liable to forfeiture, even upon the construction of the act of congress contended for by appellant.

The court were, however, of opinion that, if Strohm & Co. had been ignorant of the purpose for which De Sylva procured the schooner to be built, it would make no difference. If the guilty purpose was entertained by the owner, for whom the vessel was built or equipped, it is immaterial whether the person who builds her or equips her, as factor or master, was apprised of it or not. Upon any other construction the law would be nugatory; for it would be very easy for the foreign owner who, through a factor or a master, procured a vessel to be built or equipped for the slave-trade, in a port of the United States, to conceal from them any positive knowledge of the uses for which the vessel was intended. In general, the purpose of employing the vessel in the slave-trade, can exist only in the mind of the owner, for he has the power to control her movements; and if he procured her to be built or equipped for such a purpose, she is liable to forfeiture, although the factor or master, through whom the work was done, knew nothing of her destination. In order to work a forfeiture, a criminal intent must exist in the mind of the party who is lawfully entitled to direct the employment of the vessel; this the owner may always do; but if he places her under the control of a factor or master, who builds or equips her with that unlawful intention. having at the time authority from the owner to direct the employment of the vessel, the offence described by the law is committed, and the vessel is liable to the penalty. And inasmuch as the factor or master obtains his authority over the vessel from the owner, she is, in their hands, responsible as fully for any violation of law, as if the owner were present and directed it. Indeed, it might well happen, when the owner resided in a foreign country, that the unlawful purpose of the master or factor could be abundantly proved, while it would be impossible to offer any evidence of the knowledge of the owner.

The fair, construction of the act of congress is this: that where the criminal purpose is proved to exist in the owner, or in the factor or master, who has the direction of the vessel at the time she is built or fitted out, the forfeiture attaches; and if the owner entertained the purpose, or the factor, or the master, having'at the time the control and direction of the vessel, the purpose of either one of the three being proved, as above-mentioned, it is not necessary to bring borne tbe knowledge or purpose to either of the other two; the purpose of either one of them, as above stated, would subject the vessel to forfeiture. Here, however, it is clearly established by the evidence, that the owner, the factor and the master, all had a perfect knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the Anne was built and fitted out:, and in either view, therefore, of the construction of the act of congress, she must be condemned.

The decree of the district court is, therefore, affirmed with costs.