Strohbar v. Dwinnell

Fifth Circuit

Strohbar v. Dwinnell

29 F.2d 915, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2876

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 7, 1929

DocketNo. 5421

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 29 F.2d 915 (Strohbar v. Dwinnell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Strohbar v. Dwinnell, 29 F.2d 915, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2876 (5th Cir. 1929).

Pincite

Opinion

FOSTER, Circuit Judge.

On August 25, 1927, appellant, the bankrupt, applied for his discharge. The court fixed October 4, 1927, as the return day for the filing1 of oppositions. On September 29th, appellee, the trustee, filed specifications of opposition to the discharge, phder a standing rule of court, the ease was referred to the referee for a hearing. Under the said rule the trustee had 30 days to take his testimony, but did not do so. On June 26, 1928, appellant moved to strike the opposition and for a discharge. The court denied the motion and granted appellee 20 days’ additional time in which to take his evidence. From that order this appeal is prosecuted.

It is evident that the rule fixing the time in which the parties are to take their evidence is merely directory, and it was within the province of the District Court to so construe it. Furthermore, it is fundamental that federal courts, in common with other courts, have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice, within the scope of their jurisdiction. 7 R. C. L. par. 62. “It is always in the power of the court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it.” U. S. v. Breitling, 20 How. 252, 15 L. Ed. 900. The reason for the delay in taking evidence is not shown, but we must assume'that it was sufficient to justify the court in granting the extension, in the exercise of sound discretion.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

FOSTER, Circuit Judge.

On August 25, 1927, appellant, the bankrupt, applied for his discharge. The court fixed October 4, 1927, as the return day for the filing1 of oppositions. On September 29th, appellee, the trustee, filed specifications of opposition to the discharge, phder a standing rule of court, the ease was referred to the referee for a hearing. Under the said rule the trustee had 30 days to take his testimony, but did not do so. On June 26, 1928, appellant moved to strike the opposition and for a discharge. The court denied the motion and granted appellee 20 days’ additional time in which to take his evidence. From that order this appeal is prosecuted.

It is evident that the rule fixing the time in which the parties are to take their evidence is merely directory, and it was within the province of the District Court to so construe it. Furthermore, it is fundamental that federal courts, in common with other courts, have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice, within the scope of their jurisdiction. 7 R. C. L. par. 62. “It is always in the power of the court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it.” U. S. v. Breitling, 20 How. 252, 15 L. Ed. 900. The reason for the delay in taking evidence is not shown, but we must assume'that it was sufficient to justify the court in granting the extension, in the exercise of sound discretion.

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

29 F.2d 915, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strohbar-v-dwinnell-ca5-1929.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack